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ratio oeconomica re publicae gerendae

Mardi 28 juin 2005 2 28 /06 /2005 00:00

 


Il ministro promette due Finanziarie di sviluppo: "Crescita all'1,5%, rientro dal deficit forse in 2 anni. Dpef entro il 4 luglio"

 



Siniscalco esclude manovra bis "Sulla crescita la Ue ha fallito"



 ROMA - Nessuna manovra aggiuntiva, ma una Finanziaria "seria". Anzi, "due Finanziarie serie, per il 2006 e 2007, che saranno ispirate a un criterio di rigore". Il ministro dell'Economia, Domenico Siniscalco torna a parlare delle prossime, delicate scadenze per i conti pubblici italiani. E annuncia che il Documento di programmazione economica e finanziaria sarà pronto entro il 4 luglio.

"Lo sforzo del prossimo Dpef e della Finanziaria - dice il ministro - sarà prendere misure che servano alla crescita". Per poi aggiungere che "oggi la crescita potenziale, cioè la media della crescita rispetto ai due anni precedenti e ai due anni successivi di un dato periodo è all'1,5%."

Quindi, una stoccata all'Europa. Che "sul piano della crescita, dell'occupazione e dell'innovazione ha registrato un fallimento, sia dal punto di vista del processo, sia dal punto di vista dei risultati". E, a proposito di Ue, Siniscalco conclude che per l'Italia, colpita dalla procedura per deficit eccessivo, è "plausibile" un percorso di rientro del deficit in due anni, e cioè nel 2007.

(28 giugno 2005)

 

 

Mio "caro amico"...Pancho ti dedica questa canzone:

 

              








Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : ratio oeconomica re publicae gerendae
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Dimanche 13 novembre 2005 7 13 /11 /2005 00:00





Peter Mandelson prédit un échec des négociations de l'OMC à Hongkong...


Tu penses..., j'adore les fermiers de l'Ouest  (tant qu'il n'y a pas ceux de l'Est (en Europe)...)









Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : ratio oeconomica re publicae gerendae
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Mardi 13 décembre 2005 2 13 /12 /2005 13:35




Hommage à de hyper grandes tetes américaines:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  Brad DeLong &

Paul Krugman





Un immense 'Merci' pour vos commentaires (sans oublier vos analyses) lucides, intelligents et géniaux qui ne nous ont que pû rendre à votre merci. (DeLong et Krugman ou bien 'Quand les analyses et idées de la science économique deviennent univérselles'...)

(Encore une fois: Merci)


 

 


Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : ratio oeconomica re publicae gerendae
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Mardi 13 décembre 2005 2 13 /12 /2005 14:04



IL Y A TROIS ANS....

 

 

L'EUROPE S'EST DOTEE DE L'ARME LA PLUS REDOUTABLE, DANGEREUSE ET EFFROYABLE (POUR LES AMERICAINS) QUI PUISSE EXISTER.

ET CERTAINES (BEAUCOUP) PERSONNES N' ONT PAS ENCORE PRIS CONSCIENCE DE L'AMPLEUR DEVASTATRICE DE CETTE ARME.

 

IL Y TROIS ANS....

 

L'EUROPE S'EST DOTEE DE L'ARME ECONOMIQUE ULTIME...

 

IL Y TROIS ANS....

 

L'EUROPE S'EST DOTEE DE: 

...

 


 

 

Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : ratio oeconomica re publicae gerendae
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Mercredi 14 décembre 2005 3 14 /12 /2005 17:19


Bad Trade Deficit News



This is a much bigger piece of news than one usually gets with a monthly release--and it's not good news. Each month the trade deficit gets bigger makes it more and more likely that we will have serious macroeconomic trouble when America's savings and investment flows start to come back into balance:

Oct trade gap widens to record $68.9 billion -


The U.S. trade deficit widened unexpectedly in October to a record $68.9 billion despite a drop in the cost of imported oil, as the deficits with China, Canada, the European Union, Mexico and OPEC all hit records, government data showed Wednesday. Economists surveyed by Briefing.com had expected the trade gap to shrink in October to $62.8 billion, and the surprising growth in the imbalance suggests fourth-quarter economic growth will likely be even weaker than first thought.

The Commerce Department said the deficit widened 4.4% from September after growing 11.9% the previous month. Imports of goods and services rose 2.7%  to a record $176.4 billion while exports increased a smaller 1.7%  to $107.5 billion. While oil import prices declined in the month to an average $56.29 per barrel, the volume of crude imports surged 9.3% , driving the value to $17.1 billion, the second-highest on record. Imports of energy-related petroleum products, a wider category that includes propane and butane, hit a record $26.2 billion.


 

 

 

 


Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : ratio oeconomica re publicae gerendae
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Jeudi 15 décembre 2005 4 15 /12 /2005 16:21



Le petit monde de Pancho Villa (Edition Spéciale)...

 


       

 

 

 


"Dans une lettre commune au Financial Times, les chefs des diplomaties française et polonaise ont fait front commun jeudi contre cette proposition "qui ne peut pas être la base d'un accord". "Selon ce projet, les Etats membres les plus pauvres feraient de nouveaux sacrifices importants, tandis qu'un seul Etat membre, le Royaume Uni, verrait sa position considérablement améliorée", écrivent Philippe Douste-Blazy et Stefan Meller.

Le grand reproche fait aux propositions de M. Blair tient au fameux rabais dont le Royaume-Uni bénéficie depuis 1984, à une époque où il était beaucoup plus pauvre qu'aujourd'hui. Avec l'élargissement, ce rabais devait mécaniquement augmenter à 7,7 milliards par an sur la période 2007-2013. Jusqu'ici, le Royaume Uni n'a accepté qu'une légère diminution de ce rabais : il continuerait à croître, mais les Britanniques toucheraient 8 milliards d'euros en moins entre 2007 et 2013.
"


 

 

 

 


 

 

Bon, supposons que chaque pays ait une approche assez pragmatique de la politique, posons-nous la question pourquoi l'Angleterre, avec des intéllectuels éminents (Keynes, Russell etc. etc.) persiste et signe?

Peut-être qu'elle a bel et bien raison.


Tout le monde est d'accord sur un fait indéniable d'un point de vue économique, c'est celui que l'Europe de l'ouest doit délocaliser la production agraire dans les pays qui ont appartenu au bloc soviétique n'est-ce pas (y a qu'à voir les chiffres des personnes employés dans le secteur primaire!!!! des pays.)

 

 


Mais si Epx = f(P1) avec Epx = ∑(a1+.....+an) et supposons que par exemple 

 lim ∑(a1+....+an)  -> a4 correspond à convergence f(P1)

 

avec      Epy = f(P2) avec Epy = ∑(b1+.....+bn)  et supposons ici que p.ex. 

lim  ∑(b1+....+bn)  -> b2 correspond à convergence f(P2)



Epx,y = Ensemble de l'électorat des pays x et y

an et bn = groupes spécifiques de l'ensemble de l'électorat

f(P) = Politique appliquée en fonction du plus grand groupe d'électorat

à part: (une autre fois) f(fc) = f(P)

f(fc) = fonctions du flux des capitaux

si (a4 ≠ b2) alors f(P1) ≠ f(P2)

 


Par cet exemple (de nouveau très simplifié)  je veux dire que 2 pays peuvent suivre une approche politique totalement différente car ces approches dépendent en grande partie de la formation de leur électorat .

 

Un pays x qui doit en grande partie défendre les intérêts de son plus grand électorat (a4) ne défend pas automatiquement les íntérêts de l'ensemble d'une communauté multi-nationale.

Il faut se poser la question: Quelles sont les résultantes des  secteurs à grand impact et où se trouvent-ils? p.ex. La Grande-Bretagne. -> secteur tertiaire, l'Allemagne championne de l'exportation industrielle -> sect. secondaire, la France sect. primaire -> sect. tertiaire -> sect. secondaire etc. etc.

 

Tandis que le pays y avec son plus grand électorat (b2) et  (a4 ≠ b2) pourrait au contraire bien mieux défendre les intérêts de l'ensemble d'une communauté. (Si b4 ->0)   et ∑ f(Ppe) -> f(P1)


Si f(P1) prévaut f(P2) alors il y aura sur-offre des produits du secteur primaire en Europe. On perd beaucoup plus que l'on gagne.


De plus ∑ f(Ppo) -> f(P2)

∆ perte = ∑ (prix produits sect. prim.) << ∑ (subventions produits sect. prim.)

∑ (subventions produits sect. prim.) = f(Ep)


avec ∆ perte = ∆ perte1 < ∆ perte2 < ∆ perte3 etc. etc. = > f(∆ perte) croissante en f(t)


car d'après les lois de l'offre et de la demande les prix ne peuvent que chuter à l'avenir et ce qui est plus que certain c'est qu'il n'y aura pas de boulot crée dans pe. pe = pays de l'est)

 

 Mais si il y a transfert de la productivité de (po -> pe) du secteur primaire alors il y aura de tout facon un renforcement de ∑ f(Ppo) -> f(P2) qui engendre  ∑ (vente produits sect. sec. tn) <  ∑ (vente produits sect. sec. tn+1)


  En tous les cas, à mon avis, les grand gagnants seront ceux qui f(Ppo) -> f(P2) et les grands perdants ceux qui f(Ppo) -> f(P1)

 

 


Cette analyse ne comprend que l'évolution du secteur primaire et secondaire!

Et, à mon avis, ce véto britannique n'a rien à voir avec la tune, c'est plutôt une différence de vue dans l'implémentation et la définition de principes. (La définition des 'principes' est vachement 'relative' dans une Mosaique à 25! 

 

 


De plus, chers lecteurs, je vous pose une énigme:

Ayant déjà été dans certains pays qui ont appartenu à l'ex-bloc soviétique je peux vous assurer de source sûre que...dans beaucoup d'entre eux:

(B*h)/2 - (B*0,00000001h)/2 = ?

une piste :

 


 


"The Asian crisis, like that in Latin America, seems to have shaken basic confidence in the countries much more than the crisis in Europe. Investors are now emphasizing weaknesses in the political and institutional environment - lax bank regulation, widespread corruption, grandiose policies - that were obvious even to casual observers before this year, but which were brushed off as minor blemishes on the Asian miracle until that miracle hit a speed bump."



 


 


Pancho Villa



 


Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : ratio oeconomica re publicae gerendae
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Samedi 24 décembre 2005 6 24 /12 /2005 18:33


UNIVERSIDADES LATINOAMERICANAS PARA UNA GLOBALIZACIÓN ALTERNATIVA.



1. No estamos en contra de la globalización ni queremos acabar con ella; la consideramos como un datum que ya forma parte de nuestra realidad, y la concebimos básicamente como una incesante multiplicación de relaciones y de vínculos en todos los órdenes y niveles de la vida humana: en la comunicación, en la técnica, en la economía, educación, finanzas, axiología, comercio, política, cultura, ideologías, violencia, etcétera.[1]



2. No queremos la orientación ni las características de la globalización actual. Queremos otra orientación. Y además, pensamos que es posible transformar la que tenemos e imprimirle a nuestra realidad globalizada una direccionalidad y unas cualidades diferentes.



3. Estamos convencidos de que la universidad latinoamericana[2] puede y debe ser un participante dinámico y estratégico para lograr la nueva globalización.







FACTOR DE UNA GLOBALIZACIÓN ALTERNATIVA.


1. En primer lugar, los determinantes axiológicos. y finalistícos que cualifican y determinan la multiplicación y la transformación incesantes de relaciones. En todos los sentidos de la vida humana, no deben seguir siendo los valores que constituyen al mercado y a la dominación por él ejercida, de manera que el tipo de organización social que estamos construyendo, tampoco siga siendo concebida en función del mercado.



2. Ahora bien, la realización de los seres humanos y la obtención de su bienestar como ellos quieren que sea y no como a ellos quieren hacerlos, implica el reconocimiento mutuo de la diversidad de maneras de ser entre los hombres, y la aceptación práctica del valor vigente que tienen las diversas trayectorias históricas y culturales de las que ha brotado esa diversidad humana.



3. Reconocer y comprender que la pluralidad en la realización de los seres humanos es algo muy valioso, necesariamente implica aceptar como un factor adicional de la globalización alternativa, que los demás también tienen la verdad. Porque, efectivamente como señala un aforismo filosófico, Verum, et bonum convertuntur (lo que es verdadero, es bueno; y lo bueno, es verdadero).



4.Si en la globalización alternativa es inadmisible el dogmatismo y las verdades y trayectorias únicas, y todas las maneras de ser y de pensar de la pluralidad cultural se consideran respetables y valiosas, y el determinante axiológico y finalístico de la proliferación de relaciones es el ser humano, entonces, en esta nueva globalización tampoco tienen lugar las superioridades intrínsecas o adquiridas entre los seres humanos o entre las sociedades, que pudieran aducirse válidamente para que unos seres humanos prevalezcan sobre otros, o para que algunos se consideren o vivan subyugados a otros.



5. El quinto componente estratégico de los procesos mencionados, es el de la igualdad de derechos para participar en la toma de decisiones en la esfera pública, tanto nacional como internacional No podemos seguir pensando que el derecho a la democracia se ejerza sólo de acuerdo con los patrones únicos de ella establecidos desde los grandes centros de poder mundial, que se rigen, en última instancia, de acuerdo con los criterios y necesidades de la visión neoliberal globalizada.



6. Existe un clamor generalizado en contra de los efectos depredadores y destructivos de la naturaleza que la globalización orientada en su sentido actual ha provocado. A pesar de eso, a la naturaleza se la sigue ‘violentando para usos con fines de lucro y de dominación, y se le estudia para explotarla más eficientemente como instrumento de acumulación selectiva, aun cuando eso signifique un deterioro generalizado de las condiciones de vida y una grave amenaza para la supervivencia.



7. Lo seis factores estratégicos de la globalización alternativa que hemos descrito, implican la necesidad de una organización de las interacciones que la constituyen, en la cual se integren las diversidades la historia, la cultura, los valores, las soluciones parciales, los recursos, los conocimientos, los recursos físicos, etc. Porque la realidad no está constituida por sus diversos componentes aislados sino principalmente por las relaciones dinámicas entre ellos en cuanto forman una unidad estructurada que no anula las diversidades.



FUNCIÓN SOCIAL Y LÍNEAS POLITICAS DE LA UNIVERSIDAD LATINOAMERICANA ALTERNATIVA




Desde la perspectiva de la actual globalización, alas universidades se les ha orientado para que se transformen en instituciones muy eficientes para la producción de los servicios académicos requeridos por la economía global; en esta economía, la finalidad de incrementar y controlar el capital se encuentra intrínsecamente vinculada a los procesos de dominación que se dan en otros campos de la actividad social —la política, la comunicación, la salud. etcétera- y que infaliblemente acompañan al mentado, con todas las secuelas de inequidad y exclusión que le son propias.



Nuestras universidades, sin que sean subordinadamente instrumentalizadas, sí tienen la función social de ser factores eficientes que, a partir de su real autodefinición académica y política, generen desarrollo humano y no sólo crecimiento económico a nuestras sociedades.






 
Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : ratio oeconomica re publicae gerendae
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Jeudi 29 décembre 2005 4 29 /12 /2005 09:32


(273 - X =  -400)





FOR MOST OF THE LAST 50 YEARS, GLOBALIZATION HAS been a win-win proposition, making America richer while lifting hundreds of millions in the developing world out of poverty and despair. Recently, however, it has begun to operate differently, undermining U.S. welfare while creating imbalances likely to end in a global economic crisis.

In this new mode, globalization is tilting the world like a giant sliding board game on which the "flattening" of old barriers is accelerating the transfer of the supply side of the U.S. economy to die rest of the world, especially Asia. TakeBoeing as an example. Long America's leading exporter, it symbolizes die kind of high-tech leadership on which the future of the U.S. economy is widely said to depend.

After losing market share to the European Airbus in recent years, Boeing responded by developing the new 787 Dreamliner, which is gathering record orders. Yet these sales may not add a lot to the U.S. economy because much of the work — including production of the critical carbon-fiber wings that Boeing always insisted would be kept at home — will be done in Japan.

Even more telling is the example of the semiconductor king, Intel. When economists and political leaders say American industry should concentrate on producing very-high-technology products where it has a clear comparative advantage, Intel's chips are what they have in mind. Yet company executives recently told a presidential advisory panel that under present circumstances they must consider building more of their new factories abroad. Over the next 10 years, they explained, the cost of running a semiconductor factory in die United States could be $1 billion more than that of running it abroad.

That there is something odd here is not yet widely acknowledged. Indeed, most business, academic, media and political leaders continue to insist that globalization is proceeding smoothly, making the world rich, more democratic and more peaceful. President Bill Clinton called globalization America's strategy, and President George W. Bush describes die American economy as die "envy of the world." Nor is this view entirely unjustified. U.S. GDP and productivity growth are the highest in the developed economies, while inflation, unemployment and interest rates are among the lowest.

Nevertheless, a closer look reveals a dark side. The U.S. trade deficit is now more than $800 billion, or 7 percent of GDP, and grows inexorably as Americans continue to consume more than they produce. The trade imbalance is of unprecedented size and breadth. Economists typically expect die United States to import commodities and cheap manufactured goods while exporting high-tech products, sophisticated services and agricultural goods, for which its land and climate are well suited. In reality, the U.S. high-tech trade surplus of $30 billion in 1998 has collapsed to a deficit of about $40 billion. Agricultural trade is now also in deficit for the first time in memory, and the modest surplus in services is declining as global deployment of the high-speed Internet has made it possible for services to move offshore as easily as manufacturing. In short, U.S. exports are declining versus imports across the board, while its growth depends on foreign lenders (primarily in Japan and China) to finance die excess consumption.

Two factors explain these unexpected trends. The first has been at work for a long time. It is the gradual construction of the global economy in an asymmetrical form. For the United States, globalization has meant building its economy into a giant consumption machine. Easy consumer credit, home-equity loans witfi tax-deductible interest payments, markets largely open to imports, policies that emphasize growth through demand management and accommodative monetary policy, and myriad other incentives have led Americans to save nothing while both households and government borrow at record rates. This is often justly criticized as excessive. But it is important to understand that American buying drives most of the world's growth because the United States is virtually die only net consuming country in the world.

Globalization for most others has meant export-led growth. Particularly in Asia, "catch-up" development policies have focused on creating production and export machines. There are many flavors, but most Asian economies are characterized bv relatively low consumption, savings rates of 30 to 50 percent of GDP, government intervention in markets, managed exchange rates, promotion of investment in "strategic" industries, incentives for exports and accumulation of chronic trade surpluses along with large reserves of dollars.

Indeed, the dollar is the key to this whole lopsided global structure. The dollar, of course, is not only America's money, but also the world's primary reserve currency. As long as others will accept it in payment, America can buy and borrow without concern for saving, investment or production. Thus, deficits—whether trade or budgetary—really don't matter and America can get away with fiscal irresponsibility. Oddly, the rest of the world can be just as irresponsible. By managing exchange rates to keep the dollar overvalued and their export prices low-, other countries can oversave and overinvest because the excess production can be exported to the U.S. market.
This structure has growni for so long because it has great benefits for both sides. America gets to live above its means, as cheap imports and foreign capital keep inflation and interest rates down and home values rising. The rest of the world, especially Asia, gets to climb the ladder of technology faster than it would otherwise. By accumulating dollars, Asia also gains strategic leverage over the lone superpower— which, by outsourcing management of the dollar, has ceded a degree of control over its own long-term interest rates.

There is a downside, however. By keeping die dollar chronically overvalued and providing investment subsidies to attract strategic industries out of the United States, the Asian export-led-growth approach has long tended to shrink U.S. productive capacity. For some time, this was true mostly of commodity manufacturing, and the significance of the trend was discounted with the rationale that the U.S. economy was moving to the "higher ground" of high-tech and sophisticated services.

This argument was never entirely satisfactory because of the exchange-rate management and the investment subsidies used by export-led-growth countries to attract high-tech production to their shores. For instance, Boeing is outsourcing much of the 787's construction to Japan in part because an overly strong dollar reduces yen-based costs, and in part because the Japanese government will provide production subsidies unavailable in the United States while "encouraging" Japanese airlines to buy the planes if the work is done in Japanese factories. For Boeing, this is all of critical importance as a way to offset the launch subsidies provided by the EU to archrival Airbus.

But if it was always flawed, the argument is now in tatters in the face of the second aforementioned factor: the entrance into the global economy of China and India.
Not only do they offer low costs, which the strong dollar further reduces, but-contrary to common assumptions about developing countries — significant portions of their populations are highly skilled. They can thus be competitive across die entire range of manufactured goods and services. The negation of time and distance by the Internet and air-express services makes this all the more true.

Further, the potential size of these markets attracts investment in anticipation of growth, even if the initial production cost is not fully competitive. This is particularly true of China, where national pride and an authoritarian government willing to offer large investment incentives create an environment in which foreign companies are encouraged to engender "trust" by transferring factories and technology to China, regardless of the fact that the comparative cost advantage lies elsewhere.

This, combined with the asymmetric global economic structure, is why the U.S. trade balance is collapsing even in advanced-technology products and services. The growing trade imbalance, in turn, makes the current mode of globalization unsustainable. To finance die deficit, the United States is already absorbing about 80 percent of available world savings. The value of U.S. imports is now more than double that of exports. To merely stabilize the deficit at its current rate would require that exports grow more than twice as fast as imports.
But this cannot happen if the supply side continues to move offshore. If it doesn't happen and the deficit keeps growing, world savings will eventually be insufficient and a financial crash will be
inevitable. Of course, U.S. consumption and imports could be cut, but if that were to occur without a commensurate increase in consumption elsewhere, the whole world economy would suffer recession, if not depression.

Some economists speak bravely of a "soft landing." In this scenario, the United States reduces its budget deficit and excess consumption, while a gradually falling dollar results in rising exports to foreign markets where governments are stimulating consumption. While desirable, this will not occur automatically. Interest groups in all the key nations will defend the status quo.

Thus, for the sake not only of the United States but of all nations with a stake in globalization, it is imperative that political leaders change its current mode. The game cannot continue with one participant playing consumer while nearly all the others play producer. For the long-term success of all, everyone must agree to play the same globalization game.



Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : ratio oeconomica re publicae gerendae
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Vendredi 30 décembre 2005 5 30 /12 /2005 13:58



Ah oui, mon vieux, j'espère (en posant la main sur son épaule en signe de confiance) que tu seras notre 'Clark Kent' en économie, Mario!










"Like Antonio Fazio, his predecessor as Bank of Italy governor, Mario Draghi can be expected to rap the knuckles of any future Italian government that shies away from structural economic reform and fails to keep inflation under control.


Financial markets hope matters will be different with Mr Draghi.

As always, protectionism doesn’t work. The past resistance to change has resulted in the Italian banking system being still affected by fragmentation, with plenty of small-scale players,” said Lorenzo Codogno, economist at Bank of America.

Banking services in Italy are among the most expensive in the world. The change should help to introduce more competition, with more consolidation and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Financial markets should expect the Italian banking system to become more open to takeover attempts by foreign firms,” he said.

As a result of a recently passed law, which clips the Bank of Italy’s powers in supervising bank takeovers, Mr Draghi will in any case not be able to intervene at will in the banking sector in the style for which Mr Fazio became famous.

Mr Draghi’s appointment represents a break with tradition, in that previous governors have tended to rise to the top from within the Bank of Italy, whereas Mr Draghi has spent the past four years at Goldman Sachs, the investment bank.

His commitment to open financial markets with proper rules was demonstrated during his 10 years at the treasury, when he was responsible for a measure known as the Draghi law, passed in 1998."




Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : ratio oeconomica re publicae gerendae
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Samedi 31 décembre 2005 6 31 /12 /2005 02:08



MILTON FRIEDMAN
: Why - who -- how would they dump it?

CHARLIE ROSE: They would sell it back.

MILTON FRIEDMAN: Sell what?

CHARLIE ROSE: The interest on the debt that they have. The dollars they have.

MILTON FRIEDMAN: To whom? To whom would they sell it?

CHARLIE ROSE: Your point is that there is no buyer.

MILTON FRIEDMAN: Well, there are buyers, of course there is always a buyer. At what price?

CHARLIE ROSE: But wouldn`t that be destabilizing?

MILTON FRIEDMAN: Who would lose money? Who would lose money on that kind ...

CHARLIE ROSE: Wouldn`t that be destabilizing? Wouldn`t that suggest a lack of confidence in the American economy?

MILTON FRIEDMAN: Yes, it might. But the people who would lose by it would be the foreigners who held that and who dumped those dollars.

CHARLIE ROSE: Well, then are they in a frozen position then, so that they - they have no flexibility?

MILTON FRIEDMAN: They are not in a frozen position. They are in a position they want to be in, because that`s why they are holding these assets. Because they are afraid of risk, of political risk.

CHARLIE ROSE: What happens if they would allow ...

MILTON FRIEDMAN: And in general, let`s suppose foreigners start dumping their assets here. They would dump them at distressed prices. They would have no ...

CHARLIE ROSE: Once it started (INAUDIBLE) would begin.

MILTON FRIEDMAN: And who would buy them? The people at home, here, the people in the United States, who had confidence in the United States. So what you would have would be that the assets would go from weak hands to strong hands. It isn`t going to happen, because there is no reason for foreigners to dump the dollars.

CHARLIE ROSE: But nothing is certain, is it? I mean, certainly in economics ...

MILTON FRIEDMAN: Of course not. Nothing is absolutely certain. But you can be pretty damn sure of what is likely to happen and what isn`t.

CHARLIE ROSE: What might -- but argue the other side. What might cause someone to say we`re holding too many dollars and - and we don`t think it`s healthy.

MILTON FRIEDMAN: There is only one thing that would cause them to do that, and that`s if we engage in inflation.


Mes reflexions a ce sujet, apres-demain,

Bonne Annee a tous!

Pancho El Villan

Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : ratio oeconomica re publicae gerendae
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