Calendrier

Novembre 2009
L M M J V S D
            1
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15
16 17 18 19 20 21 22
23 24 25 26 27 28 29
30            
<< < > >>

Recommander

adresse e-mail (courriel)

panchovillan@yahoo.com

Syndication

  • Flux RSS des articles

Brad DeLong

Lundi 4 juillet 2005

 

Europe’s Neo-Liberal Challenge

J. Bradford DeLong



For over 20 years I have argued that Western Europe’s high unemployment rates are unsustainable. At the end of the 1970’s, monetarists bet that only a transitory and modest increase in unemployment could rein in the creeping – and trotting – inflation of the industrial west, and that in retrospect the cost of returning to effective price stability would be judged worthwhile. In Britain and the United States, this monetarist bet turned out well. In Western Europe, it did not.

Over the past 25 years in Europe, unemployment rose as monetary policy was tightened and interest rates were raised to fight inflation. But after inflation succumbed, unemployment did not fall – or not by much. If unemployment was not stuck quite at Great Depression levels, it remained high enough to make long-term joblessness or the fear of long-term joblessness a defining experience.


Societies in which the official unemployment rate stands at 10% or more for generations are societies in which government economic management has failed. So, for 20 years it has seemed to me that Western Europe’s underlying political equilibrium – corporatist bargaining and ample social insurance, on the one hand, and tight monetary policies, on the other – must crack.


Twin fears appear to be paralyzing European policymakers. Europe’s central bankers fear that their political masters will order them to loosen monetary policy, that the structural reforms needed to free up aggregate supply will not be forthcoming, and that the result will be a return to the inflation of the 1970’s. In short, they fear that all of the sacrifices made for price stability will have been in vain.


West European politicians, for their part, fear the opposite outcome. They worry that even after undertaking structural reforms to reduce the attractiveness of unemployment benefits and increase the ability of workers to move to jobs and of firms to move to workers, central bankers will continue to insist on tight money. In short, they fear that, with no expansion of output or employment, the net effect will simply be an increase in poverty.


Of course, these fears are accompanied by the hope that structural reforms and monetary expansion work in harmony, boosting employment and output without raising inflation by much. But the reality is that steps toward looser monetary policies are non-existent – especially with the fledgling European Central Bank anxious to establish its inflation-fighting credibility – and that steps toward structural reforms are half-hearted, hesitant, and small.


For 20 years, I have been wrong: West European polities have remained stable despite the exclusion of a large proportion of citizens from meaningful participation in much of economic life. West European economies have continued to grow – albeit not as rapidly as they might have – despite bearing the heavy burden of the unemployed 10% or more of the labor force.


Now, though, it looks like I may finally be right – or at least right to worry, if not to panic. The French rejected the European Union constitution, primarily – or so it appears – because further European integration, it is feared, must bring in its wake the huge costs and disruptions of neo-liberalism.


It is one thing to back the “European project” when the idea is to bind Germany so tightly to France that never again will anybody think it worthwhile to wage a war over what language is spoken in Alsace-Lorraine. It is another when the European project means that French workers face competition from Polish plumbers, Romanian farmers, and Turkish shop clerks.


In Germany, the electorate seems poised to eject Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder out of discontent with his tepid allegiance to the neo-liberal project. The problem is that the electorate will then get four years of rule by a chancellor, Angela Merkel, whose commitment to the neo-liberal project is almost as strong as mine. I think that Germany would be better off in a decade under more neo-liberal policies. But this does not seem to be what the German electorate wants, and this makes the complexion of German politics four years from now incalculable.


Coupled with all this is northern European discontent with the central bankers, specifically with the ECB and the euro. It is not that the end of European Monetary Union is on the agenda; it is merely that people have begun thinking about possible low-probability futures in which the end of EMU might be placed on the agenda. That is enough to shake asset prices worldwide.


Western Europe’s accomplishments since World War II are among the most heartening and impressive success stories in world history. Everyone should want today’s undivided Europe to build on these accomplishments, rather than for generations of high unemployment to jeopardize them.


But this will require a shift in the ECB’s attitude. Europe needs a monetary policy that views aiding employment growth in northern Europe as more important than continental price stability.


There will, after all be inflation in southern and eastern Europe – there must be, for as regions develop and industrialize their terms of trade must improve, and under a monetary union regional inflation is how this can happen. The ECB should not try to balance inflation in the south and east with deflation in the north in order to hit artificial continent-wide targets.

 

 

 

 


Par Pancho Villa
Ecrire un commentaire - Voir les 0 commentaires - Recommander
Dimanche 31 juillet 2005

Inviting the avoidable


By J BRADFORD DELONG


MAY BE it is excessive skittishness, or perhaps it is the result of global financial volatility in recent years — crises in Mexico in 1994-95, East Asia in 1997-98, Russia in 1998, and then in Brazil, Turkey, and Argentina — but we economists are more concerned about monetary affairs and possible future disasters than we have been in many decades.

This month, the Switzerland-based Bank for International Settlements (BIS) was the latest to worry aloud about the financial risks that the world seems to be building into its future. “[A]ll the countries hit by financial crisis... experience[d] a very sharp slowdown” the BIS says of the recent past.

It then cites “global current account imbalances” particularly “the US external deficit” describing it as “unprecedented for a reserve currency country to have a current account deficit of such magnitude.” In short, the world has become “increasingly prone to financial turbulence.

The BIS hints at the possibility of a financial crisis that, with the US at its centre, would dwarf by at least an order of magnitude all crises that have occurred since 1933. Yet, in response to this risk, the BIS issues the standard textbook recommendations.

Countries whose policies and economies are out of balance should change their policies, thereby restoring balance: “deficit countries should reduce the rate of growth of domestic spending below that of domestic production. Allowing their currencies to depreciate in real terms would make their products more competitive, and also provide an incentive for production to shift out of non-tradables into tradables.

This is economists’ polite code for the message that the US must gradually cut its budget deficit, while other countries — like China and Japan — must gradually let the value of the dollar fall and that of their own currencies rise. So the BIS proposes nothing new or particularly attention-grabbing.

But if we turn to America’s government, we see an enormous pretence that the current budget deficit is not a problem. As Stan Collender, a noted observer of the US federal budget, has commented, “No one with federal budget responsibilities actually seems to be interested in the budget.

This is not “because the budget committees are too busy....[T]he House and Senate...are not doing much of anything...[because] they don’t want to.” Within the Bush administration, director of the office of management and budget Josh Bolten “has been virtually invisible,” while “the president and vice-president...avoid talking publicly about the budget.

Let us be clear on this point: it is not that politicians who wish to take the lead on fiscal consolidation are failing to gain traction; it is that there are no politicians — at least none with any agenda-setting influence — who are even trying to steer the US towards adopting a more responsible fiscal policy.

This is a grotesque failure of leadership. Governments that pursue policies — whether US fiscal laxity or China’s just-removed exchange-rate peg — that create unsustainable imbalances do so for what they regard as important political reasons. Appeals to them to change their policies, and thus contribute to the common global good of financial stability, are fruitless unless others are seen to change their policies, act responsibly, and so contribute to the common good as well.

International policy coordination requires a leader, a first mover. But, while the US, as the world’s largest economy, is best suited for this role, it has so far failed to play its part. Treasury secretary John Snow has spent almost no public time on the budget, but a lot of public time on China. Republican political operatives care far less about national savings than they do about manufacturing-sector job losses.

So what else is new?” you may ask — and with good reason. The list of issues on which the Bush administration has failed to lead is a long one, and failure to take steps to diminish the risks of future financial catastrophe cannot rank very high. The entire Bush administration has been a succession of leadership failures, so why harp on its poor financial management?

From a purely practical point of view, one reason is that ensuring global financial stability is an issue on which real progress can be made relatively easily. The Bush administration may not care that deficit reduction is the right policy for America, but it might care far more if the issue were framed as a prerequisite for policy changes abroad that diminish pressure from imports on domestic manufacturing employment.






Par Pancho Villa
Ecrire un commentaire - Voir les 0 commentaires - Recommander
Mercredi 14 décembre 2005




Una forma habitual para informarse



by Brad DeLong




" No es extraño, pues, que cada vez más redactores, columnistas, directores y editores de medios en EE UU sean consumidores de blogs políticos. El director ejecutivo de The New York Times, Bill Keller, declaró en noviembre de 2003: "Suelo mirar los blogs (...) A veces leo algo en alguno de ellos que me hace pensar que hemos metido la pata". Howard Kurtz, uno de los principales columnistas de EE UU, cita a bloggers en su columna en The Washington Post. Muchos influyentes columnistas especializados en asuntos internacionales, como Paul Krugman y Fareed Zakaria, dicen que leer blogs es una de sus formas habituales para informarse.


Para los medios convencionales –que, casi por definición, tienen déficit de conocimientos especializados–, los weblogs sirven, asimismo, como depósitos de información. Y para los lectores de todo el mundo, pueden hacer el papel de hombre de la calle, puesto que ofrecen informaciones de primera mano, sin filtro, sobre otros países. Esta faceta es especialmente útil, dado el descenso del número de corresponsales de prensa desde los 90. Las bitácoras pueden incluso proporcionar análisis expertos y resúmenes de textos en otras lenguas –artículos de periódico o estudios oficiales– que, de otro modo, los periodistas y comentaristas no podrían leer o entender. "


 


 

 

Par Pancho Villa
Ecrire un commentaire - Voir les 0 commentaires - Recommander
Samedi 24 décembre 2005



...ou bien comme Brad DeLong (ah, pourquoi ne sont-ils pas tous comme lui?) le décri(e)t si bien sur son blog:



The Intellectual Bankruptcy of the Republican Leadership





"...The insiders' theory - what we might call the true tax-cut theory - was memorably described by David Stockman, Ronald Reagan's budget director, as "starving the beast." Proponents of this theory argue that conservatives should seek tax cuts not because they won't create budget deficits, but because they will. Starve-the-beasters believe that budget deficits will lead to spending cuts that will eventually achieve their true aim: shrinking the government's role back to what it was under Calvin Coolidge.
..." (**)







(**) "Starve-the-beast is a strategy of using budget deficits in order to force the government to reduce its social spending; a timely example is the tax cutting policy under U.S. President George W. Bush. The word beast in the expression refers to the government and the social programs it funds, such as Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families), and implies that these social programs are destructive.

A current well-known proponent of starve-the-beast in the U.S. is Grover Norquist.

It appears the earliest reference to "starving the beast" as a doctrine was made during the Reagan administration by White House budget director David Stockman, to describe its fiscal philosophy."





"Demokraten haben ein eher europäisches Weltbild. Für sie trägt der Staat Verantwortung für seine Bürger und sein Land. Republikaner bleiben dagegen eher dem uramerikanischen Freiheitsgedanken treu. Der sieht staatliche Einflussnahme auf die freie Marktwirtschaft, die Abhängigkeit der Unterschichten von Sozialprogrammen sowie die Sonderbehandlung von Minderheiten als einen Verlust genau jener Eigenverantwortung, die Grundlage jeder persönlichen Freiheit sei. Die Steuergeschenke für die Reichen und die konsequente Defizitpolitik der Republikaner basieren auf einem Prinzip, das Ronald Reagans Haushaltsplaner David Stockman «Starving the Beast» nannte – das Biest aushungern."




"Starving the beast" : affamer la bête. Stratégie préconisée par les néo-conservateurs américains pour se débarrasser de l'Etat fédéral, c'est-à-dire augmenter les dépenses sans retour économique visible (l'armée, par exemple) et diminuer les impots, de manière à ce que le déficit, la dette étatiques et les intérêts qui en résultent soient si importants que le gouvernement, quel que soit sa couleur politique, n'ait plus comme solution pendant dix ou quinze ans que de diminuer les prestations de l'Etat."







Par Pancho Villa
Ecrire un commentaire - Voir les 0 commentaires - Recommander
Dimanche 15 janvier 2006


Exuberancia semirracional

J. Bradford DeLong



En 1996, el economista de Yale Robert Shiller miró a su alrededor, sopesó los registros históricos y concluyó que el mercado de valores estadounidense estaba sobrevaluado. En el pasado, siempre que las relaciones entre precio y ganancias eran altas, los retornos de las acciones futuras de largo plazo eran bajos. Sin embargo, ahora los precios del índice amplio S&P 500 son 29 veces el promedio de las ganancias de la última década.

En base a los análisis de regresión econométrica realizados por Shiller y John Campbell, de Harvard, Shiller predijo en 1996 que el S&P 500 sería una mala inversión durante la década siguiente. Argumentó que en la década que terminaría en enero de 2006, caería el valor real del S&P 500. Incluso incluyendo los dividendos, su estimación de los retornos probables ajustados a la inflación a los inversionistas de acciones del S&P 500 era cero, muy por debajo del cerca del 6% anual real que hemos llegado a considerar como típico del mercado de valores estadounidense.

Los argumentos de Shiller eran convincentes. Persuadieron a Alan Greenspan a dar su famoso discurso de la “exuberancia irracional” en el American Enterprise Institute en diciembre de 1996. Ciertamente me convencieron a mí también.

No obstante, Shiller estaba equivocado. A menos que el mercado de valores de EE.UU. colapse antes de fines de junio, la última década lo habrá visto ofrecer retornos ligeramente superiores a los promedios históricos... y muy, muy superiores a cero. Quienes invirtieron y reinvirtieron su dinero en el mercado de valores de EE.UU. en la última década casi lo han duplicado, incluso si se toma en cuenta la inflación.

¿Por qué estaba equivocado Shiller? Podemos apuntar a tres factores, cada uno de los cuales puede explicar cerca de un tercio de los retornos reales de un 6%, en lugar de cero, de la última década:

· Las revoluciones de alta tecnología que han estado detrás de la muy real “nueva economía”, que han acelerado el crecimiento de la productividad de las compañías estadounidenses.

· Los cambios en la distribución del ingreso, alejándose del trabajo y acercándose al capital, lo que ha hecho crecer las utilidades corporativas como parte de la producción.

· La creciente tolerancia al riesgo por parte de los inversionistas del mercado de valores, lo que parece haber elevado las relaciones de precio a ganancias de largo plazo en cerca de un 20%.

Ninguno de estos tres factores era obvio en 1996 (aunque había signos del primero y asomos del tercero para aquellos lo suficientemente inteligentes o afortunados como para advertirlos). En 1996, apostar a los análisis de regresión de Shiller era algo razonable y tal vez inteligente. Pero también era algo tremendamente riesgoso, como aprendió todo aquél que siguió la estrategia de cartera implícita en su análisis.

Esto no quita nada de la importancia de la pregunta que abordara Shiller. ¿Por qué los mercados de valores del mundo están sujetos a arranques de “exuberancia irracional” y “pesimismo excesivo”? ¿Por qué los inversionistas racionales e informados no dan más pasos para apostar con fuerza a los valores fundamentales, contra los arrebatos de entusiasmo de la muchedumbre desinformada?

La década pasada nos ofrece dos razones. Primero, si concedemos que los análisis de regresión de Shiller identificaron correctamente los valores fundamentales de largo plazo hace una década, apostar a ellos en el largo plazo es tremendamente riesgoso. En una década pueden ocurrir montones de buenas noticias, suficientes como para quebrar un mercado bajista incluso ligeramente apalancado cuando los precios de las acciones parecen altos, y pueden ocurrir montones de malas noticias, suficientes como para quebrar un mercado alcista incluso ligeramente apalancado cuando los precios de las acciones parecen bajos.

En consecuencia, incluso en situaciones extremas –como el punto álgido de la burbuja de las punto com a fines de 1999 y principios de 2000-, es muy difícil hacer grandes apuestas a los valores fundamentales, incluso para aquellos que creen saber cuáles son. Es todavía más difícil para quienes dicen saber esto y desean hacer grandes apuestas de largo plazo en contrario convencer a otros que les confíen su dinero.

Si fuera fácil correr los velos del tiempo y la ignorancia y evaluar los valores fundamentales de largo plazo con un alto grado de confianza, sería simple y seguro hacer grandes apuestas de largo plazo en sentido contrario sobre ellos. En ese caso, el dinero inteligente moderaría los entusiasmos –positivo y negativo- de la multitud no informada.

Sin embargo, por supuesto, no podemos superar la incertidumbre de largo plazo. Como lo puso J.P. Morgan cuando se le pidió que predijera lo que harían los precios de las acciones: “Van a fluctuar”.



Par Pancho Villa
Ecrire un commentaire - Voir les 0 commentaires - Recommander
Vendredi 10 mars 2006


Glaukon: What are you reading?

Admetos: William the Silent--a biography of a sixteenth century Dutch prince and politician. What are you reading?

Glaukon: The Assassin's Gate--an account of America's ongoing misadventure in Iraq.

Admetos: They are both works of politico-military history, but other than that these books must be about very different things, yes?

Glaukon: No.

Admetos: No?

Glaukon: Our big-headed friend would say that they are about the same thing.

Admetos: He would?

Glaukon: Let me put it this way: Your book is about how the world's preeminent superpower sends the most powerful conventional military force the world had ever seen to occupy and reform a distant land. But the alien occupiers find themselves in a hostile land riddled with violent religious sectarians. The occupiers do not speak the language or understand the politics. Powerful local neighbors make lots of trouble. And the situation spirals downward. Right?

Admetos: You have it. That's what my book is about.

Glaukon: And that's what my book is about.




Par Pancho Villa
Ecrire un commentaire - Voir les 1 commentaires - Recommander
Mardi 14 mars 2006


Europe's Free Riders

J. Bradford DeLong

In the United States, individual states that follow unsound fiscal policies face a penalty. Their bonds sell at a discount relative to those of better-managed individual states. The higher debt service they must pay serves – to some degree – as a form of discipline against the temptation to spend now and pay later.

Of course, the discipline of the market is not perfect: the bond market does not “see” implicit future liabilities (like promised pension payments) to any great degree. Nevertheless, this enforced fiscal discipline, combined with individual states’ own internal budgetary procedures, has prevented a large scale state-level fiscal crisis from occurring in the US since the Great Depression.

Let us now turn to Europe. Before the advent of the euro, there were many fiscal crises in individual nation-states in southern Europe, which produced waves of high inflation. But, with the single currency in place, the road to solving a fiscal crisis through inflation has been closed, as the European Central Bank (ECB) now stands watch over monetary policy.

Nevertheless, even with nation-states no longer able to rely on inflation to solve their unbalanced finances, the single currency allows them to use the debt capacity properly belonging to other members of the European Union to extend their spending sprees and postpone political accountability for periods of laissez les bons temps roulés. To head off this possibility, the EU created the Stability and Growth Pact: government deficits had to be less than 3% of GDP.

Last week, the government of Germany – once the most fiscally prudent and disciplined EU country – broke the pact’s rules for fiscal discipline for the fifth consecutive year, and did so without (much) apology. Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck signaled that he expected the European Commission to apply some sanctions to Germany: the credibility of the pact would, he said, be at stake if no action were taken. Thus, Germany would not block sanctions this time, as it did two and a half years ago.

But Steinbrueck also made it clear that he expects any sanctions in response to Germany’s predicted 3.4%-of-GDP fiscal deficit to be largely symbolic, not penalties that would cost its government or economy anything of significance. The Stability and Growth Pact is not – or is not yet – working anywhere near the way it was intended to work.

What about market discipline? Is the German government’s willingness to issue more debt and run bigger deficits limited because the market recognizes and penalizes nation states that allow their fiscal positions to weaken?

In a word, no. The interest rates on the euro-denominated sovereign debt of the twelve euro-zone governments are all very similar. So the market does not seem to care that countries have different potentials to generate exports to fund the financial flows needed for debt repayments, or different current and projected debt-to-GDP ratios.

Willem Buiter of the University of Amsterdam and Anne Sibert of the University of London believe that it is the ECB’s willingness to, in effect, accept all euro-zone debt as collateral that has undermined the market’s willingness to be an enforcer of fiscal prudence. As long as the marginal piece of German debt is used as collateral for a short-term loan or as the centerpiece of a repurchase agreement to gain liquidity, its value is much more likely to be determined by the terms on which the ECB accepts it as collateral than by its fundamentals. The ECB’s treatment of all such debt as equally powerful sources of back-up liquidity now trumps any analysis of differences in long-term sovereign risk.

In the long run, this is dangerous. Both market discipline and sound fiscal management are needed to create a reasonable chance of long-run price stability. Omit either a market penalty now for behavior that may become reckless or the institutional levers that give a voice to future generations, and you run grave risks – perhaps not today or tomorrow, but someday, and for the rest of your life.

As time passes, the coming of the single currency and the way that the euro has been implemented is generating more and more unease. Policy as a whole over the entire euro zone is too deflationary. The necessary transfers are not being made to make the common currency bearable to regions that lose out and are already in recession when the ECB tightens policy. The institutional foundations of stable long-run fiscal policy are being eroded. And now, Buiter and Sibert argue convincingly, the ECB is giving the market less scope to reward the thrifty and penalize the profligate than it should.

There is no movement of the soil yet, and there will not be for some time. But the ground under the euro may well begin to shift if things don’t change.


Par Pancho Villa
Ecrire un commentaire - Voir les 0 commentaires - Recommander
Lundi 10 avril 2006



Colonel Blake:
Gentlement, I'm Corporal O'Reilly, they call me Radar. You'll be staying in Major Burns' tent. I'll take your things over there now.

Colonel Blake: Get everything out of the Jeep...

Radar: Don't worry about the Jeep. I'll change the numbers.

Colonel Blake: ...Oh, and change the numbers on that Jeep.




L’Apocalypse fiscale

J. Bradford DeLong


Alors que les soutiens du président George W. Bush se sont émiettés aux États-Unis durant l'année dernière, l'élément le plus surprenant de ce mouvement est peut-être la rébellion des économistes et des observateurs des politiques économiques. La semaine dernière, Peggy Noonan, qui rédigeait les discours du président Reagan et du président Bush père, déclarait au Wall Street Journal que si elle avait su ce qu'allait être la politique fiscale de George W. Bush, elle aurait voté pour Al Gore aux élections présidentielles de 2000.

"Si j'avais pu croire [que George W. Bush] s'afficherait comme un républicain à la Rockefeller, très dépensier… Je n'aurais pas voté pour lui…" écrivait-elle. Bush "s'est présenté comme un conservateur… [et] le conservatisme est hostile, pour des raisons diverses allant de la philosophie et la pensée abstraite au pragmatisme et à l'action véritable, aux grosses dépenses et à une imposition lourde…" Elle exprime ensuite un désespoir quasi-total : "M. Bush n'a plus à se présenter aux élections et est dans une position où il peut s'engager et défendre, même si ce n'est que de manière rhétorique, le ralentissement et la réduction des dépenses. Il ne l'a pas fait. Et rien ne montre qu'il le fera…"

Noonan n'a pas tout à fait raison. George W. Bush ne s'est pas présenté comme le défenseur d'un conservatisme ordinaire, mais comme ce qu'il a appelé "le conservatisme à visage humain", entretenant ainsi une certaine ambiguïté. Certains n'en ont retenu que le "conservatisme" : ils s'attendaient à ce que la politique fiscale du gouvernement Bush garde la bride serrée sur les dépenses et élimine de nombreux programmes pour financer des réductions d'impôts importantes.

D'autres n'en ont retenu que le "visage humain" : ils s'attendaient à ce que la politique fiscale de Bush rejettent les réductions d'impôts et adoptent en priorité des dépenses de type Démocrate, notamment le développement des aides fédérales à l'éducation et aux prestations pharmaceutiques, montrant ainsi que les Républicains pouvaient faire fonctionner une version financièrement plus efficace de l'État providence. D'autres encore ont interprété ce "conservatisme à visage humain", comme le disait le commentateur Andrew Sullivan, comme un "écran de fumée…nécessaire pour tout repli réussi aussi vague soit-il de l'intervention de l'État dans un système de prestations insatiable." Ils s'attendaient à des réductions d'impôts suivies d'une attaque toutes voiles dehors sur les dépenses sociales quand les déficits auraient réapparu.

De ce fait, en 2000 et 2001, personne ne connaissait vraiment la direction politique du gouvernement Bush. Allait-il s'agir d'un conservatisme fiscal traditionnel? Allait-il faire ce que font les Démocrates mais en mieux? Allait-il "affamer l'animal" en gonflant la dette gouvernementale au point que les programmes sociaux devraient être réduits?

Les deux premières priorités, si elles sont bien conçues et mises en œuvre, représentent certainement des buts très honorables à instituer pour tout gouvernement. La troisième l'est moins et a peu de chance de réussir : elle repose sur le principe dangereusement fragile selon lequel les adversaires politiques du parti au pouvoir feront preuve d'un certain sens de l'intérêt général et se montreront moins impitoyables quand ils reviendront au pouvoir.

Les conservateurs et les Républicains pouvaient bien sûr espérer que leurs principales priorités politiques apparaîtraient alors comme la stratégie principale du gouvernement. Ils pouvaient également se contenter d'une des trois stratégies qu'ils espéraient voir mettre en œuvre, s'accordant en tout cas sur le fait que la politique fiscale allait toujours être meilleure qu'elle ne l'aurait été sous la férule des Démocrates.

C'est alors qu'une chose étrange s'est produite : le gouvernement Bush n'a mis en œuvre aucune des trois options que l'on croyait inscrites au programme. Le gouvernement a choisi une voie totalement différente : certes, il y eut d'importantes réductions d'impôts, mais des réductions mal conçues d'un point de vue de la perspective de la théorie de l'offre destinée à relancer la croissance, et des dépenses prioritaires intérieures relevant de la philosophie des Démocrates, qui furent mal mises en œuvre. En outre, le gouvernement Bush associa ses politiques avec une extraordinaire réticence à mettre un veto à tout ce qui venait du Congrès et, après les quelques mois qu'il fallut avant que cela ne devienne évident, à une incapacité totale à limiter l'action du Congrès.

Ce qu'il en est sorti ne représentait ni un conservatisme fiscal traditionnel, ni des politiques démocrates sans Démocrates, ni un populisme visant à affamer l 'animal mais une chose sans nom. Il y a un échange entre deux personnages dans une scène du film "Apocalypse Now" qui capture l'anti-éthique qui caractérise bien les politiques du gouvernement Bush :

Willard : "On m'a dit que vous étiez devenu complètement fou et que vos méthodes n'étaient pas logiques."

Kurtz : "Mes méthodes ne sont-elles pas logiques?"

Willard : "Je ne vois aucune méthode, monsieur."

Ce qui a poussé les Républicains et les conservateurs à leur (récente) révolte contre la politique fiscale ne vient pas de ce qu'ils pensent que le gouvernement Bush a adopté la mauvaise méthode mais plutôt qu'ils n'en voient aucune à l'œuvre. Et c'est pourquoi ils sont si nombreux à souhaiter maintenant d'avoir eu un candidat différent sur lequel porter leur suffrage à l'époque, en 2000.




Par Pancho Villa
Ecrire un commentaire - Voir les 0 commentaires - Recommander
Vendredi 14 avril 2006


QUID EST PATRIA...?






Brad:

'Dulce et decorum pro patria mori'



P.-V.:
'Quid est patria, nisi consensus tyrannorum minutorum ad opprimendos imbelles timidos, et qui plerumque sunt innoxii'


P.S.: BTW, Brad, I'm always ready to go...




Par Pancho Villa
Ecrire un commentaire - Voir les 0 commentaires - Recommander
Mercredi 26 avril 2006


Just when, and by how much, will the US dollar depreciate?

By J. Bradford DeLong



As more time passes with neither the value of the US dollar declining sharply nor market forces beginning to shrink the US' current-account deficit -- which may well reach US$1 trillion this year -- two diametrically opposed reactions are emerging. Most international finance economists are becoming increasingly frightened that a major international financial crisis could erupt. Indeed, they fear that the scale of that potential crisis is becoming larger and larger.
Others -- especially managers of financial assets -- are becoming increasingly convinced that economists don't know very much, and that what they do know is of no use to traders like themselves (Hyperopia & Myopia!). They see little reason to believe that current asset values and trade flows are not sustainable.

After all, they (or some of them) argue, the real GDP of the US is growing by US$400 billion per year, with about US$270 billion going to labor and US$130 billion to capital. Even after depreciation, that US$130 billion of extra annual income is capitalized at about US$1.5 trillion of wealth, so the current-account deficit, even at US$1 trillion, is not overwhelmingly large. We Americans can sell off two-thirds of the increment to our wealth to finance imports and still be US$500 billion better off this year than we were last year.

Moreover, the annual interest charged on the extra US$1 trillion per year that Americans borrow from the rest of the world is about US$50 billion -- just one-eighth of annual economic growth, while the trade deficit is financed out of the growth of the value of capital. So what's unsustainable? Why can't the US current-account deficit remain at this year's value indefinitely?

The counterargument hinges on the difference between the current-account deficit and the trade deficit. The current-account deficit is equal to the trade deficit plus the cost of servicing the net international asset position: the net rent, interest, and dividends owed to foreigners who have invested their capital in the US. As time passes, deficits accumulate. As deficits accumulate, the cost of servicing the net international asset position grows.

Thus, in order to keep the current-account deficit stable, the trade deficit must shrink. And the only way for the trade deficit to shrink substantially is for net imports to fall, which requires either a relatively sharp decline in the value of the US dollar, thereby raising import prices, or a depression in the US. Both outcomes would weaken demand for foreign goods by making Americans feel that they are too poor to buy them.

As a result, holders of US dollar-denominated assets should be looking forward to two alternative scenarios. In one, the value of the US dollar will be low; in the other, the US will be in a depression. In neither scenario does it make sense to hold huge amounts of US dollar-denominated assets today. Therefore, foreign speculators should, any day now, dump their US dollar-denominated assets onto the market, and so bring about the US dollar decline that they so fear.

But foreign-currency speculators and international investors are not looking forward to either of these scenarios. They continue to hold very large positions in US dollar-denominated assets, which they would not do if they thought the US faced a choice between a cheap US dollar and a deep depression.

So, what alternative does the market see? And why is it so different from the possible scenarios that international financial economists see?

The answer appears to be that there is nobody in the financial centers of New York, London, Tokyo, Frankfurt, and Hong Kong who thinks it is their business to bet on a future flight from the US dollar. Especially in times of crisis -- and a sharp fall in US imports would imply a much more severe crisis for Asian and European exporters than it would for the US -- the US dollar is a currency that you run to, not from.

George Soros can bet on a run on the British pound. Thai import-export firms can bet on a run on the baht by accelerating their US dollar receipts and delaying their US dollar payouts. Everyone can bet on a run on the Argentine peso -- a favorite sport of international financial speculators for a century and a half. But not the US dollar. Not yet.

In other words, the market is betting that the US dollar will fall gradually in the next five years, and that the US current-account deficit will narrow without a financial crisis. That is what happened in the late 1980s, and in the late 1970s, too.

After all, God, it is said, protects children, fools, dogs, and the US. But the odds on a soft landing are lengthening with each passing day.


Par Pancho Villa
Ecrire un commentaire - Voir les 0 commentaires - Recommander

Liens/Links

Recherche

Présentation

Créer un blog sur over-blog.com - Contact - C.G.U. - Rémunération en droits d'auteur - Signaler un abus - Articles les plus commentés