Calendrier

Décembre 2009
L M M J V S D
  1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15 16 17 18 19 20
21 22 23 24 25 26 27
28 29 30 31      
<< < > >>

Recommander

adresse e-mail (courriel)

panchovillan@yahoo.com

Syndication

  • Flux RSS des articles

Paul Krugman

Mardi 19 juillet 2005 2 19 /07 /2005 00:00




Many seemingly authoritative figures, not all of them partisan shills, say that the American economy has fully recovered from the recession that began in 2001. They point to the unemployment rate, which has fallen from a peak of 6.3 percent in 2003 to 5 percent last month. That's not quite as low as the 4.2 percent unemployment rate in February 2001, when the recession began, but it's fairly low by historical standards.

 

 

 

 

 

 


For some reason, however, the public isn't feeling prosperous. Gallup tells us that only 3 percent of Americans describe the economy as "excellent," and only 33 percent describe it as "good."


Maybe people are just ungrateful. Maybe they've been misled by negative media reports. Maybe they're grumpy about their paychecks: adjusted for inflation, average weekly earnings have been flat for the past five years.


Or maybe the figures on unemployment are giving a false signal.
Economists who argue that there's something wrong with the unemployment numbers are buzzing about a new study by Katharine Bradbury, an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, which suggests that millions of Americans who should be in the labor force aren't. "The addition of these hypothetical participants," she writes, "would raise the unemployment rate by one to three-plus percentage points."


Some background: the unemployment rate is only one of several numbers economists use to assess the jobs picture. When the economy is generating an abundance of jobs, economists expect to see strong growth in the payrolls reported by employers and in the number of people who say they have jobs, together with a rise in the length of the average workweek. They also expect to see wage gains well in excess of inflation, as employers compete to attract workers.


In fact, we see none of these things. As Berkeley's J. Bradford DeLong writes on his influential economics blog, "We have four of five indicators telling us that the state of the job market is not that good and only one - the unemployment rate - reading green."
In particular, even the most favorable measures show that employment growth has lagged well behind population growth over the past four years. Yet the measured unemployment rate isn't much higher than it was in early 2001. How is that possible?


The answer, according to the survey used to estimate the unemployment rate, is a decline in labor force participation. Nonworking Americans aren't considered unemployed unless they are actively looking for work, and hence counted as part of the labor force. And a large number of people have, for some reason, dropped out of the official labor force.


Those with a downbeat view of the jobs picture argue that the low reported unemployment rate is a statistical illusion, that there are millions of Americans who would be looking for jobs if more jobs were available. Those with an upbeat view argue that labor force participation has fallen for reasons that have nothing to do with job availability - for example, young adults, recognizing the importance of education, may have chosen to stay in school longer.


 That's where Dr. Bradbury's study comes in. She shows that the upbeat view doesn't hold up in the face of a careful examination of the numbers. In fact, because older Americans, especially older women, are more likely to work than in the past, labor force participation should have risen, not fallen, over the past four years. As a result, she suggests that there may be "considerable slack in the U.S. labor market": there are at least 1.6 million and possibly as many as 5.1 million people who aren't counted as unemployed but would take jobs if they were available.


There's both good news and bad news in that assessment. The good news is that the economy probably has plenty of room to expand before inflation becomes a problem (which implies that the Fed's decision to start raising interest rates was premature).
The bad news is that it's hard to see where further expansion will come from. We've already had four years of extremely loose fiscal and monetary policy. Tax cuts have pushed the federal budget deep into the red. Low interest rates have helped generate a housing bubble that has lifted real estate prices to ludicrous heights in major parts of the country.


If all that wasn't enough to give us a full economic recovery, what will?


 

 

Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : Paul Krugman
Ecrire un commentaire - Voir les commentaires - Recommander
Vendredi 22 juillet 2005 5 22 /07 /2005 00:00


China Unpegs Itself

 


 


Thursday's statement from the People's Bank of China, announcing that the yuan is no longer pegged to the dollar, was terse and uninformative - you might say inscrutable. There's a good chance that this is simply a piece of theater designed to buy a few months' respite from protectionist pressures in the U.S. Congress.

Nonetheless, it could be the start of a process that will turn the world economy upside down - or, more accurately, right side up. That is, the free ride China has been giving America, in which the world's richest economy has been getting cheap loans from a country that is dynamic but still quite poor, may be coming to an end.

It's all about which way the capital is flowing.

Capital usually flows from mature, developed economies to less-developed economies on their way up. For example, a lot of America's growth in the 19th century was financed by investors from Britain, which was already industrialized.

A decade ago, before the world financial crisis of 1997-1998, capital movements seemed to fit the historic pattern, as funds flowed from Japan and Western nations to "emerging markets" in Asia and Latin America. But these days things are running in reverse: capital is flowing out of emerging markets, especially China, and into the United States.

This uphill flow isn't the result of private-sector decisions; it's the result of official policy. To keep China's currency from rising, the Chinese government has been buying up huge quantities of dollars and investing the proceeds in U.S. bonds.

One way to grasp how weird this policy is would be to think about what a comparable policy would look like in the United States, scaled up to match the size of our economy. It's as if last year the U.S. government invested $1 trillion of taxpayers' money in low-interest Japanese bonds, and this year looks set to invest an additional $1.5 trillion the same way.

Some economists think there is a deep rationale for this seemingly perverse policy. I think it's something the Chinese government stumbled into as it tried to protect itself from the 1997-1998 crisis, and it is reluctant to change because the Chinese economy has been doing well. That is, China's leaders don't want to mess with success.

But pressures against China's dollar purchases are building. By keeping the yuan down, China is feeding a trade surplus that is creating a growing political backlash in America and Europe. And China, which is still a poor country, is devoting a lot of resources to the accumulation of a basically useless pile of dollars instead of to higher living standards.

The question is what happens to us if the Chinese finally decide to stop acting so strangely.

An end to China's dollar-buying spree would lead to a sharp rise in the value of the yuan. It would probably also lead to a sharp fall in the value of the dollar relative to other major currencies, like the yen and the euro, which the Chinese haven't been buying on the same scale. This would help U.S. manufacturers by raising their competitors' costs.

But if the Chinese stopped buying all those U.S. bonds, interest rates would rise. This would be bad news for housing - maybe very bad news, if the interest rate rise burst the bubble.

In the long run, the economic effects of an end to China's dollar buying would even out. America would have more industrial workers and fewer real estate agents, more jobs in Michigan and fewer in Florida, leaving the overall level of employment pretty much unaffected. But as John Maynard Keynes pointed out, in the long run we are all dead.

In the short run, some people would win, but others would lose. And I suspect that the losers would greatly outnumber the winners.

And what about the strategic effects? Right now America is a superpower living on credit - something I don't think has happened since Philip II ruled Spain. What will happen to our stature if and when China takes away our credit card?

This story is still in its early days. On the first day of the new policy, the yuan rose only 2 percent, not enough to make any noticeable difference. But one of these days Chinese dollar purchases will trail off, and we'll find ourselves living in interesting times.

 

 




add:

"The Strangest Party (These Are The Times)"  by (H)-INXS (H:= Hutchence)

Welcome to the strangest party baby
It's like were staring at the sun
Everybody's got their invitations
Hoping that your gonna come, yeah

These are the times
These are the crimes
What are we waiting for
What are we hating for

Your part of the solution
Or part of the problem
Your gonna have to dance with one
Your giving up on the future honey
I'll count you out of having some
Yeah, some

These are the times (times)
These are the crimes (crimes)
What are we waiting for
What are we hating for

Here comes the rain
Yeah, here comes the rain yeah

These are the times
These are the crimes
What are we waiting for
What are we hating for

These are the time (times)
These are the crimes (crimes)
What are we waiting for (what are we)
What are we hating for (waiting for)

Wash away the pain
Into the blue sea, yeah

These are the times (times)
These are the crimes (crimes)
What are we waiting for (what are we)
What are we hating for (waiting for)

Wash away the rain
Into the blue sea, yeah

These are the times
These are the times

 

 

 

 

Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : Paul Krugman
Ecrire un commentaire - Voir les commentaires - Recommander
Dimanche 31 juillet 2005 7 31 /07 /2005 00:00
 

 

 


Toyota, Moving Northward




By Paul Krugman

 

Modern American politics is dominated by the doctrine that government is the problem, not the solution. In practice, this doctrine translates into policies that make low taxes on the rich the highest priority, even if lack of revenue undermines basic public services. You don't have to be a liberal to realize that this is wrong-headed. Corporate leaders understand quite well that good public services are also good for business. But the political environment is so polarized these days that top executives are often afraid to speak up against conservative dogma.

Instead, they vote with their feet. Which brings us to the story of Toyota's choice.

There has been fierce competition among states hoping to attract a new Toyota assembly plant. Several Southern states reportedly offered financial incentives worth hundreds of millions of dollars.

But last month Toyota decided to put the new plant, which will produce RAV4 mini-S.U.V.'s, in Ontario. Explaining why it passed up financial incentives to choose a U.S. location, the company cited the quality of Ontario's work force.

What made Toyota so sensitive to labor quality issues? Maybe we should discount remarks from the president of the Toronto-based Automotive Parts Manufacturers' Association, who claimed that the educational level in the Southern United States was so low that trainers for Japanese plants in Alabama had to use "pictorials" to teach some illiterate workers how to use high-tech equipment.

But there are other reports, some coming from state officials, that confirm his basic point: Japanese auto companies opening plants in the Southern U.S. have been unfavorably surprised by the work force's poor level of training.

There's some bitter irony here for Alabama's governor. Just two years ago voters overwhelmingly rejected his plea for an increase in the state's rock-bottom taxes on the affluent, so that he could afford to improve the state's low-quality education system. Opponents of the tax hike convinced voters that it would cost the state jobs.

But education is only one reason Toyota chose Ontario. Canada's other big selling point is its national health insurance system, which saves auto manufacturers large sums in benefit payments compared with their costs in the United States.

You might be tempted to say that Canadian taxpayers are, in effect, subsidizing Toyota's move by paying for health coverage. But that's not right, even aside from the fact that Canada's health care system has far lower costs per person than the American system, with its huge administrative expenses. In fact, U.S. taxpayers, not Canadians, will be hurt by the northward movement of auto jobs.

To see why, bear in mind that in the long run decisions like Toyota's probably won't affect the overall number of jobs in either the United States or Canada. But the result of international competition will be to give Canada more jobs in industries like autos, which pay health benefits to their U.S. workers, and fewer jobs in industries that don't provide those benefits. In the U.S. the effect will be just the reverse: fewer jobs with benefits, more jobs without.

So what's the impact on taxpayers? In Canada, there's no impact at all: since all Canadians get government-provided health insurance in any case, the additional auto jobs won't increase government spending.

But U.S. taxpayers will suffer, because the general public ends up picking up much of the cost of health care for workers who don't get insurance through their jobs. Some uninsured workers and their families end up on Medicaid. Others end up depending on emergency rooms, which are heavily subsidized by taxpayers.

Funny, isn't it? Pundits tell us that the welfare state is doomed by globalization, that programs like national health insurance have become unsustainable. But Canada's universal health insurance system is handling international competition just fine. It's our own system, which penalizes companies that treat their workers well, that's in trouble.

I'm sure that some readers will respond to everything I've just said by asking why, if the Canadians are so smart, they aren't richer. But I'll have to leave the issue of America's comparative economic performance for another day.

For now, let me just point out that treating people decently is sometimes a competitive advantage. In America, basic health insurance is a privilege; in Canada, it's a right. And in the auto industry, at least, the good jobs are heading north.

 

 

 

 


Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : Paul Krugman
Ecrire un commentaire - Voir les commentaires - Recommander
Dimanche 31 juillet 2005 7 31 /07 /2005 00:00

 


French Family Values

 



 by Paul Krugman

 


Americans tend to believe that we do everything better than anyone else. That belief makes it hard for us to learn from others. For example, I've found that many people refuse to believe that Europe has anything to teach us about health care policy. After all, they say, how can Europeans be good at health care when their economies are such failures?

Now, there's no reason a country can't have both an excellent health care system and a troubled economy (or vice versa). But are European economies really doing that badly?

The answer is no. Americans are doing a lot of strutting these days, but a head-to-head comparison between the economies of the United States and Europe - France, in particular - shows that the big difference is in priorities, not performance. We're talking about two highly productive societies that have made a different tradeoff between work and family time. And there's a lot to be said for the French choice.

First things first: given all the bad-mouthing the French receive, you may be surprised that I describe their society as "productive." Yet according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, productivity in France - G.D.P. per hour worked - is actually a bit higher than in the United States.

It's true that France's G.D.P. per person is well below that of the United States. But that's because French workers spend more time with their families.

O.K., I'm oversimplifying a bit. There are several reasons why the French put in fewer hours of work per capita than we do. One is that some of the French would like to work, but can't: France's unemployment rate, which tends to run about four percentage points higher than the U.S. rate, is a real problem. Another is that many French citizens retire early. But the main story is that full-time French workers work shorter weeks and take more vacations than full-time American workers.

The point is that to the extent that the French have less income than we do, it's mainly a matter of choice. And to see the consequences of that choice, let's ask how the situation of a typical middle-class family in France compares with that of its American counterpart.

The French family, without question, has lower disposable income. This translates into lower personal consumption: a smaller car, a smaller house, less eating out.

But there are compensations for this lower level of consumption. Because French schools are good across the country, the French family doesn't have to worry as much about getting its children into a good school district. Nor does the French family, with guaranteed access to excellent health care, have to worry about losing health insurance or being driven into bankruptcy by medical bills.

Perhaps even more important, however, the members of that French family are compensated for their lower income with much more time together. Fully employed French workers average about seven weeks of paid vacation a year. In America, that figure is less than four.

So which society has made the better choice?

I've been looking at a new study of international differences in working hours by Alberto Alesina and Edward Glaeser, at Harvard, and Bruce Sacerdote, at Dartmouth. The study's main point is that differences in government regulations, rather than culture (or taxes), explain why Europeans work less than Americans.

But the study also suggests that in this case, government regulations actually allow people to make a desirable tradeoff - to modestly lower income in return for more time with friends and family - the kind of deal an individual would find hard to negotiate. The authors write: "It is hard to obtain more vacation for yourself from your employer and even harder, if you do, to coordinate with all your friends to get the same deal and go on vacation together."

And they even offer some statistical evidence that working fewer hours makes Europeans happier, despite the loss of potential income.

It's not a definitive result, and as they note, the whole subject is "politically charged." But let me make an observation: some of that political charge seems to have the wrong sign.

American conservatives despise European welfare states like France. Yet many of them stress the importance of "family values." And whatever else you may say about French economic policies, they seem extremely supportive of the family as an institution. Senator Rick Santorum, are you reading this?

 


 

Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : Paul Krugman
Ecrire un commentaire - Voir les commentaires - Recommander
Dimanche 7 août 2005 7 07 /08 /2005 00:00


Design for Confusion



By Paul Krugman



I'd like to nominate Irving Kristol, the neoconservative former editor of The Public Interest, as the father of "intelligent design." No, he didn't play any role in developing the doctrine. But he is the father of the political strategy that lies behind the intelligent design movement - a strategy that has been used with great success by the economic right and has now been adopted by the religious right.

Back in 1978 Mr. Kristol urged corporations to make "philanthropic contributions to scholars and institutions who are likely to advocate preservation of a strong private sector." That was delicately worded, but the clear implication was that corporations that didn't like the results of academic research, however valid, should support people willing to say something more to their liking.

Mr. Kristol led by example, using The Public Interest to promote supply-side economics, a doctrine whose central claim - that tax cuts have such miraculous positive effects on the economy that they pay for themselves - has never been backed by evidence. He would later concede, or perhaps boast, that he had a "cavalier attitude toward the budget deficit."

"Political effectiveness was the priority," he wrote in 1995, "not the accounting deficiencies of government."

Corporations followed his lead, pouring a steady stream of money into think tanks that created a sort of parallel intellectual universe, a world of "scholars" whose careers are based on toeing an ideological line, rather than on doing research that stands up to scrutiny by their peers.

You might have thought that a strategy of creating doubt about inconvenient research results could work only in soft fields like economics. But it turns out that the strategy works equally well when deployed against the hard sciences.

The most spectacular example is the campaign to discredit research on global warming. Despite an overwhelming scientific consensus, many people have the impression that the issue is still unresolved. This impression reflects the assiduous work of conservative think tanks, which produce and promote skeptical reports that look like peer-reviewed research, but aren't. And behind it all lies lavish financing from the energy industry, especially ExxonMobil.

There are several reasons why fake research is so effective. One is that nonscientists sometimes find it hard to tell the difference between research and advocacy - if it's got numbers and charts in it, doesn't that make it science?

Even when reporters do know the difference, the conventions of he-said-she-said journalism get in the way of conveying that knowledge to readers. I once joked that if President Bush said that the Earth was flat, the headlines of news articles would read, "Opinions Differ on Shape of the Earth." The headlines on many articles about the intelligent design controversy come pretty close.

Finally, the self-policing nature of science - scientific truth is determined by peer review, not public opinion - can be exploited by skilled purveyors of cultural resentment. Do virtually all biologists agree that Darwin was right? Well, that just shows that they're elitists who think they're smarter than the rest of us.

Which brings us, finally, to intelligent design. Some of America's most powerful politicians have a deep hatred for Darwinism. Tom DeLay, the House majority leader, blamed the theory of evolution for the Columbine school shootings. But sheer political power hasn't been enough to get creationism into the school curriculum. The theory of evolution has overwhelming scientific support, and the country isn't ready - yet - to teach religious doctrine in public schools.

But what if creationists do to evolutionary theory what corporate interests did to global warming: create a widespread impression that the scientific consensus has shaky foundations?

Creationists failed when they pretended to be engaged in science, not religious indoctrination: "creation science" was too crude to fool anyone. But intelligent design, which spreads doubt about evolution without being too overtly religious, may succeed where creation science failed.

The important thing to remember is that like supply-side economics or global-warming skepticism, intelligent design doesn't have to attract significant support from actual researchers to be effective. All it has to do is create confusion, to make it seem as if there really is a controversy about the validity of evolutionary theory. That, together with the political muscle of the religious right, may be enough to start a process that ends with banishing Darwin from the classroom.






Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : Paul Krugman
Ecrire un commentaire - Voir les commentaires - Recommander
Mardi 27 décembre 2005 2 27 /12 /2005 16:04



Paolo décrit dans son livre...




...la philosophie des 'Supply-Siders'
(correspond en partie à la philosophie des défenseurs de l'école autrichienne en économie, pauvre Wittgenstein...!) aux  E.-U.
après avoit lu quasiment tous ses livres et une grande partie de ses NBER-papers, je ne peux que lui donner, hélas,  raison...(en analysant la lignée philosophique et logique de ses argumentations en fonction du temps...)


Parenthèse ouverte, parenthèse fermée...









"  switch"   ...



"The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air (maybe collateral effects and damages due to the consumption of some illicit drugs?) , are distilling tehir frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back...soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good and evil.



John Maynard Keynes




"  re-switch"  ...





Preface


“ …But it has also been the age of the policy entrepreneur: the economist who tells politicians what they want to hear. The way that a small group of “supply-siders”, preaching a doctrine that even conservative economists regarded as nonsense, came to dominate American economic policy is one of the wonders of our age. The story of the “strategic traders”, who are in effect the liberal counterparts of the supply-siders, is still unfolding. …”




Act I, Scene II



“…It is the late 1970s. A powerful conservative political movement has risen. The ideological core of this movement is a group of so-called supply-siders, who combine a rejection of Keynesianism with a belief that sharp tax cuts will produce a tremendous surge in economic growth, so much that one need not to worry about offsetting these cuts by reducing expenditures. The supply-siders draw some legitimacy for their ideas from economists like Martin Feldstein; but the supply-siders themselves are primarily journalists and political staffers, with only a few renegade professors.
When Ronny runs for President, he bases his campaign on supply-side ideas. Even fellow Republicans are aghast: George Bush calls it “voodoo economics.” And the Republican establishment is sure that once in office, Reagan will turn to real experts for advice. But they are wrong: he goes through with the supply-side program. The policy entrepreneurs of the right have seized power. …”




Taxation and economic Growth


“…In the next chapter we’ll turn to the “supply-siders”, a movement of radical conservatives who believed that tax cuts would lead to a huge surge of economic growth. Most famous of these supply-siders was Arthur Laffer, who claimed that a tax cut would lead to so much more output that revenue would actually rise. The important thing to realize here is that neither Feldstein nor his followers made any such extravagant claims.

One example may take the point. In the Bush years (1988-92), the centerpiece of conservative demands for further tax cuts was the idea of reducing capital gains; indeed, Republicans came to put almost religious faith in the power of a capital gains cut to energize the economy. But in 1980, Lawrence Summers, in a paper that made a very strong case for reducing the rate of taxation on corporations and investors, estimated that even a complete elimination of the tax on capital gains would take almost ten years to raise U.S. output by a single percentage point….”




The situation in 1980



“… What one might have expected was a modest, less than revolutionary shift in policy. Indeed, such a shift had already begun under President Jimmy Carter: it was Carter who deregulated airlines, trucking, and oil, and there were even some modest cuts in taxes on the very well-off during the Carter years. In January 1980, one might reasonably have predicted a mild trend in the same direction, whoever won the election.
That wasn’t how it turned out, because the persuasive, reasonable conservatives who made the case for lower taxes didn’t end up defining the Republican policy. Instead, it was a very different group: the supply-siders.

“…Most people who think about supply-side economics at all, probably imagine that it is simply a strong form of conservative economics, basically Milton Friedman carried a step or two further. But the story of supply-side economics is much stranger than that. There are many conservative economists; indeed, as we saw in the last two chapters, a conservative intellectual agenda dominated academic work on macro-economics and public finance for much of the 1970s and 1980s. But these academic conservatives are not supply-siders, nor have the supply-siders been drawn from their ranks. Instead, supply-side economics was and remains a movement of outsiders, of a small group that has never found respectability even within mainstream conservatism, exiles in their own intellectual country. Yet this group came to control first the world’s most powerful business paper, then the economic policies of the world’s most powerful nation. …”

“…The ideas embraced by the Reagan administration were, however, anything but deep. To the astonishment of the serious conservatives, the real winners of 1980 turned out to be the supply-siders – ideologues whose economic concepts were cartoonlike in their simplicity, who dismissed conventional economics because they could not be bothered to understand it. …”





Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : Paul Krugman
Ecrire un commentaire - Voir les commentaires - Recommander
Vendredi 30 décembre 2005 5 30 /12 /2005 22:17






Paolo nous résume ce qu'il y a eu l'année passée...












A year ago, everyone expected President Bush to get his way on Social Security.

A year ago, everyone thought Congress would make Mr. Bush's tax cuts permanent, ...

A year ago, Mr. Bush made many Americans feel safe, ...

A year ago, before "Brownie, you're doing a heck of a job" became a national punch line, ...

A year ago, hardly anyone outside Washington had heard of Jack Abramoff, ...

A year ago, Dick Cheney, who repeatedly cited discredited evidence linking Saddam to 9/11, ...

A year ago, Howard Dean - who was among the very few prominent figures to question...

A year ago, it was clear that before the Iraq war, the administration suppressed information...

A year ago, the Washington establishment treated Ayad Allawi as if he were Nelson Mandela.

A year ago, when everyone respectable agreed that we must "stay the course," only a handful ...

A year ago, Mr. Bush hadn't yet openly reneged on Scott McClellan's 2003 pledge that "if ...

A year ago, we didn't know that Mr. Bush was lying, or at least being deceptive, ...

A year ago, most Americans thought Mr. Bush was honest.

A year ago, we didn't know for sure that almost all the politicians and pundits who thundered, ...



Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : Paul Krugman
Ecrire un commentaire - Voir les commentaires - Recommander
Lundi 2 janvier 2006 1 02 /01 /2006 09:50







- Miami




                ≈ ?



 

Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : Paul Krugman
Ecrire un commentaire - Voir les commentaires - Recommander
Mardi 7 mars 2006 2 07 /03 /2006 23:56






"In the spring of 2005 a panel of “conservative scholars and policy leaders” was asked to identify the most dangerous books of the 19th and 20th centuries.... Charles Darwin and Betty Friedan ranked high on the list. But The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money did very well, too. In fact, John Maynard Keynes beat out V.I. Lenin and Frantz Fanon. Keynes, who declared in the book’s oft-quoted conclusion that “soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil,” [384] would probably have been pleased.

Over the past 70 years The General Theory has shaped the views even of those who haven’t heard of it, or who believe they disagree with it. A businessman who warns that falling confidence poses risks for the economy is a Keynesian, whether he knows it or not. A politician who promises that his tax cuts will create jobs by putting spending money in peoples’ pockets is a Keynesian, even if he claims to abhor the doctrine. Even self-proclaimed supply-side economists, who claim to have refuted Keynes, fall back on unmistakably Keynesian stories to explain why the economy turned down in a given year....

It’s probably safe to assume that the “conservative scholars and policy leaders” who pronounced The General Theory one of the most dangerous books of the past two centuries haven’t read it. But they’re sure it’s a leftist tract, a call for big government and high taxes.... [T]he arrival of Keynesian economics in American classrooms was delayed by a nasty case of academic McCarthyism. The first introductory textbook to present Keynesian thinking, written by the Canadian economist Lorie Tarshis, was targeted by a right-wing pressure campaign aimed at university trustees. As a result of this campaign, many universities that had planned to adopt the book for their courses cancelled their orders, and sales of the book, which was initially very successful, collapsed. Professors at Yale University, to their credit, continued to assign the book; their reward was to be attacked by the young William F. Buckley for propounding “evil ideas.”

But Keynes was no socialist - he came to save capitalism, not to bury it. And there’s a sense in which The General Theory was... a conservative book.... Keynes wrote during a time of mass unemployment, of waste and suffering on an incredible scale. A reasonable man might well have concluded that capitalism had failed, and that only... the nationalization of the means of production - could restore economic sanity.... Keynes argued that these failures had surprisingly narrow, technical causes... because Keynes saw the causes of mass unemployment as narrow and technical, he argued that the problem’s solution could also be narrow and technical: the system needed a new alternator, but there was no need to replace the whole car. In particular, “no obvious case is made out for a system of State Socialism which would embrace most of the economic life of the community.”... Keynes argued that much less intrusive government policies could ensure adequate effective demand, allowing the market economy to go on as before.

Still, there is a sense in which free-market fundamentalists are right to hate Keynes. If your doctrine says that free markets, left to their own devices, produce the best of all possible worlds, and that government intervention in the economy always makes things worse, Keynes is your enemy. And he is an especially dangerous enemy because his ideas have been vindicated so thoroughly by experience.

Stripped down, the conclusions of The General Theory might be expressed as four bullet points:

1. Economies can and often do suffer from an overall lack of demand, which leads to involuntary unemployment
2. The economy’s automatic tendency to correct shortfalls in demand, if it exists at all, operates slowly and painfully
3. Government policies to increase demand, by contrast, can reduce unemployment quickly
4. Sometimes increasing the money supply won’t be enough to persuade the private sector to spend more, and government spending must step into the breach

To a modern practitioner of economic policy, none of this - except, possibly, the last point - sounds startling or even especially controversial. But these ideas weren’t just radical when Keynes proposed them; they were very nearly unthinkable. And the great achievement of The General Theory was precisely to make them thinkable....

So now let’s talk about the core of the book, and what it took for Keynes to write it.... In Book I, as Keynes gives us a first taste of what he’s going to do, he writes of Malthus, whose intuition told him that general failures of demand were possible, but had no model to back that intuition: “[S]ince Malthus was unable to explain clearly (apart from an appeal to the facts of common observation) how and why effective demand could be deficient or excessive, he failed to provide an alternative construction; and Ricardo conquered England as completely as the Holy Inquisition conquered Spain.”... That need to “provide an alternative construction” explains many of the passages in The General Theory that, 70 years later, can seem plodding or even turgid.... When you’re challenging a long-established orthodoxy, the vision thing doesn’t work unless you’re very precise about the details....

Keynes’s struggle with classical economics was much more difficult than we can easily imagine today. Modern introductory economics textbooks - the new book by Krugman and Wells included - usually contain a discussion of something we call the “classical model” of the price level. But that model offers far too flattering a picture of the classical economics Keynes had to escape from. What we call the classical model today is really a post-Keynesian attempt to rationalize pre-Keynesian views.... The real classical model... was, essentially, a model of a barter economy, in which money and nominal prices don’t matter, with a monetary theory of the price level appended in a non-essential way, like a veneer on a tabletop. It was a model in which Say’s Law applied.... One measure of how hard it was for Keynes to divest himself of Say’s Law is that to this day some people deny what Keynes realized - that the “law” is, at best, a useless tautology when individuals have the option of accumulating money rather than purchasing real goods and services....

There’s a widespread impression among modern macroeconomists that we’ve left Keynes behind, for better or for worse. But that impression, I’d argue, is based either on a misreading or a nonreading.... If you don’t read Keynes himself, but only read his work as refracted through various interpreters, it’s easy to imagine that The General Theory is much cruder than it is.... Let me address one issue in particular: did Paul Samuelson, whose 1948 textbook introduced the famous 45-degree diagram to explain the multiplier, misrepresent what Keynes was all about? There are commentators who insist passionately that Samuelson defiled the master’s thought. Yet I can’t see any significant difference between Samuelson’s formulation and Keynes’s own equation for equilibrium employment, right there in Chapter 3: [29]. Represented graphically, Keynes’s version looks a lot like Samuelson’s diagram; quantities are measured in wage units rather than constant dollars, and the nifty 45-degree feature is absent, but the logic is exactly the same.

The bottom line, then, is that we really are all Keynesians now. A very large part of what modern macroeconomists do derives directly from The General Theory; the framework Keynes introduced holds up very well to this day.

Yet there were, of course, important things that Keynes missed or failed to anticipate. The strongest criticism one can make of The General Theory is that Keynes mistook an episode for a trend. He wrote in a decade when even a near-zero interest rate wasn’t low enough to restore full employment, and brilliantly explained the implications of that fact - in particular, the trap in which the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve found themselves, unable to create employment no matter how much they tried to increase the money supply. He knew that matters had not always been thus. But he believed, wrongly, that the monetary environment of the 1930s would be the norm from then on.... In the United States the era of ultra-low interest rates ended in the 1950s... Yet the United States has, in general, succeeded in achieving adequate levels of effective demand. The British experience has been similar. And although there is large-scale unemployment in continental Europe, that unemployment seems to have more to do with supply-side issues than with sheer lack of demand.... [Keynes] underestimated the ability of mature economies to stave off diminishing returns. Keynes’s “euthanasia of the rentier” was predicated on the presumption that as capital accumulates, profitable private investment projects become harder to find.... [T]he euthanasia of the rentier does not seem imminent. But there’s an even more important factor that has kept interest rates relatively high, and monetary policy effective: persistent inflation, which has become embedded in expectations.... [E]ven now, when inflation is considered low, most of the 20-year rate reflects expected inflation rather than expected real returns.

The irony is that persistent inflation, which makes The General Theory seem on the surface somewhat less directly relevant... can be attributed in part to Keynes’s influence, for better or worse. For worse: the inflationary takeoff of the 1970s was partly caused by expansionary monetary and fiscal policy, adopted by Keynes-influenced governments with unrealistic employment goals.... For better: both the Bank of England, explicitly, and the Federal Reserve, implicitly, have a deliberate strategy of encouraging persistent low but positive inflation, precisely to avoid finding themselves in the trap Keynes diagnosed....

What makes The General Theory truly unique... is that it combined towering intellectual achievement with immediate practical relevance to a global economic crisis.... There has been nothing like Keynes’s achievement in the annals of social science. Perhaps there can’t be. Keynes was right about the problem of his day: the world economy had magneto trouble, and all it took to get the economy going again was a surprisingly narrow, technical fix. But most economic problems probably do have complex causes and don’t have easy solutions....
"








Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : Paul Krugman
Ecrire un commentaire - Voir les 1 commentaires - Recommander
Mardi 14 mars 2006 2 14 /03 /2006 18:33



'A Few Notes on Income Inequality - Krugman - NYT Web Journal: growing international trade plays some role in growing inequality, but it is, literally, a fraction of a fraction of the story. That's cold comfort for the factory worker whose plant has just been closed because it couldn't compete with imports from China, or the software engineer whose job has just been outsourced to India-- and unless we can do something to provide more economic security, protectionist forces will become unstoppable. But I still believe that we can increase economic security and reduce inequality without shutting down international trade.

One of the truly strange features about discussions of inequality is the way people shy away from talking about the extent to which the gains from rising inequality have gone to a tiny, wealthy elite.

Here's a mild example. A few days ago Steve Pearlstein of the Washington Post -- a good guy, and sensible -- wrote about income inequality. As I did in my column just a few days earlier, "Feeling No Pain," he emphasized the "retrospective income" distribution data released by the I.R.S. (Paper at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04asastr.pdf. Tables at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04asastr.xls.)

As he pointed out, those data show that the share of income received by the top 10 percent of taxpayers rose from 33 percent in 1979 to 44 percent in 2003. And for his pains, he was smeared by someone at the Cato Institute who needs help -- technical help. Hint to Alan Reynolds: check which table you're looking at before claiming that Congressional Budget Office data refute a statement you don't like.

But Pearlstein stops there, leaving the impression that everyone in the top 10 percent was a big winner. In fact, there was hardly any rise in the share of income going to people between the 90th and 95th percentiles: almost all the gain went to the top 5 percent. And most of the gain went to a very small elite. The income share of the top 1 percent went from 9.6 to 17.5 percent, accounting for more than 70 percent of the top decile's gain. The income share of the top 0.25 percent went from 4.9 to 10.5, accounting for a bit more than half the total gain.

Why stop with data that convey the false impression that the winners from inequality are a fairly large group? Does talking about the reality that a very small elite has gotten the lion's share of the gains sound too, um, shrill? '




P.-V.:

Tu penses. La difference du 'profit' ne peut qu'etre (de nos jours)  que  fonction de 'L' ...vu que 'A' est  devenu 'global'...



Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : Paul Krugman
Ecrire un commentaire - Voir les commentaires - Recommander

Liens/Links

Recherche

Présentation

Créer un blog sur over-blog.com - Contact - C.G.U. - Rémunération en droits d'auteur - Signaler un abus - Articles les plus commentés