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12 avril 2008 6 12 /04 /avril /2008 09:09









(*) Translation: When Kenneth is right...well, he's simply right...



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10 juin 2007 7 10 /06 /juin /2007 00:48









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21 avril 2007 6 21 /04 /avril /2007 19:26





                















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11 avril 2007 3 11 /04 /avril /2007 02:07











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7 mars 2007 3 07 /03 /mars /2007 15:51


Hegemony through global hedge funds

Kenneth Rogoff


The recent volatility in global capital markets should give pause to those who say German leaders, who have been arguing for greater transparency in global hedge funds, are just sore losers.

American and British policymakers, in particular, say the German whining is nonsense, and that hedge funds, along with other New Age financial entities such as private equity firms, are key innovators in today’s global economy.

This debate is ... clouded by a healthy dose of national self-interest. With New York and London the centres of global finance, the United States and Britain have enormous profits at stake. So it is convenient for them to downplay the likelihood that risks to the world’s financial system will be spread more evenly than the benefits.

German leaders, by contrast, must reckon with a populace that is deeply resistant to rapid change, particularly when it involves job cuts. Many German workers believe, as one trade unionist recently lamented, that takeovers are being driven by a philosophy of "buy it, strip it and flip it".

To be sure, the profits currently being earned by the leading financial firms are dizzyingly high. ... Even we economists who believe that global financial innovation yields huge net benefits must admit that today’s hedge fund boom is becoming like the tech bubble. ... [I]n today’s go-go ultra-high liquidity environment, ... roughly 1,000 of the world’s 9,000 hedge funds went out of business last year.

The big question is whether this Wild West mentality poses broader risks to the global financial system, particularly given circumstances where a large number of firms are all collectively making the same bet. If they lose, a long string of bankruptcies can cut deeply into banking systems...

At the moment, the most glaring weakness is the so-called "yen carry trade". Hedge funds have borrowed hundreds of billions of dollars at ultra-low interest rates in Japan, and invested the proceeds in countries such as Brazil and Turkey, where interest rates are high.

As long as the yen remains weak, this investment strategy will be a money machine. But if the yen appreciates sharply, as it easily could given Japan’s huge current account surplus, some hedge funds will suffer huge capital losses and the yen carry trade will implode.

And while today’s main risk is the yen, in a couple months it could be something completely different. So pressure outside the US and Britain to put the hedge fund industry on a tighter regulatory leash is hardly surprising. The Germans, for example, want to reduce risk by forcing hedge funds to adhere to stricter reporting requirements.

The funds respond to such proposals by arguing that if they are required to reveal their investment strategies, they will lose their incentive to innovate, and a recent US government report — a multi-agency effort headed by Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson (formerly of Goldman Sachs) — supports that position.

Greater regulation would be a mistake, the report argues, because the global economy’s best defence against systemic risk is the exercise of common sense and "due diligence" by each and every person who invests or interacts with hedge funds.

In other words, the US is telling investors to carry their own guns, because, as in the Wild West, there might not be a sheriff around to help. But frankly, as we are reminded by recent events, it is hard to see how at least a small increase in transparency can hurt. The Germans, in chairing the G8 this year, should not surrender on this issue. ...





Addendum d'une reflexion de la part de Lafayette (que P.-V. trouve interessante):




""Many German workers believe, as one trade unionist recently lamented, that takeovers are being driven by a philosophy of "buy it, strip it and flip it"."

Merkel, the PM of Germany, born in East Germany is dedicated to rightist principles. (She even - unwisely - backed a flat-rate tax.) This woman has NO delusions whatsoever about what the left promises (pap to the masses) and then fails to deliver (eyes bigger than their stomachs and ensuing government Debt Mountains).

But, she did not win an outright plurality in the election that voted her into office (which she had to fight tooth and nail with machos from both the right and the left to obtain). She is walking a tightrope between her instincts that tell her that economies need continuous supervision but moderate regulation and the leftists in both France and Germany who are complaining about capitalist hedge-fund "vultures".

The fact of the matter is that hedge-funds employ new management that, yes, does shuck jobs, restore financial balance ... but does inevitably rehire. still, they never rehire at the same salary levels and never the same number who lost their jobs. OTH, they save businesses from total closure ... and dead European smokestacks are a sorry sight everywhere.

In fact, what disturbs most the Germans is the same pain and anguish that bothers the French. After forty odd years of living in a cocoon, they cannot possibly fathom that the paradigm has changed forever.

Ask any Doctor/Economist; until patients/economies realize that they are sick, there is little hope that administering a remedy will be effective.

The US and Europe have the same complaint, but different reasons. Unions in Germany cannot understand that the featherbedding and over regulation of employment is a thing of the past. American unions cannot understand that high-pay low-skilled jobs are going to the Far East (far more quickly than high-paying high-skilled jobs).

Neither do politicians yet understand that in a liberal globalized economy governments no longer make the rules of the game, but must learn to obey them. Just this week, the French female candidate for President met with Merkel to suggest that the present crisis at Airbus be resolved by a government recapitalization of the company.

Again the idiot-left thinks the state should come to the rescue. (They did the same in the 1970s & 1980s when successive administrations dumped billions into saving Honeywell-Bull, the national champion of French computer manufacturers, which finally went belly up.) I am not saying that Airbus will die. But, certainly, the problem with the company is NOT refinancing inefficient production lines (shared between Germany and France) but rationalizing those lines. That means redundancies.

People cannot understand the VERY profound change in employment that the doubling of global manpower (in China, Russia and East Europe) has effected. It is a very bitter pill to swallow and there is NO QUICK FIX."







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8 février 2007 4 08 /02 /février /2007 23:31


No grand plans, but the financial system needs fixing
by Kenneth Rogoff



What ever happened to all the grandiose plans for improving the global financial architecture? Up until a few years back, leading policy economists seemed to be tripping over themselves to come up with blueprints for radical change. Particularly popular were plans for new global institutions, including a financial regulator, a sovereign bankruptcy court, an international deposit insurance corporation, and even a global central bank. More modest plans (such as mine) merely called for a sweeping restructuring of
the major existing multilateral financial institutions, the international Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Over the past couple of years, however, all introspection appears to have vanished. Instead, the policy community has developed a smug belief that enhanced macroeconomic stability at the national level combined with continuing financial innovation at the international level have obviated any need to tinker with the system. Never mind that cross-border asset holdings have exploded to roughly $60,000bn (€46,000bn) (or about 120 per cent of global gross domestic product). There is no problem that markets cannot solve.

Really? How well would markets handle the fallout from a sharp slowdown in India or China? How would they react to a dirty nuclear bomb in a US city that triggered a retreat from US assets, and a sadden reluctance on the part of global investors to keep financing America's 800-plus billion dollar current account deficit? Or a rapid escalation of conflict in the Middle East that encompassed Iran and Saudi Arabia? Or an avian flu pandemic? Global central bank cooperation has markedly improved in recent years, especially through the regular exchange of views that takes place every other month at the Bank for International Settlements. But contrary to market perceptions, global central banks have only very limited instruments for dealing with a genuinely sharp rise in global volatility,
particularly one that is geo-politically induced.

True, it is not clear that any of the grand plans of the past couple of decades would better equip the world economy to deal with such catastrophic shifts. The typical grand plan was far too simplistic and heavy-handed to function effectively outside the confines of the comment pages. By and large, the world is far better off relying on more organic approaches that balance co-ordination and competition among national regulatory and legal institutions. If too much power is wasted, in a single global regulatory institution, there is a grave danger that innovation wffl be stifled. By the same token, a global central bank that faces no competition from other currency providers could easily prove an inflation-prone disaster.

But just because most grand plans were far too simplistic does not mean we should dismiss the deeper problems that they aimed to address. As global hedge funds proliferate and increasingly influence key markets, weaknesses in the co-ordination of national regulators of banks, which lend to hedge funds, have become even more glaring. Capital flows are once again rushing into emerging markets. Will the modest innovations in debt contracts adopted in the wake of Argentina's default make much of a difference next time?

The real shame with the disappearance, of grand plans is that they had provided a valuable reservoir of ideas to spur major improvements in the world's existing multilateral financial institutions. The big problem today, of course, is that multilateral government lending has become increasingly irrelevant in a world where rapidly growing private debt and equity markets increasingly dwarf official financing.

The IMF is already engaged in a rethink of its role and function. Just last month, a group of eminent persons, chaired by former BIS head Sir Andrew Crockett, offered some constructive suggestions on how the IMF might finance its surveillance and technical assistance activities during a. period when its revenues from crisis lending are rapidly dwindling. I would go further and simply eliminate most countries' access to crisis lending altogether, on the grounds that, in practice, the availability of such resources often ends up just delaying adjustment (as in Argentina in 2001 or Russia in 1998), rather than cushioning it. My own grand plan, developed jointly with Stanford's Professor Jeremy Bulow back in 1990, would also switch all World Bank lending to outright grants. A shift to grants would help shield some of the world's poorest countries from excessive debt build-ups and, perhaps more importantly, make aid more transparent Bat none of tins seems likely right now, either.

We should bemoan the world's lack of interest in grand plans to improve the financial architecture, but not because any of them was necessarily perfect The problem, rather, is a lack of the purpose and energy needed to sustain even more modest, and unambiguously positive, reforms. Which means, of course, that after the next round of crises, we shall be deluged with even more and eves grander
 plans.





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7 février 2007 3 07 /02 /février /2007 22:20




Betting with the house's money

by Kenneth Rogoff

Many people have been asking why the dollar hasn't crashed yet. Will the United States ever face a bill for the string of massive trade deficits...? ...[S]taggeringly, US borrowing now soaks up more than two-thirds of the combined excess savings of all the surplus countries in the world...

Foreigners are hardly reaping great returns on investing in the US. On the contrary, they typically get significantly lower returns than Americans get on their investments abroad. ...[T]he central banks of Japan and China are holding almost two trillion dollars worth of low-interest bonds. A very large share of these are US treasury bonds and mortgages. This enormous subsidy to American taxpayers is, in many ways, the world's largest foreign aid program. ...

Most sober analysts have long been projecting a steady trend decline in the dollar... So why hasn't more adjustment taken place already? The first answer, of course, is that the trade-weighted dollar has fallen - by more than 15% in real terms since its peak in early 2002. Yet the US deficits have persisted, and even risen, since then.

The real driving force has been two-fold. First and foremost, America's government and consumers have been engaged in a never-ending consumption binge. On the consumer side, this is quite understandable. ...

Overall, after almost 25 years of stunning prosperity, punctuated by only two mild recessions, most Americans feel pretty confident about their economic situation. ... So it is not surprising that private consumption continues to hold up... People have enjoyed such huge capital gains over the past decade that most feel like gamblers on a long winning streak. By now, they see themselves as playing with the house's (or their houses') money. (voir en bas du billet...)

It is less easy to rationalise why the US government is continuing to run budget deficits despite a cyclical boom. When a fiscally responsible government launches a war, it typically cuts back on other domestic expenditures and raises taxes. The Bush administration did the opposite. It may not be good economics, but the strategy proved to be good politics, for a time. Unfortunately, it is unlikely the new Democratic majority in Congress will do much about it.

Of course, it takes two to tango. In order for the US economy to run deficits with the world, other countries must be willing to ... supply ... savings. Ben Bernanke ... once famously pinned the whole US current account deficit on a "global savings glut". But it would be more accurate to say that there is global investment shortfall, with investment trending downwards despite the upward trend in global growth.

This investment shortfall is due to many factors, but perhaps the main one is ... substantial medium-term institutional roadblocks to investment in many developing countries, where long-term returns now seem to be by far the highest. The net result is that money is being parked temporarily in low-yield investments in the US, although this cannot be the long-run trend.

What then is future of the dollar? As long as the status quo persists, with strong global growth and stunning macroeconomic stability, the US can continue to borrow and run trade deficits without immediate consequence. Over time, the dollar will still decline, but perhaps by no more than a couple of percent a year. Nevertheless, it is not hard to imagine scenarios in which the dollar collapses. Nuclear terrorism, a slowdown in China, or a sharp escalation of violence in the Middle East could all blow the lid off the current economic dynamic. ...

In sum, the fact that the US trade balance has defied gravity for so many years has made it possible for the dollar to do so, too. But some day, the US may well have to pay the bill for its spendthrift ways. When that day arrives, Americans had better pray that their creditors will be as happy to accept dollars as they are now.




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31 janvier 2007 3 31 /01 /janvier /2007 02:20


Interview (a Gst...ehm..., Davos...) de Kenneth Rogoff
a la FTD...


Transcript (de la part de P.-V.) ici...


Kenneth Rogoff, there had been much talk about when the dollar will fall and because of the big imbalances, you have done much work on that, why didn't it happen yet?


Well, I've done a series of papers starting in 2001 with Maury Obstfeld at Berkeley where we look at scenarios under which the US current account would shrink and the implications for the dollar, we looked at scenarios like a rise in the US savings, higher productivity in Europe, asked, what would the effects on the current account be and implications for the dollar... now, the..., the thing that our model doesn't, you know predict very well  is the current account and I don't think there doesn't exist a model that it predicts that really well (P.-V. thinks that the affair of the CA represents for him, the finest form of political economy...) so, I think what the surprise has been, has been that US CA deficit has been so durable my take on it, as we've been in this extraordinarily benign period of high global growth, and very very low volatility ("M. Trichet avait jugé, samedi, à Davos (Suisse), que le risque financier était sous-évalué. Les taux d'intérêt sont très bas, et la volatilité élevée. "Cela n'est probablement pas durable", avait-il ajouté."...donc...volatility equity market + volatility forex market = ...0? ), where anomalies can go on for a long time. Turkey can run a big CA-deficit and have a big public debt and money keeps rushing in... I mean, I hope Turkey does well but what it would face in a more normal environment would be a lot more like what we saw in May of last year...this is the same for the US so, I think people who say this is gonna go on for 25 years well if we have a global boom with no volatility for 25 years, I agree, but when we see some normalization, I think it's quite a vulnerability and we could see much more movement than now...


When we look at the global exchange rate of the dollar, the nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis all the different other currencies...the dollar has already come down... By how much and how much is it?... why didn't it reduce the CA deficit in the US?


Well, the dollar has come down but the... since... in fact it started coming down maybe a year after we wrote our paper in 2001, maybe [...?] on a trade weighted basis but the anomaly is our model says that wouldn't have happened yet because in our model, a durable drop in the dollar doesn't really happen or the CA shrinks and it hasn't... so...you know in fact... that's the larger puzzle for us, is not that the dollar has come down more but that it came down without the CA coming down. You know, I don't see the Euro being as out of line with the dollar as emerging markets in Asia, the Yen...you know as we speak today as at 121 Tokyo feels cheap... you know, all of the sudden it's incredible, so the big realignments that need to take place are with Asia also with a number of the emerging markets...


But the Asians are the only ones who defend their currencies not to appreciate, ...the Europeans have suffered that in the past two years what is your opinion on that ...how should Europeans avoid that they will appreciate against the dollar...?


I don't think there's much that Europe really can do. I think the positive approach that Europe can take, is to try to become more of a financial center like the US. I envision a Euro appreciating further and Europe's starting to run significant deficits...like the US is, but in a positive way where Europe is becoming more a financial center and those deficits represent investing in financial assets in Europe ...this is very good business btw, the US makes a lot of money off this and I think btw. the natural US CA deficits, it's not zero, it's probably 2%...of GDP, but it sure isn't 7% of GDP like we're saying now...so Europe were, as a whole, you know, very close to balance, could easily mimic the US and the 2%...that's consistent with having a somewhat stronger Euro...


How could the CA easily be reduced in 2007 as we are now what could happen... Asia and especially Japan and Germany begun to grow much faster, so it's already sthg. which goes in the right direction but it didn't really change very much up to now what could happen...?


Well, it means it is changing so I think we in fact at the moment... are entering a benign scenario in which part of the adjustment process is taking place, so... the biggest part is Europe is growing faster, oil prices are coming down, the US CA which might had been at 6.5% of GDP for 2006 it's probably on track to be a 7.5% in 2007 but, because of the declining oil prices, because Europe is been outperforming, I think it's actually gonna coming under a 6% if we saw the Chinese and Asia currencies move more maybe that would bring it to 5%...what hasn't happened is US savings has not moved very much... it's stunning so... that depends on many factors but the housing market really hasn't fallen that much the equity market has probably countered anything that's happened in the housing market so I think if US savings doesn't rise then we'll probably see the CA continue to sit there at 5.5% ...this movement is gonna to bring the dollar down a bit more but it's, we're not going to see anything dramatic, so we're in a benign scenario at the moment, we're not seeing a crash in 2007, but, we might not always be in a benign scenario...


What could Americans do?


Hah... well, I mean the truth of the matter is the biggest vulnerability of the US at the moment are geopolitical... that the US has an incredible mess on attend in Iraq, in the M-E.,... weak and global position generally and I don't think the bill has come home for this...and the first thing Americans need to address is to get this right...I don't see that happening in the near term I have to say...but until Americans straighten this out, they're very, very vulnerable...there are certainly other things you could do...you could try to balance the budget a bit, who would make a lot of sense...we're in an epic boom... it just can't get any better than this and yet, we're running in deficits, we have the social security problem... there's a lot that could be done...but unfortunately, I don't think that very much is gonna happen...


Last question on that...when should we start to worry about the CA deficit...?



Well, I think when we see a sharp rise in volatility in markets that's driven by some obvious fundamental factor, I keep harking on the geopolitical [...?] we could have a 30% drop in housing but some obvious fundamental factor that's raising volatility in the macro-economy and markets...which are at record lowest by many measures...then we can start whining...




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20 décembre 2006 3 20 /12 /décembre /2006 21:35


Le prix du bonnet d'ane (prix dont le pere est Econoclaste) revient pour la premiere fois a Kenneth Rogoff qui a voulu essayer de chercher des analogies de la politique monetaire entre l'Argentine et la zone Euro...








mm.de: Also waren die Notenbanken zu lange Cheerleader des Booms?


Rogoff: Auch wenn die wichtigen Notenbanken heute politisch unabhängig sind (???) - was eine hervorragende Entwicklung ist -, sie sind nicht unbeeinflusst von der politischen Großwetterlage. Die Fed ist letztlich ein Political Animal. Gerade vor der Präsidentschaftswahl 2004 musste sie sehr vorsichtig sein mit Zinsanhebungen, George Bush wollte schließlich wiedergewählt werden.

mm.de: Das Weiße Haus diktiert die Zinsen?

Rogoff: Nein, so direkt läuft das nicht. Aber die Fed hat Wahlen immer im Blick - der Präsident ernennt die Mitglieder des Gouverneursrats. (Jeder weiss doch dass Herr Greenspans Verhalten sich den verschiedenen politischen Begebenheiten, vor und nach den Wahlen, durch eine subtil-laxere oder subtil-haertere Geldpolitik unterschieden hat...oder?)






mm.de: Wird der Euro Chart zeigen den Dollar als Weltwährung ersetzen?


Rogoff: Kaum. Dazu sind die Unsicherheiten über die Zukunft des europäischen Projekts zu groß. Viele Notenbanken auf der Welt hatten den Plan, ihre Devisenreserven allmählich zu diversifizieren, sodass sie bis 2020 etwa zu gleichen Teilen Dollar und Euro in ihren Portfolios gehabt hätten. Dieser Prozess ist vorbei, seit im vergangenen Jahr die Franzosen gegen die EU-Verfassung stimmten.(Rome wasn't built in one day...das muss auf alle Faelle anders gehen...)

mm.de: Die Verfassung hat doch nur am Rande etwas mit der Währungsunion zu tun.

Rogoff: Nun ja, der Euro war immer ein politisches Projekt. Die ökonomische Logik dahinter ist nicht so überzeugend.(Doch, denn es geht darum die 'politische Einheit' durch die zuerst 'wirtschaftliche Vereinigung' zu erzwingen...) Offen gesagt: Ich glaube, Deutschland ginge es besser, wenn es seine eigene Währung hätte. Ihr hättet niedrigere Zinsen, wenn Ihr nicht in einer Währungsunion mit Ländern wie Spanien und Italien wärt.(Das stimmt, aber das waere eine auf kurze Dauer bestehende Verbesserung, die im nachhinein wahrscheinlich auf schlimmere Weise zugrunde gehen wuerde...)





mm.de: Inflation und Zinsen sind niedrig, auch in Deutschland. Der Euro funktioniert doch.


Rogoff: Der Euro hat in einem bislang freundlichen weltwirtschaftlichen Umfeld funktioniert. Er hat noch keinen Stresstest bestehen müssen. Argentinien funktioniert momentan auch.(Also Argentinien kann man wirklich ueberhaupt nicht mit Laender aus dem Euroraum vergleichen...OUCH!!!)





mm.de: Das klingt ganz nach Katastrophenalarm. Zeichnen Sie da nicht ein arg pessimistisches Szenario?


Rogoff: Meinen Sie? Der Sinn des Projekts war doch, die Integration Europas voranzutreiben. Wenn es diese politische Dynamik nicht mehr gibt - warum am Euro festhalten? Man wird dann feststellen, dass er aus ökonomischer Sicht keine so großartige Idee war.(Schwachsinn, diese politische Dynamik kommt gerade erst jetzt so langsam in Fahrt...und P.-V. wiederholt hier das was er schon immer gesagt hat, was die politische Dynamik im Euroraum angeht 'Il faut laisser le temps au temps...')







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5 novembre 2006 7 05 /11 /novembre /2006 20:10


"The American lifestyle is not negotiable"











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