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Martin Wolf

Mercredi 20 juillet 2005




Tough liberalism is the only response



By Martin Wolf



Human beings must co-operate intensely with strangers. They are also intensely suspicious of those different from themselves. The reconciliation between these two aspects of ourselves is the greatest challenge of our age.Consider the following characteristics of our world: technology has reduced the costs of transport and communications to an unprecedentedly low level; the world economy has become more integrated than ever before; ideas can be disseminated with ease; we live within some 200 states with vastly different capacities; huge gaps have emerged between average living standards in the poorest and richest countries; economic failure and success generate huge social pressures in poorer countries; powerful incentives attract people to migrate from poor to richer countries; and, finally, values, beliefs and identities remain hugely diverse. In short, we live cheek by jowl, but are deeply divided. Moreover, historical methods of managing conflicts among strangers are also now unworkable.


The experience of the US in Iraq demonstrates, for example, that empires do not work. Without some legitimacy, only a ruthless despotism can retain an empire. The US lacks the legitimacy and, happily, the ruthlessness. As inconceivable as a world empire is a universal religion. Today’s world possesses a hodge podge of faiths and non-faiths. States now rest on single religions (as in Iran or Saudi Arabia), civic creeds (as in the US), national identities (as in Japan), procedural values (as in Switzerland) or on no shared identity (as in much of sub-Saharan Africa).


Our world is one of interdependence. In the absence of co-operation, we have the capacity to impoverish ourselves, if not destroy ourselves altogether. But our world is also one of hostility. Those hostilities are, moreover, not only between states, but within them as well.
As Robert Leiken notes in the latest Foreign Affairs, “Europe now plays host to often disconsolate Muslim offspring, who are its citizens in name, but not culturally or socially.


Yet that is just a small part of what is happening in our world. Nationalism is also on the rise. China and Japan are, for example, increasingly economically interdependent and politically estranged, just as happened with the great European powers prior to 1914. Comparable tensions can be seen emerging in the relationship between China and the US. In these cases, too, the tribalism shows itself in cycles of grievance and suspicion.


It is far easier to enumerate the challenges than find the solutions. But a tough-minded liberalism, in its European more than American sense, is the only answer. That was the solution proposed by the founders of the multilateral world order after the second world war. It remains the best solution today. We must agree, within reason, to differ. In essence, this means that we agree more on procedural norms than on substantive ones. Moreover, we enshrine those procedural norms within institutions.


This means multilateralism. The only alternatives are empires or the balance of power. Neither is a workable basis for international order in so interdependent and dangerous a world. The former is impossible at the global level. The latter is inherently unstable. International order can only be built on co-operation among the larger powers within a system of principles and rules that all share in making and to which all are committed. The attachment of the Bush administration to unilateralism is a huge strategic blunder. It leaves the US shorn of legitimacy, bereft of allies and desperately trying to impose order by force. This strategy is failing, as it was bound to do.


This also means addressing grievances. How countries deal with supposedly internal matters, such as the Chechen conflict, are matters of global concern, because they have global consequences. The same, self-evidently, is true of relations between Israelis and Palestinians or India and Pakistan.
Again, this means helping states to work better and promoting development within them. We cannot live safely in a world in which non-state actors operate freely with access to lethal technologies. We need to ensure that all states are able to control their territory. This is why it is right to intervene powerfully where states collapse and to promote economic development, which is not only good in itself, but provides the foundation of greater political stability in the long run.
This means, above all, finding a modus vivendi between different beliefs and values in the world as a whole and within countries.

 
At the global level this is easier than within countries, since the demands of tolerance and co-operation are so much greater when people live side by side. Multiculturalism always has limits. But the limits are particularly obvious within a state if one group believes legitimacy derives from voting and the other that it derives from a holy book. The aim is to develop institutions that generate the trust needed to live in peace. Claims that one possesses the faith that provides an answer to everything, while all alternatives are worthless, are inconsistent with such trust and co-operation. So are calls to holy war. Yet so must be imposition of democracy by force.


We have come to a new stage in the history of our species. We live in what is becoming a globalised world while remaining divided in countless ways. Our ingenuity has created the integrated world, just as our history have created the divisions. We must find ways to live side-by-side, in peace and co-operation, despite our mutual distrust and dislike.
We need enough trust to be able to co-operate, as Paul Seabright of the University of Toulouse argued in a brilliant book published last year. This can only come from the liberal values of toleration. Liberalism is the only unifying creed for a divided world. Can it win against those who despise tolerance? The omens look dire. But if it fails to do so, we will share a miserable world.


 


 

 

Par Pancho Villa
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Mercredi 14 décembre 2005




Dans l'Edition du FT d'aujourd'hui Martin Wolf (qui est a mon avis génial) résume très bien la situation macro-économique mondiale:





"...With an aggregate population of more than 3.3bn, the developing countries of east and south Asia contain more than three times as many people as today's high income countries. The collapse in the cost of communications and the worldwide opening of markets, the two driving forces behind contemporary globalisation, multiply the impact of these numbers on the global economy. ..."










Par Pancho Villa
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Mercredi 11 janvier 2006




....
J'ai de l'amour plein la tête, un cœur d'amitié
Je ne pense qu'à faire la fête et m'amuser,
Moi vous pouvez tout me prendre, je suis comme ça
Ne cherchez pas à comprendre, écoutez-moi
















Martin Wolf: The failure to calculate the costs of war


By Martin Wolf (shortened version by Pancho Villa)



Before the Iraq war began, Lawrence Lindsey, then president George W. Bush’s economic adviser, suggested that the costs might reach $200bn. The White House promptly fired him. Mr Lindsey was indeed wrong. But his error lay in grossly underestimating the costs. The administration’s estimates of a cost of some $50-$60bn were a fantasy, as were Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction, and much else.

An analysis by Linda Bilmes of Harvard University and the Nobel-laureate Joseph Stiglitz of Columbia University suggests that the administration underestimated the economic costs by considerably more than an order of magnitude.* To paraphrase erstwhile senator Everett Dirksen: “a $100bn error here, a $100bn error there and pretty soon you are talking real money”.


Additional costs must be added: medical treatment; cost of injuries; disability payments; cost of demobilisation; need for increased defence spending (partly because of higher recruitment costs in the aftermath of the war) and additional interest on debt. Such costs will be bigger, the longer and greater the troop presence. Under the conservative scenario, the total budgetary cost is estimated at $750bn. Under the moderate scenario, the cost is $1,184bn. To put this in context, the minimum budgetary cost is 10 times the world’s net annual official development assistance to all developing countries.

Now consider the wider costs to the US economy. In the conservative case, the adjustments add $187bn to the budgetary cost, even if the macroeconomic impact is ignored. In the moderate one, they add $305bn.

What are these economic costs? The difference between the wages reserves earn in their normal occupations and the lower wages they earn in service are a cost. While life is priceless, the government necessarily values lives in making its decisions. Using the Environmental Protection Agency’s valuation of $6.1m, the authors conclude that the cost of fatalities will be at least $23bn. There are also ongoing economic costs from the terrible injuries. Finally, there is accelerated depreciation of military hardware.

So far, then, the economic cost comes out at a minimum of $839bn (excluding interest). This, alas, does not end the story. In one area, at least, further costs are evident: the jump in the price of oil. Mr Lindsey is reported to have said that “the best way to keep oil prices in check is a short, successful war on Iraq”. He was wrong. Oil production in Iraq has plummeted, from around 2.6m barrels a day before the war to 1.1m.


Higher oil prices have wider macroeconomic effects. In the short to medium run, spending by the now poorer consumers tends to fall faster than spending by the now richer producers rises. Central banks concerned about inflation also adopt tighter monetary policies than they would otherwise do, while fiscal policy does not normally adjust swiftly to such changes. With a modest “income multiplier” of 1.5, the conservative estimate of the additional losses in output is $187bn over five years. With a multiplier of two and the higher price effect, these costs rise to $450bn.

The authors also add two differences between expenditures on the war in Iraq and likely alternatives: first, they are overwhelmingly abroad; second, they do not contribute directly to consumption, either now or in the future. With these costs taken into account, the total macroeconomic costs may add up to $750bn (see chart) and total costs to $1,850bn.

Critics will stress that both authors served under President Bill Clinton. In the current heated atmosphere of US politics that will be enough to discredit their analysis. It should not do so. Whether or not one believes the war was justified, one should still be concerned that a decision to go to war was taken in the absence of any intelligent analysis of the likely costs.

Nor can one argue that it was impossible to do such an analysis. As I pointed out in a questioning column on the war published almost three years ago (this page, February 4 2003), William Nordhaus of Yale had already prepared a superb analysis, which suggested that $100bn was the lowest imaginable cost and close to $2,000bn perfectly conceivable.
...

Even those who supported the war must draw two lessons. First, the exercise of military power is far more expensive than many fondly hoped. Second, such policy decisions require a halfway decent analysis of the costs and possible consequences. The administration’s failure to do so was a blunder that will harm the US and the world for years to come.

* The Economic Costs of the Iraq War,




THE human cost of the more than 2,000 American military personnel killed and 14,500 wounded so far in Iraq and Afghanistan is all too apparent. But the financial toll is still largely hidden from public view and, like the suffering of those who have lost loved ones, will persist long after the fighting is over.

The cost goes well beyond the more than $250 billion already spent on military operations and reconstruction. Basic running costs of the current conflicts are $6 billion a month - a figure that reflects the Pentagon's unprecedented reliance on expensive private contractors. Other factors keeping costs high include inducements for recruits and for military personnel serving second and third deployments, extra pay for reservists and members of the National Guard, as well as more than $2 billion a year in additional foreign aid to Jordan, Pakistan, Turkey and others to reward their cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan. The bill for repairing and replacing military hardware is $20 billion a year, according to figures from the Congressional Budget Office.

But the biggest long-term costs are disability and health payments for returning troops, which will be incurred even if hostilities were to stop tomorrow. The United States currently pays more than $2 billion in disability claims per year for 159,000 veterans of the 1991 gulf war, even though that conflict lasted only five weeks, with 148 dead and 467 wounded. Even assuming that the 525,000 American troops who have so far served in Iraq and Afghanistan will require treatment only on the same scale as their predecessors from the gulf war, these payments are likely to run at $7 billion a year for the next 45 years.

All of this spending will need to be financed by adding to the federal debt. Extra interest payments will total $200 billion or more even if the borrowing is repaid quickly. Conflict in the Middle East has also played a part in doubling the price of oil from $30 a barrel just prior to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 to $60 a barrel today. Each $5 increase in the price of oil reduces our national income by about $17 billion a year.

Even by this simple yardstick, if the American military presence in the region lasts another five years, the total outlay for the war could stretch to more than $1.3 trillion, or $11,300 for every household in the United States.





NEW STUDY SUGGESTS ECONOMIC COST OF IRAQ WAR MUCH LARGER THAN PREVIOUSLY RECOGNIZED



A new study by two leading academic experts suggests that the costs of the Iraq war will be substantially higher than previously reckoned. In a paper presented to this week’s Allied Social Sciences Association annual meeting in Boston MA., Harvard budget expert Linda Bilmes and Columbia University Professor and Nobel Laureate Joseph E. Stiglitz calculate that the war is likely to cost the United States a minimum of nearly one trillion dollars and potentially over $2 trillion.



The study expands on traditional budgetary estimates by including costs such as lifetime disability and health care for the over16,000 injured, one fifth of whom have serious brain or spinal injuries. It then goes on to analyze the costs to the economy, including the economic value of lives lost and the impact of factors such as higher oil prices that can be partly attributed to the conflict in Iraq. The paper also calculates the impact on the economy if a proportion of the money spent on the Iraq war were spent in other ways, including on investments in the United States



“Shortly before the war, when Administration economist Larry Lindsey suggested that the costs might range between $100 and $200 billion, Administration spokesmen quickly distanced themselves from those numbers,” points out Professor Stiglitz. “But in retrospect, it appears that Lindsey’s numbers represented a gross underestimate of the actual costs.”



The Allied Social Sciences Association meeting is attended by the nation’s leading economists and social scientists. It is sponsored jointly by the American Economic Association and the Economists for Peace and Security.



Par Pancho Villa
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Samedi 4 février 2006



Martin Wolf dans FT:



'I suggest the discussion needs to be focused around five questions: first, what is actually happening? Second, why has the US developed such large current account deficits? Third, in what sense, if any, are these deficits a matter for concern? Fourth, what is likely to happen and over what time period? Finally, to the extent that they are a concern, what actions should be taken to deal with them and by whom? Let me outline below what I see as the issues under each of the questions I have listed.'




P.-V. pense que:



Imaginez 2 mecs,filles, peu importe, sur une balancoire avec sur chaque cote une personne. Sauf que la personne du cote droit pese 50 kilos tandis que la personne du cote gauche en pese 150.

Maintenant, tant que la personne du cote gauche est assise penard sur la balancoire, l'autre personne du cote droit se retrouve logiquement 'penard' en haut.(Celle du cote droit peut s'agiter, bouger, sauter, etc. etc., rien n'y fait, elle sera obligee de rester en haut tant que la personne du cote gauche ne decide le contraire)

Mais si, helas, la personne du cote gauche a les boules et decide spontanemment de se casser il pourrait y avoir du grabuge pour la personne du cote droit. Cela depend donc essentiellement de 2 facteurs:


  1. 1. la vitesse avec laquelle la personne du cote gauche se leve et
  1. 2. la distance de l'axe de la balancoire entre celle-ci et les deux sieges.(bras de levier)



Par Pancho Villa
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Dimanche 9 juillet 2006










Financial Times' chief economic commentator, Martin Wolf, was awarded  a journalism prize (en americain  price), by the Fundacio Catalunya Cerrada? (El 18 de febrero, ETA anunciaba una tregua únicamente para el territorio de Cataluña con el "deseo de unir los lazos entre el pueblo vasco y el catalán". El entonces presidente del gobierno, José María Aznar, declaró que este anuncio era la contribución de ETA a "esta estrategia repulsiva, promovida por Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya"... ah bon...) (Cerrada?, Vive les enjeux...politiques espagnols, Angleterre je t'aime, moi non plus? Catalonia Foundation).
Previous winners include Francesc-Marc Alvaro and Ralf Dahrendorf. The Foundation praised Mr Wolf's 'rigorous and considered analysis'. It also recognised through him the Financial Times' contribution to the defence of freedom, the market economy cand globalisation.






Ici, la version 'catalane'...



Martin Wolf convida a reflexionar sobre Europa en rebre el VI Premi de Periodisme de la Fundació
El lliurament del Premi Periodístic de la Fundació Catalunya Oberta a Martin Wolf, cap d’opinió del prestigiós diari econòmic Financial Times i reconegut economista a nivell mundial, ha tingut un ample ressò a la premsa, tant del nostre país com internacional, que també n’han ressaltat diversos aspectes del discurs pronunciat amb motiu de l’esdeveniment.

Així, a Marçal Sintes (Avui, dissabte) l’ha fet reflexionar sobre els reptes d’Europa, arran d’un comentari de Wolf (“Europa va prosperar en un món d’economia oberta en el passat. Pot, indubtablement, tornar-ho a fer. Però el continent ha d’acceptar i reconèixer la naturalesa del món en què viu” nd P.-V.:' L'Europe a prospere dans un monde d'economie ouverte dans le passe. Elle pourra, sans doute, renouer a ce passe. Cependant le continent devra reconnaitre l'essence du monde dans lequel elle vit.') el principal dels quals és “que Europa, les societats europees en el seu conjunt, sigui prou lúcida i valenta per fer això”, de la mateixa manera que Jaume Arias (La Vanguardia, dissabte) coincideix amb un pronòstic del guardonat en el sentit que “la cooperació hispano-lusa és i serà més necessària davant la perspectiva global que es veu a venir, dura i competitiva com mai”. Baltasar Porcel dedica dues de les seves columnes al mateix diari i si dilluns apunta que “reconforten del premiat i de la fundació la claredat i el rigor de llurs conviccions”, dimarts explica que s’ha trobat un amic que pertany al que en diríem entorn progressista i al qual, quan li ha esmentat el Financial Times i la Fundació Catalunya Oberta, li ha respost que això és la dreta. A continuació, l’escriptor d’Andraitx es resigna: “cal sobreviure i Wolf queda molt lluny de Catalunya, espero que el meu amic em recordi quan torni al paradís de la plaça de Sant Jaume...”

L’aspecte més purament informatiu de l’esdeveniment se centra en l’entrevista de David Caminada a Martin Wolf al diari Avui de divendres on diu, entre altres coses, que “la nova economia dóna moltes oportunitats als països pobres, però caldrà que se’ls ajudi a fer reformes estructurals”; les ressenyes també de divendres a La Vanguardia (que ressalta que el premi valora “la defensa de la llibertat, l’economia de mercat i la globalització” que fa Wolf) i Expansión que se centra més en el debat posterior al discurs del guardonat, on aquest va indicar que Espanya podia ser “la Florida d’Europa” o el digital El Debat.com, que recull de les paraules de Wolf que “Karl Marx era favorable a una globalització del capitalisme del segle XIX”. Per la seva banda, les quatre edicions (general, europea, nord-americana i asiàtica) de Financial Times es fan ressò del guardó atorgat a Martin Wolf.






Par Pancho Villa
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Jeudi 12 octobre 2006




How China has managed to keep the renminbi pinned down

MARTIN WOLF



China will do what it considers to be in its own interest. That should surely be self-evident. What is not self-evident is how it does - and should - identify that self-interest. That is almost always more difficult than naive realists tend to suppose. This is true of its policy towards North Korea. It is just as true of its policy towards the exchange rate.

The Chinese government seems to believe its interest lies in maintaining a highly competitive real exchange rate for as long as possible. The evidence also suggests it can do so for a long time. But should it do so?

Economic theory indicates that a fast-growing developing country should have an appreciating real exchange rate. This is known as the Balassa-Samuelson effect, after the late Bela Balassa of Johns Hopkins University and the Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson, who discovered it independently of each other.

The argument is straightforward. Economies contain two sorts of activity: tradeable - manufacturing and services that can be supplied readily at a distance; and non-tradeable - haircuts, childcare and so forth. With economic development, productivity in the former tends to rise faster than in the latter.

Assume, for simplicity's sake, that we are talking about a small country with a fixed exchange rate. Then the price of tradeables will be set in the world market and the domestic price will be the world price multiplied by the exchange rate. Prices of non-tradeables will rise relative to those of tradeables, because their relative unit labour costs will be increasing. This is why haircuts are cheap in poor countries and expensive in rich ones.

What does all this have to do with China? The answer, as Andrew Smithers of London-based Smithers & Co, has pointed out, is that real exchange rate appreciation is the dog that has not barked.

Despite the modest change in exchange rate policy in July 2005, the nominal exchange rate of the renminbi has moved little since January 1994. Because China's inflation rate has been below that of the US for most of the past nine years, the tendency of the real exchange rate has been towards depreciation. According to JPMorgan, it has depreciated by about 7 per cent since January 1998.

Yet China seems to meet all the conditions for real exchange rate appreciation. As the International Monetary Fund notes in its September World Economic Outlook, productivity growth in industry has, on average, been about three percentage points a year faster than in services since 1979.

If a real exchange rate one would expect to appreciate depreciates, one would also expect China to become more competitive in world markets. The evidence suggests that this is the case: look at both the astonishing growth of China's exports and the soaring current account surplus.

I would argue that there are now three fundamental indicators of a significant undervaluation. First, the scale of the required foreign currency intervention; second, the fact that the source of surplus receipts of foreign exchange is now a current account surplus rather than inflows of relatively unstable short-term capital; and, above all, that the surplus in the basic balance - the sum of the current account and long-term capital inflows - is at least 10 per cent of gross domestic product (see charts). Jonathan Anderson of UBS suggests that the undervaluation is about 20 per cent.*

As Mr Smithers argues, the progressive real depreciation of the renminbi is why China's emergence has also been disinflationary for the world. The prices of the manufactures it exports have indeed tended to fall in dollars. But this did not have to be the case. It was the combination of a virtually fixed nominal exchange rate with a depreciating real exchange rate that made it so.

Why then has this happened? It is not an accident. On the contrary, as Mr Anderson notes, the government has worked hard to achieve this result.
In normal circumstances, powerful economic forces work against an increasingly undervalued real exchange rate. As David Hume, the great Scottish philosopher, argued, the monetary mechanism is one way of achieving this outcome. At a fixed exchange rate, a current account surplus not offset by a corresponding voluntary capital outflow will generate an increase in the monetary base. That should generate a credit expansion, excess demand, a rise in the domestic price level and an appreciation in the real exchange rate.

Overheating, in short, is not the problem, but rather the natural solution to an undervalued real exchange rate. But, as Mr Anderson points out, China's economy is sufficiently large, sufficiently closed, sufficiently regulated and sufficiently labour-abundant to prevent this effect from working through.

The People's Bank of China has been able to sterilise the monetary impact of the massive purchases of foreign currency it has undertaken to keep the exchange rate down (see charts). Moreover, because China's overall savings are so high and its capital market sufficiently segmented from that of the rest of the world, domestic interest rates are about one and a half percentage points below those currently earned on its reserves.

Sterilisation - the sale of domestic securities to mop up the excess liquidity generated by official intervention in foreign currency markets - is not merely feasible, but even highly profitable, if one is prepared to ignore the risk of a large ultimate capital loss, hi the very long. run, the spending generated by low domestic interest rates is indeed likely to produce excess demand and inflation, particularly if the economy and the financial system are liberalised. But there is little sign that this is at all imminent.

The discussion in last week's column concluded that there is a strong case for the Chinese government to absorb the surplus savings domestically, in the interests of the Chinese people. But the discussion here concludes that they can prevent such an adjustment for a very long time if they wish to do so.

So the authorities have a choice. What then should it be? If they should decide to reduce the current account surplus, should they allow faster appreciation of the nominal exchange rate or overheating and faster inflation? And how should they choose to expand demand? These will be the subjects of next week's final column in this series.







Par Pancho Villa
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Mercredi 15 novembre 2006




Martin Wolf, que P.-V. adore, casse (...et la, il la casse vraiment...) la baraque...en disant exactement ce que Pancho Villa aussi avait sur le coeur...Bravo Martin...









Traduction 'a la va-vite' de P.-V....


'Ceci est un forum pour economistes. Mais je pense que l’on doive etre d’accord avec le fait que le sujet de la politique etrangere est bien trop important afin de n’etre delaisse qu’a des ‘experts’. En tant que citoyens, si ce n’est pas en tant qu’economistes, je pense que nous aussi, nous devons y rajouter notre grain de sel, et c’est pour cela que j’ai ose traiter, a certaines occasions, des questions de politique etrangere. Larry, lui-même, a su montrer ce qui etait posssible de faire [traitement de ces questions], en nous ayant livre une excellente analyse de l’etat d’ame qui se trouve derriere ce qu’il decrit en tant que ‘l’election de la repudiation’


Ce que je voudrais souligner, est que la facon avec laquelle cette administration a encadre le monde de l’apres 9/11 fut une vraie catastrophe. Il n’existe tout simplemenet pas de ‘guerre contre le terrorisme’. La puissance militaire n’a pas les capacites d’assurer une securite durable contre ce qui s’appelle une idee. Meme dans le cas de la guerre froide, la victoire a ete atteinte [tautologie dans le texte original] parce que le communisme n’a pas su offrir une vie meilleure. Ce a quoi nous nous sommes engages, est en essence, une operation de contrôle complexe et globale combinee a une guerre d’idees.

Nous devrions etre confiants de croire que nos idees vont au bout du compte triompher si nous-mêmes, nous ne voudrons pas les trahir et ceci en leur laissant le temps qu’il faudra. En rejetant les traits essentiels qui definissent la fin de la loi, i.e. en employant la torture, en diffamant ceux qui ne sont pas d’accord avec ces idees, en demolissant de vieilles alliances, en ayant une indulgence confidentielle sans bornes a l’egard du pouvoir militaire et pour finir, en promettant de transformer les societes a l’aide d’une arme pointee sur celles-ci, l’administration a trahi des valeurs essentielles occidentales [mais pas celles du far-ouest]. Elle a aussi montre une incompetence grotesque en ce qui concerne l’execution. Comment pouvons nous gagner une guerre des idees comme celle-ci ? Les Etats-Unis, et j’espere, le monde, qu’il soit occidental ou non-occidental, doivent recommencer des le debut.

Je pense qu’une des grandes contributions de FDR pendant les sombres jours des annees 30 a ete cette declaration en disant : ‘Nous n’avons rien a craindre sauf la peur elle-meme’. Sa politique etait celle de l’espoir. Dans un sense bien different, Ronald Reagan aussi a su donner de l’espoir. Et c’est ce que moi je trouve impardonnable : la peur nous rend minuscules, la peur nous rend faibles, et la peur nous rend detestables. Nous ne pouvons vaincre ce conflict d’idees si tout ce que nous pouvons offrir est en fait notre peur.

Le peuple americain a aussi su montrer que la peur ne rend pas necessairement immobile. Ceci est un triomphe d’idees essentiellement democratiques qui a demontre qu’une majorite de gens ordinaires a su au bout du compte atteindre la juste conclusion. Il n’y a qu’a esperer que les E.-U. soient maintenant sinceres envers eux-memes.'






Par Pancho Villa
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Mercredi 29 novembre 2006



Martin Wolf, que P.-V. adore, casse (...et la, il la casse vraiment...et de nouveau) la baraque...en disant en partie ce que Pancho Villa aussi avait sur le coeur...Bravo Martin...(...2eme partie)




Fear up the Bush doctrine and revisit America's real values
By Martin Wolf

US voters have now repudiated those who sought to impose democracy by force abroad. In spite of the gerrymandering of districts, the advantages of incumbency and renewed recourse to the politics of fear, common sense prevailed. George Bush is still president. But he is damaged political goods. That is good, because change is desperately needed.

The signal feature of this administration has not been merely incompetence, but its rejection of principles on which US foreign policy was built after the second world war. The administration's strategy has been based, instead, upon four ideas: the primacy of force; the servation of a unipolar order; the unbridled exercise of US power, and right to initiate preventive war in absence of immediate threats.

The response to the terrorist outrage of September 11 2001 reinforced the hold of all these principles. The notion of an indefinite and unlimited "war on terror" became the fulcrum of US foreign policy. It led to the idea of an "axis of evil" connecting Saddam Hussein's Iraq to theocratic Iran and Kim Jong-il's North Korea. It brought about the justified invasion of Afghanistan, but also the diversion into Iraq. Not least, the idea of the war on terror led to the indefinite imprisonment of alleged enemy combatants without judicial oversight, toleration of torture, "extraordinary rendition" of suspects, the extra-territorial prison at Guantanamo Bay and, by indirect means, the abuses at Abu Ghraib.

All this has been bad enough. It is made worse by what John Ikenberry of Princeton University and Charles Kupchan of Georgetown aptly describe as the "sloppy intelligence, faulty judgment and ideological zealotry" that marked implementation, above all in Iraq.* Yet the poor implementation is not an accident. A belief in the primacy of the military naturally led to the transfer of responsibility to the department of defence; a belief in the efficacy of force created the conviction that victory meant peace and a swift transition to democracy; and riisrlain for allies guaranteed the absence of co-operation in postwar occupation.

The US must now start again. It must design a foreign policy for the current age. In doing so, it should discard almost everything the Bush administration has proclaimed.

First, the aims of foreign policy go far beyond the misnamed "war on terror". The Islamist terrorists with which the world should, indeed, be concerned do not even pose the same existential threat as the cold war's competition among superpowers. Equally important are maintenance of a prosperous world economy, management of the rise of new great powers, economic development, not least in the Islamic world, and management of the global commons.

Second, military power is far less effective than its supporters suppose. The threat of force cannot change the policies of other great powers, except to make them more suspicious of US intentions. It must make potential enemies still more determined to obtain nuclear weapons. As Iraq has shown, vast power cannot even impose stability on a country of 21m.

Third, the legitimacy of America as a global power rests on the ability of the US to command the respect of other countries and peoples. Gerhard Schroder could not have won an election in 2002 on an anti-American platform if the German people's confidence in the US had not been undermined. Yet more important, the war against jihadi terrorists is a war of ideas. It will be won not by fear, but by making the west's values more attractive to hundreds of millions of Muslims than those of its fanatical opponents. The willingness of this administration to treat the rule of law as an optional extra has made it far more difficult to defeat the terrorist ideology in the long run.

Fourth, multilateral institutions matter. They turn what would otherwise be clashes of prestige and power into acceptance of shared rules of good behaviour. Above all, only the willing co-operation of at least the world's leading powers can address many of the global challenges. Shared institutions make such co-operation more credible and more sustained.

Fifth, solid alliances matter. The coalition of the willing has proved a slender reed. Even the UK is unlikely to let itself be dragged into a venture similar to Iraq again, in which it is fully committed but has no influence on how policy is executed. Yet the US has proved unable to achieve what it seeks unaided. Fixed alliances are indeed constraints, but they are also means of seeming commitments.

The foreign policy of Mr Bush, arguably the worst president since the US became a world power, has come to a dead end. The big question is what happens now. For disastrous though it has been, alternatives could be as bad. A "realism" entirely indifferent to western values would be one blunder. Still worse would be a retreat from the war in Iraq into isolationism and from openness into protectionism.

I, however, am an optimist. Winston Churchill famously said that "the United States invariably does the right thing after having exhausted every other alternative". The world will not accept an American master. But it will still welcome American leadership, provided that leadership takes due account of the interests of others and rests on the values that the US has itself spread to the world.

Three decades ago, when the Vietnam war had just been lost, President Richard Nixon had been forced to resign and the world economy was in inflationary turmoil, the future of the west seemed dark. Yet over the next one and a half decades China chose the market and the Soviet empire collapsed. The victories over communism were not secured through force of arms, but through the attractions of the west's prosperity, freedom and democracy.

Foreign policy is inescapably difficult. But one point is, I would suggest, incontrovertible. The US needs to renew its faith in the values of freedom, the rule of law and global cooperation on which it built an astonishingly successful international order after 1945. The right way ahead cannot go through 19th century views on sovereignty and the balance of power. It should go via the power of US example rather than its military power and via its ability to give a lead rather than unilateral dictation. The great US policymakers of the 20th century understood that well. Then-successors should show the same wisdom in the 21st.


*Liberal Realism: The Foundations of a Democratic Foreign Policy, The National Interest, Fall 2004, www.aspenberlin.org/interesting_ articles.php?iGedminId= 72


Par Pancho Villa
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Mardi 12 décembre 2006


The saga of the falling dollar still has a long way left to go
by Martin Wolf


Richard Nixon's Treasury secretary, John Connolly, famously remarked that "the dollar is our currency, but your problem". He would be right again now. The rest of the world normally wants a strong dollar. Yet the dollar is now in a bear market. How long might this go on? The plausible answer must be: a while yet.

Since early 2002 the dollar has been on a steep downward path: on JPMorgan's trade-weighted real exchange rate it has depreciated by 23 per cent since February 2002. This is the third such sustained decline since Mr Connolly's remarks. The first was during the early 1970s. The second was from 1985 to 1988. On each of the two previous occasions, the depreciating real exchange rate also helped generate a big adjustment in the balance of payments. This was strikingly true in the 1980s. The same thing is happening again.

Between 1996 and 2004, real US domestic demand grew fester than real gross domestic product every year. This was necessary, I have previously argued, if GDP was to rise in line with potential, given the prevailing real exchange rates and the weak rate of growth of demand in much of the rest of the world. Over these years, cumulative growth in US real demand was 39 per cent, while GDP grew by 33 per cent. The difference was the real increase in the deficit in trade in goods and non-factor services.

This has now changed. US real GDP will have grown at almost exactly the same rate as real demand in 2005 and 2006, according to the most recent economic outlook from the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. In real terms, the current account deficit is consequently stabilising at last, albeit at a very high level.

US exports are also at last growing at roughly the same rate as imports: between the third quarter of 2003 and the third quarter of this year exports of goods and services grew 27 per cent, in constant prices, while imports rose 26 per cent. This is a big change: over the previous eight years, US exports rose by a mere 31 per cent, while imports rose by 80 per cent, again in constant prices.

Does this suggest that the needed adjustment in the real exchange rate has come to an end? Probably not.
If the current account deficit were to remain dose to 7 per cent of GDP, US net liabilities would probably stabilise at substantially more than 100 per cent of GDP. That would be an extraordinarily high level for such a big economy. Moreover, one would expect a rise in net liabilities from about 22 per cent of GDP at the end of last year to force substantial changes in asset prices. The larger the US share in the portfolios of the rest of the world, the higher the prospective returns that foreign investors would, be expected to demand, to compensate for the risk.

Either a lower dollar, or lower US asset prices, or both, would seem the inevitable result. Moreover, it is hard to imagine that a falling exchange rate would not be a big part of this picture. The fact that the US borrows entirely in its own currency makes deficits safer for itself, but riskier for its creditors. For this reason a belief that the currency has become undervalued - and so can be expected to appreciate - would make it easier to sustain net liabilities on such a gigantic scale. This is one reason why such movements tend to overshoot.

Moreover, some three-fifths of gross US liabilities of $13,625bn (€10,224bn) at the end of last year took the form of bonds, currency, bank liabilities and similar claims The value of such claims to foreign creditors is more vulnerable to inflation and so to the impact on domestic prices of a sizeable currency depreciation than claims on real assets. The US cannot guarantee the dollar against a fall and would not wish to, even if it could. So creditors are likely to come to a point at which they wish to see the depreciation before they continue to supply the capital flows that win be needed.

Creditors win also be more willing to go on buying US assets if they start to see a reduction in the country's deficits. That would require a period during which exports grew fester than imports, in real terms. It is at least plausible that this would also necessitate a lower real exchange rate than we have ever seen before.

Thus, even though the currency has fallen a long way, it is easy to imagine its falling more. How far it would need to fall would depend on how quickly demand grew in the rest of the world. It would also depend on what happened hi the US economy itself: the weaker domestic demand and the tower the interest rate, the lower the dollar itself might go.

In short, the long bear market in the dollar is probably not over. But even if it were over, on a trade-weighted basis, that would not be the end of the story. An overall decline is only a part of what is required. Also important is some redistribution of the adjustment.

Hitherto, high-income countries that are not running large current account surpluses have experienced big appreciations against the dollar, while the developing countries that are running such surpluses have not. That is unlikely to be sustainable, not least because it has required colossal exchange rate intervention. Official reserves exceeded $4,500bn by the end of the first half of 2006, an increase of some $2,700hn since the end of 1999.

It is possible to imagine a world in which a substantial part of the US current account deficit were shifted to other high-income countries by a depreciation of the currencies of the entire extended dollar area. But it is hard to imagine the countries with floating exchange rates tolerating such a shift for long. The eurozone is a particulariy unlikely candidate.

Where then have we arrived in the story? First, adjustment is beginning to happen, as the dollar has plunged substantially on a trade-weighted basis, while demand in the rest of the world has also picked up; second, the decline in the dollar has probably not reached the level needed to sustain either a big diminution of the external deficit or the needed financing; third, even if it has, the necessary adjustment of exchange rates between the countries in the extended dollar area and countries with floating exchange rates has still hardly begun.

This extended saga will finish with many chapters: the rise of the dollar
while the US current account deficit exploded was the first; the fall of the ,
dollar while the current account deficit went on rising was the second; we are now in the third, when the deficit stabilises at last. But this story is not yet over. What sort of problem the dollar win prove to be over the entire cycle is unclear. All we can say at the moment is: "So far, not too bad." Let us hope it remains so.



Par Pancho Villa
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Vendredi 15 décembre 2006



L'indispensable 'Loup'
(sans vouloir pointer du doigt le sujet precedent....) a ete recompense...




"Martin Wolf, the FT's chief economics commentator, was yesterday awarded an honorary doctorate in economics by the LSE."







Par Pancho Villa
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