Overblog
Suivre ce blog Administration + Créer mon blog

PrÉSentation

  • : Politique Economique & Commerce International
  • : Analyses sur la Politque Economique "Inter"-"Nationale"...
  • Contact

adresse e-mail (courriel)

panchovillan@yahoo.com

Recherche

Archives

24 novembre 2006 5 24 /11 /novembre /2006 02:07











Partager cet article
Repost0
16 septembre 2006 6 16 /09 /septembre /2006 14:40








Winners and Losers in the Post-9/11 Era

Joseph S. Nye


September 11, 2001, is one of those dates that mark a transformation in world politics. Just as the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, signified the Cold War’s end, al-Qaeda’s attack on the United States opened a new epoch. A non-governmental group killed more Americans that day than the government of Japan did with its surprise attack on another transformative date, December 7, 1941. While the jihadi terrorist movement had been growing for a decade, 9/11 was the turning point. Five years into this new era, how should we characterize it?

Some believe that 9/11 ushered in a “clash of civilizations” between Islam vs. the West. Indeed, that is probably what Osama bin Laden had in mind. Terrorism is a form of theater. Extremists kill innocent people in order to dramatize their message in a way that shocks and horrifies their intended audience. They also rely on what Clark McCauley and others have called “jujitsu politics,” in which a smaller fighter uses the strength of the larger opponent to defeat him.

In that sense, bin Laden hoped that the US would be lured into a bloody war in Afghanistan, similar to the Soviet intervention two decades earlier, which had created such a fertile recruiting ground for jihadists. But the Americans used a modest amount of force to remove the Taliban government, avoided disproportionate civilian casualties, and were able to create an indigenous political framework.

While far from perfect, the first round in the fight went to the US. Al-Qaeda lost the sanctuaries from which it planned its attacks; many of its leaders were killed or captured; and its central communications were severely disrupted.

Then the Bush administration succumbed to hubris and made the colossal mistake of invading Iraq without broad international support. Iraq provided the symbols, civilian casualties, and recruiting ground that the jihadi extremists had sought in Afghanistan. Iraq was George Bush’s gift to Osama bin Laden.

Al-Qaeda lost its central organizational capacity, but it became a symbol and focal point around which like-minded imitators could rally. With the help of the Internet, its symbols and training materials became easily available around the world. Whether al-Qaeda had a direct role in the Madrid and London bombings, or the recent plot to blow up airliners over the Atlantic, is less important than the way it has been transformed into a powerful “brand.” The second round went to the extremists.

The outcome of future rounds in the struggle against jihadi terrorism will depend on our ability to avoid the trap of “jujitsu politics.” That will require more use of the soft power of attraction rather than relying so heavily on hard military power, as the Bush administration has done. For the struggle is not a clash of Islam vs. the West, but a civil war within Islam between a minority of terrorists and a larger mainstream of non-violent believers.

Jihadi extremism cannot be defeated unless the mainstream wins. Military force, intelligence, and international police cooperation needs to be used against hardcore terrorists affiliated with or inspired by al-Qaeda, but soft power is essential to attracting the mainstream and drying up support for the extremists.

US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld once said that the measure of success in this war is whether the number of terrorists we are killing and deterring is larger than the number that the terrorists are recruiting. By this standard, we are doing badly. In November 2003, the official number of terrorist insurgents in Iraq was given as 5,000. This year, it was reported to be 20,000. As Brig. General Robert Caslen, the Pentagon’s deputy director for the war on terrorism, put it, “We are not killing them faster than they are being created.”

We are also failing in the application of soft power. According to Caslen, “We in the Pentagon are behind our adversaries in the use of communication – either to recruit or train.”

The manner in which we use military power also affects Rumsfeld’s ratio. In the aftermath of 9/11, there was a good deal of sympathy and understanding around the world for America’s military response against the Taliban. The US invasion of Iraq, a country that was not connected to the 9/11 attacks, squandered that good will, and the attractiveness of the US in Muslim countries like Indonesia plummeted from 75% approval in 2000 to half that level today. Indeed, occupying a divided nation is messy, and it is bound to produce episodes like Abu Ghraib and Haditha, which undercut America’s attractiveness not just in Iraq, but around the world.

The ability to combine hard and soft power is smart power. When the Soviet Union invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia during the Cold War, it undercut the soft power that it had enjoyed in Europe in the aftermath of World War II. When Israel launched a lengthy bombing campaign in Lebanon last month, it created so many civilian casualties that the early criticisms of Hezbollah by Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia became untenable in Arab politics. When terrorist excesses killed innocent Muslim civilians such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad did in 1993 or Abu Musab al-Zarqawi did in Amman in 2005, they undercut their own soft power and lost support.

The most important lesson five years after 9/11 is that failure to combine hard and soft power effectively in the struggle against jihadi terrorism will lead us into the trap set by those who want a clash of civilizations. Muslims, including Islamists, have a diversity of views, so we need to be wary of strategies that help our enemies by uniting disparate forces behind one banner. We have a just cause and many potential allies, but our failure to combine hard and soft power into a smart strategy could be fatal.


Partager cet article
Repost0
5 septembre 2006 2 05 /09 /septembre /2006 00:34


Le réalisme progressiste

Joseph S. Nye


Aux USA, les sondages montrent qu'une majorité d'Américains désapprouve la politique étrangère du président Bush, mais il n'y a pas consensus sur ce qu'elle devrait être. Lors de son premier mandat, l'ambition débridée des néo-conservateurs et la pression des nationalistes ont produit une politique étrangère qui ressemblait à une voiture qui dispose d'un accélérateur, mais pas de freins. Elle était condamnée à déraper.

Comment l'Amérique devrait-elle employer son pouvoir sans précédent et quelle devrait être la place qu'elle attribue aux valeurs morales ? Les réalistes mettent en garde contre le fait de laisser ces valeurs déterminer la politique, mais la démocratie et les droits de l'homme ont été une part inhérente de la politique étrangère américaine depuis deux siècles. Le Parti démocrate pourrait résoudre ce problème en adoptant le "réalisme progressiste" proposé par Robert Wright et d'autres.

Une politique étrangère basée sur le réalisme progressiste commencerait par une évaluation de la force et des limites du pouvoir américain. Les USA sont la seule superpuissance, mais leur supériorité ne repose ni sur un empire, ni sur une hégémonie. L'Amérique peut influer le reste du monde, mais elle ne peut le contrôler.

Le pouvoir dépend toujours du contexte, et le contexte de la politique internationale ressemble aujourd'hui à une partie d'échec qui se jouerait sur trois niveaux. Le premier niveau, celui du pouvoir militaire, est dominé par l'Amérique, mais le deuxième, celui des relations économiques, est multipolaire, et le troisième, celui auquel se joue le changement climatique, le trafic de drogues, les risques liées à la grippe aviaire et le terrorisme, se caractérise par une répartition chaotique du pouvoir.

Le pouvoir militaire n'est qu'une petite partie de la solution pour répondre aux menaces qui pèsent sur la planète, au troisième niveau. Il y faut la coopération entre les gouvernements et les institutions internationales. Même au niveau supérieur, si les militaires américains disposent d'une supériorité écrasante dans les airs, sur les mers et dans l'espace (le budget de la défense des USA représente près de la moitié des dépenses militaires de l'ensemble des pays de la planète), ils sont beaucoup moins à l'aise quand il s'agit de contrôler les élans nationalistes des populations dans des zones occupées.

Une politique étrangère basée sur le réalisme progressiste mettrait aussi l'accent sur une stratégie mondiale qui combinerait le pouvoir militaire et le pouvoir de séduction en un pouvoir "intelligent", tel celui qui a permis de remporter la Guerre froide. L'Amérique doit employer le pouvoir militaire contre les terroristes, mais elle ne peut espérer remporter la lutte contre le terrorisme si elle ne remporte pas le cœur et n'attire pas l'adhésion des modérés. L'usage contre-productif de la force (comme à Abou Ghraïb ou à Haditha) engendre de nouveaux terroristes.

Aujourd'hui, les USA n'ont pas une telle stratégie intégrée. Beaucoup des instruments officiels du pouvoir de séduction (la diplomatie, les médias à destination de l'étranger, les programmes d'échanges, l'aide au développement, l'assistance lors des catastrophes, les contacts avec les militaires des autres pays), sont dispersés dans différents ministères sans aucune politique d'ensemble, et encore moins un budget commun pour les combiner avec le pouvoir militaire en une stratégie cohérente de sécurité. Les USA dépensent environ 500 fois plus pour l'armée que pour les médias et les programmes d'échanges internationaux. Est-ce la bonne proportion ? Quelles devraient être les relations entre le gouvernement et tout ce qui participe au pouvoir de séduction de manière non officielle et qui émane de la société civile - de Hollywood à Harvard, en passant par la Fondation Bill et Melinda Gates ?

Une politique étrangère basée sur le réalisme progressiste doit mettre en avant la promesse "de vie, de liberté et de poursuite du bonheur" inscrite dans le marbre de la tradition américaine. Cette stratégie mondiale reposerait sur quatre piliers :

1°) la garantie de la sécurité des USA et de ses alliés ;

2°) le maintien d'une économie forte, tant sur le plan intérieur qu'international ;

3°) la mise en œuvre de mesures préventives pour éviter les désastres environnementaux (comme une pandémie ou des inondations généralisées) ;

4°) le soutien à la démocratie libérale et au respect des droits de l'homme sur le plan intérieur et si possible à l'étranger.

Cela ne veut signifie pas qu'il faille imposer les valeurs américaines par la force. La carotte est plus efficace que le bâton pour promouvoir la démocratie, et il y faut du temps et de la patience. Les USA seraient sages d'encourager à une évolution graduelle vers la démocratie, tout en reconnaissant la réalité de la diversité culturelle.

Une telle stratégie mondiale s'occuperait en priorité de quatre menaces majeures. Le plus grand danger est sans doute que du matériel nucléaire tombe entre les mains de terroristes. Empêcher cela suppose de combattre le terrorisme et de favoriser la non-prolifération, une meilleure protection du matériel nucléaire, la stabilité au Moyen-Orient et une plus grande attention portée aux pays où l'Etat est en déroute.

Le second défi majeur est la montée d'un bloc hostile, alors que la part de l'Asie dans l'économie mondiale augmente régulièrement pour tendre vers la même proportion que sa part de 60% de la population mondiale. Pour y répondre, il faut une politique qui intègre la Chine en tant qu'acteur responsable sur la scène internationale, tout en maintenant des relations amicales avec le Japon, l'Inde et les autres pays de la région.

La troisième menace majeure est une dépression économique qui pourrait être déclenchée par une mauvaise gestion financière ou par une crise qui perturberait le transit du pétrole du Golfe persique, où se trouvent les deux tiers des réserves mondiales. Pour y faire face, il faut une politique qui réduise progressivement la dépendance à l'égard du pétrole, tout en sachant que l'économie américaine ne peut être isolée du marché mondial de l'énergie.

La quatrième menace majeure qui pèse sur nous est une catastrophe écologique, qui pourrait être liée entre autres à une pandémie ou au changement de climat. Pour y répondre, il faut une politique énergétique avisée et davantage de coopération avec les institutions internationales comme l'Organisation mondiale de la santé.

Une politique basée sur le réalisme progressiste prendrait en compte l'évolution de l'ordre du monde à long terme et reconnaîtrait qu'il est de la responsabilité du pays le plus puissant de la planète d'œuvrer à l'intérêt général et à la défense des biens communs à tous. Au 19° siècle, la Grande-Bretagne définissait son intérêt national d'une manière très large en y incluant la défense de la liberté sur les mers, une économie internationale ouverte et une stabilité dans l'équilibre des pouvoirs en Europe. Cette politique orientée vers l'intérêt général bénéficiait à la Grande-Bretagne comme aux autres pays. Elle a aussi contribué à assurer sa légitimité et son pouvoir de séduction.

Maintenant que les USA sont à la place de la Grande-Bretagne, ils se doivent de jouer un rôle similaire en défendant une économie internationale ouverte et les biens communs (les mers, l'espace et Internet), en intervenant comme médiateur dans les conflits internationaux avant qu'ils ne dégénèrent et en développant les institutions et une réglementation internationales. Du fait que la mondialisation diffuse les connaissances techniques et que les technologies de l'information permettent une plus large participation de tous aux communications mondiales, la prépondérance américaine va diminuer au cours de ce siècle. Le réalisme progressiste exige que l'Amérique s'y prépare en définissant son intérêt national d'une manière qui bénéficie à tous.


Partager cet article
Repost0
13 juillet 2006 4 13 /07 /juillet /2006 17:36


The Fragility of a Flat World

by Joseph S Nye

The world is flat! So says the columnist Thomas Friedman, who chose that provocative title for his bestselling book to awaken people to the dramatic effects that technology is having on the world economy. Distance is shrinking. Geographical barriers no longer provide easy protection. Manufacturing workers and high-tech professionals alike in Europe and America are being challenged by global competition. Western consumers who call a local company are likely to speak to someone in India.

Skeptics have pointed to the limits of Friedman’s metaphor. As one put it, the world is not flat, but "spiky." A contour map of economic activity in the world would show mountains of prosperity and many ravines of deprivation. Moreover, distance is far from dead. Even neighbors with low tariff barriers, like Canada and the United States, trade more internally than across borders. Seattle and Vancouver are close geographically, but Vancouver trades more with distant Toronto than with nearby Seattle.

Such criticism notwithstanding, Friedman makes an important point. Globalization, which can be defined as interdependence at inter-continental distances, is as old as human history. Witness the migration of peoples and religions, or trade along the ancient silk route that connected medieval Europe and Asia. But globalization today is different, because it is becoming quicker and thicker.

After the first trans-Atlantic cable in 1868, Europe and America could communicate in a minute. In 1919, the economist John Maynard Keynes described the possibility of an Englishman in London using a telephone to order goods from around the world to be delivered to his house by the afternoon. But Keynes’s Englishman was wealthy and thus exceptional. Today, hundreds of millions of people around the world have access to global goods in their local supermarkets.

Similarly, as recently as two decades ago, instantaneous global communication existed, but was economically out of reach for most people. Now, virtually anyone can enter an Internet café and enjoy a capability that was once available only to governments, multinational corporations, and a few individuals or organizations with large budgets. Tremendous declines in computing, communication, and transport costs have democratized technology.

Only a decade ago, two-thirds of all Internet users were in the US. Today, less than a quarter are located there. Knowledge is power, and more people have access to information today than at any time in human history. Non-state actors now have capabilities that were once limited to governments. The nation-state is not about to be replaced as the dominant institution of world politics, but it will have to share the stage with more actors, including organizations like Oxfam, celebrities like Bono, and transnational terrorist networks like Al Qaeda.

But flattening is reversible. It has happened before. The world economy was highly integrated in 1914, but economic interdependence declined during the next three decades. The global economy did not recover that same level of integration until 1970, and even then it remained divided by the Iron Curtain.

World War I was the trigger that set off the reversal, with economic globalization declining while military globalization increased, as witnessed by two world wars and a global cold war. This reflected deeper problems of domestic inequality created by nineteenth-century economic progress. Politics did not keep pace, and the result was the rise of pathological ideologies – fascism and communism – that divided nations and the world. The creation of the welfare state in Western countries after World War II helped to create a safety net for people disadvantaged by economic change, thereby encouraging them to accept the return of international economic interdependence.

Some analysts see China playing a role today similar to Germany’s role in the twentieth century. A rising power, beset with internal inequality, turns to nationalism and challenges the dominant power, provoking a war that turns back the progress of economic globalization. While the American and Chinese economies are highly interdependent today, so, too, were Germany and Britain before 1914.

But the analogy is imperfect. Germany had surpassed Britain in industrial production by 1900. Even at its current high rates of growth, China’s economy is unlikely to equal that of the US for at least two more decades.

The greater threat to a flat world is likely to come from the non-state and transnational forces that have been unleashed by the diffusion of technology. On September 11, 2001, a non-state network killed more Americans in a surprise attack than the government of Japan did at Pearl Harbor in 1941. I have called this the privatization of war. If such actors obtain nuclear and biological materials, the world will look very different. Borders will become harder to cross for both people and goods. And if such actors disrupt the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf, home to two-thirds of the world’s reserves, a global depression like that of the 1930’s could strengthen protectionism further.

Globalization has two driving forces: technology and policy. Thus far, policy has reinforced the flattening effects of technology. As the world’s largest economy, the US has taken the lead in promoting policies that reduce barriers. But the events described above could reverse such policies.

Some critics of globalization might welcome such an outcome. But the result, as we saw after 1914, would be the worst of both worlds – reversal of the economic globalization that spreads technology and power, but reinforcement of negative dimensions of military and ecological globalization, such as war, terror, climate change, and the spread of infectious diseases. In that case, the flat world could become a desert.



Partager cet article
Repost0
8 mai 2006 1 08 /05 /mai /2006 16:22


Donald Rumsfeld and Smart Power ('I don't know what it means') -edition...

Joseph S. Nye


Donald Rumsfeld, America’s Secretary of Defense, recently spoke about the Bush administration’s global war on terror. “In this war, some of the most critical battles may not be in the mountains of Afghanistan or the streets of Iraq, but in newsrooms in New York, London, Cairo, and elsewhere. Our enemies have skillfully adapted to fighting wars in the media age, but for the most part we have not.”

The good news is that Rumsfeld is beginning to realize that the struggle against terrorism cannot be won by hard military power alone. The bad news is that he still does not understand soft power – the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion. As The Economist commented about Rumsfeld’s speech, “until recently he plainly regarded such a focus on ‘soft power’ as, well, soft – part of ‘Old Europe’s’ appeasement of terrorism.”

Now Rumsfeld finally realizes the importance of winning hearts and minds, but, as The Economist put it, “a good part of his speech was focused on how with slicker PR America could win the propaganda war.” In other words, in blaming the media for America’s problems, Rumsfeld forgot the first rule of marketing: if you have a poor product, not even the best advertising will sell it.

Rumsfeld’s mistrust of the European approach contains a grain of truth. Europe has used the attractiveness of its Union to obtain outcomes it wants, just as the US has acted as though its military pre-eminence could solve all problems. But it is a mistake to count too much on hard or soft power alone. The ability to combine them effectively is “smart power.”

During the Cold War, the West used hard power to deter Soviet aggression, while it used soft power to erode faith in Communism behind the iron curtain. That was smart power. To be smart today, Europe should invest more in its hard-power resources, and America should pay more attention to its soft power.

During President George W. Bush’s first term, Secretary of State Colin Powell understood and referred to soft power, whereas Rumsfeld, when asked about soft power in 2003, replied “I don’t know what it means.” A high price was paid for that ignorance. Fortunately, in his second term, with Condoleezza Rice and Karen Hughes at the State Department and Rumsfeld’s reputation dented by failures that in the private sector would have led to his firing or resignation, Bush has shown an increased concern about America’s soft power.

Of course, soft power is no panacea. For example, soft power got nowhere in attracting the Taliban government away from its support for Al Qaeda in the 1990’s. It took hard military power to sever that tie. Similarly, North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il likes to watch Hollywood movies, but that is unlikely to affect his decision about whether to give up his nuclear weapons program. Such a choice will be determined by hard power, particularly if China agrees to economic sanctions. Nor will soft power be sufficient to stop Iran’s nuclear program, though the legitimacy of the Bush administration’s current multilateral approach may help to recruit other countries to a coalition that isolates Iran.

But other goals, such as promoting democracy and human rights, are better achieved by soft power. Coercive democratization has its limits, as the US has learned in Iraq.

This does not mean that Rumsfeld’s Pentagon is irrelevant to American soft power. Military force is sometimes treated as synonymous with hard power, but the same resource can sometimes contribute to soft power. A well-run military can be a source of attraction, and military cooperation and training programs can establish transnational networks that enhance a country’s soft power. The US military’s impressive work in providing humanitarian relief after the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 helped restore America’s attractiveness, and enhanced its soft power.

But the misuse of military resources can also undercut soft power. The Soviet Union possessed a great deal of soft power in the years after World War II. But the Soviets’ attractiveness as liberators was destroyed by the way they later used their hard power against Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Brutality and indifference to “just war” principles of discrimination and proportionality can also destroy legitimacy. The efficiency of the initial American military invasion of Iraq in 2003 created admiration in the eyes of some foreigners. But this soft power was undercut by the inefficiency of the occupation, the mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, and the policy – initiated by Rumsfeld – of detainment without hearings at Guantánamo.

To be sure, no one expects that we can ever attract people like Mohammed Attta or Osama bin Laden. We need hard power to deal with such cases. But today’s terrorist threat is not Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations. It is a civil war within Islam between a majority of normal people and a small minority who want to coerce others into a accepting a highly ideological and politicized version of their religion. We cannot win unless the moderates win. We cannot win unless the number of people the extremists recruit is lower than the number we kill and deter.

Rumsfeld may understand this calculus in principle, but his words and actions show that he does not know how to balance the equation in practice. Doing so – and thus being in a position to win the war – is impossible without soft power.


Partager cet article
Repost0
12 avril 2006 3 12 /04 /avril /2006 02:55


Why America must be pragmatic with Putin

 by Joseph Nye



When George W. Bush, US president, famously looked into Vladimir Putin's eyes a few years ago, he should have seen a new Russian tsar. For a president who has put democracy promotion at the top of his agenda, Mr Putin's Russia is an awkward problem.

John McCain, the senator, suggested that western leaders should boycott the summit of the Group of Eight leading industrialised nations scheduled for Moscow this summer. Meanwhile, journalists report a policy debate between Dick Cheney ... who urges a tougher line toward Mr Putin's backsliding, and Condoleezza Rice ... who reportedly takes a more pragmatic position. Mr Bush apparently rejected Mr McCain's advice but the problem of dealing with Mr Putin's Russia remains difficult.

I recently revisited Moscow. The city looks more like a normal European capital than the dreary city of 20 years ago. In the 1980s, Russian colleagues risked critical comments only when walking out of doors or in noisy restaurants, but never in their bugged offices. This time I found students, journalists and politicians willing to criticise Mr Putin openly. Russia may not be democratic but there is certainly more private property and personal freedom than there was two decades ago.

Ironically, Mikhail Gorbachev, the man who helped make that freedom possible, is not very popular in Russia today. ... he [is] praised by intellectuals and artists but many members of the public blame him for weakening Soviet Russia. As one friend told me, when Mr Gorbachev visited his home city, crowds shouted abuse at him. He stopped and shouted back: "Don't forget I am the one who gave you the right to shout!"

But free speech is not the same as democracy, particularly when it cannot be amplified and organised for political purposes. While newspapers and some radio stations are openly critical of the regime, television is strictly controlled. As one of Mr Putin's supporters proudly explained: "We are a manipulated democracy."...

What will Russia's future look like? One former political leader suggested that Russian politics is like a pendulum. It had swung too far in the direction of chaos under Boris Yeltsin and was now swinging too far in the direction of order under Mr Putin, but would eventually reach equilibrium.

Others were not so sure. A young Duma member told me he foresaw a continual decline of freedom rather than a return to equilibrium. Dmitri Trenin, deputy director of the Carnegie Endowment's Moscow Center, argues that "although not democratic, Russia is largely free. Property rights are more deeply anchored than they were five years ago. Russia's future now depends heavily on how fast a middle class - a self-identified group with personal stakes in having a law-based government accountable to taxpayers - can be created".

Faced with this uncertainty, how should we respond? Ms Rice said last December that "the fundamental character of regimes matters more today than the international distribution of power".

Yet in addition to our democracy agenda, the US has a realist agenda based on very tangible interests. It needs Russian co-operation in dealing with issues such as nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea, the control of nuclear materials and weapons, combating the current wave of Salafi-jihadist terrorism, and energy production and security (which will be a focus of the G8 agenda). ...

There may not be as much conflict between these two agendas as first appears. If the US were to turn its back on Russia, we would not advance the growth of liberal democracy in Russia. Most Russian liberals I spoke to believed such isolation would accelerate the xenophobic and statist tendencies long present in Russian culture and make the liberal democratic cause even more difficult.

In their view, the US should look to the long run, use our soft power of attraction, expand exchanges and contacts with Russia's new generation, support Russia's entry into the World Trade Organisation and address Russian deficiencies with specific criticisms rather than general harangues or counter-productive isolation.

The sources of change in Russia will remain rooted in Russia, and American influence will be limited no matter what we do. But petulant actions that play well in American domestic politics may hinder rather than help Russians who share our values.


Partager cet article
Repost0
5 mars 2006 7 05 /03 /mars /2006 21:15


Envisager la question du pétrole d’un mauvais point de vue

Joseph S. Nye



"Dans son récent discours sur l’état de l’Union, le président George W. Bush déclarait que « l’Amérique est dépendante du pétrole ». Il a annoncé un programme de recherche en énergie pour réduire les importations américaines de pétrole en provenance du Moyen-Orient à hauteur de 75% dans les vingt ans à venir. Mais même si ce programme réussit, cela ne résoudra pas la question de la sécurité énergétique de l’amérique. Les États-Unis n’importent qu’un cinquième de leur pétrole depuis le Moyen-Orient.

Les Américains ne sont pas les seuls à s’inquiéter de la question du pétrole sous l’angle de la sécurité. La Chine et l’Inde, les deux pays les plus peuplés au monde, ont compris que le taux élevé de leur croissance économique dépend entre autres du pétrole étranger. Alors que ces pays consomment à eux deux moitié moins de pétrole que les États-Unis, leur consommation s’accélère rapidement. Lorsque les pays pauvres consommeront autant par tête que les pays riches, y aura-t-il assez de pétrole pour tout le monde ?

La Chine et l’Inde ont sillonné le globe pour signer des accords financiers et politiques coûteux avec les nouveaux pays producteurs de pétroles pour s’en arroger la production. Quand les pays occidentaux, par exemple, ont découragé leurs compagnies pétrolières de faire affaire avec le gouvernement soudanais à cause de sa gestion inadéquate du génocide au Darfour, la Chine s’est empressée d’acheter le pétrole de ce pays.

Certains experts disent que la production mondiale de pétrole sera à son plus haut dans une dizaine d’années environ. D’autres répliquent que de nouvelles découvertes et l’amélioration des technologies d’extraction du pétrole dans les champs existants donnent un air un peu trop alarmiste à ces prévisions. Comme on ne dispose pas de statistiques précises sur les réserves de pays tels que l’Arabie saoudite, il est impossible de régler cette question de manière définitive. Mais la majorité des experts s’accordent pour dire que l’on n’arrivera pas à bout des réserves de pétrole dans un avenir proche, malgré la demande croissante de la Chine et de l’Inde. On sait qu’il existe plus de trois billions de barils en réserve, et on pense qu’on en découvrira de nouvelles.

En tout cas, les débats sur la taille des réserves mondiales de pétrole et le moment où la production sera à son plus haut ignorent la question clé de la sécurité. Au cœur du problème se trouve non pas la quantité mondiale de pétrole mais plutôt sa répartition géographique. Les deux-tiers des réserves connues se situent dans le Golfe persique, une des régions du monde les plus instables.

L’approvisionnement en pétrole est donc fortement conditionné par les problèmes politiques bien plus que par la rareté des réserves. Pour la cHine et l’Inde, cela ne fait que renforcer leur désir de s’approprier des réserves dans des pays autres que les pays du Golfe persique. De même, cela a poussé M. Bush a déclarer son intention de réduire les importation depuis cette région de 75% dans les vingt ans à venir.

Au premier abord, la tâche de M. Bush semble facile. Les États-Unis consomment environ 21 millions de barils par jour, et en importent 2,5 millions depuis le Golfe persique. Avant même que de nouvelles technologies produisent cette quantité de fuel, les États-Unis pourraient importer depuis le Nigeria, le Venezuela et d’autres pays. Mais même si ces pays restent stables, l’Amérique n’aura toujours pas assuré sa sécurité. Ce qui importe, c’est le total des importations de pétrole du pays et non pas leurs origines.

Imaginons que le Golfe persique entre en crise à cause des efforts iraniens pour acquérir l’arme nucléaire. L’Iran a déjà menacé de réduire ses exportations de pétrole si le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies lui impose des sanctions pour avoir failli à ses engagements nucléaires. La plupart des experts prévoient qu’un tel événement pourraient faire monter les prix du pétrole, y compris au Venezuela et au Nigeria, ainsi que d’autres pays où les États-Unis, la Chine et l’Inde s’approvisionnent, à plus de 100 USD le baril. L’augmentation rapide des prix pourrait aggraver les économies importatrices de pétrole, quelle que soit sa provenance.

Le monde a appris sa leçon depuis la guerre israélo-arabe de 1973. Les pays arabes exportateurs de pétrole avaient alors placé un embargo sur la vente de pétrole aux États-Unis et aux Pays-bas pour les punir de leur soutien envers Israël. Mais le pétrole destiné aux États-Unis et aux Pays-bas fut envoyé à d’autres pays, notamment le Japon, tandis que le pétrole destiné à d’autres pays trouva le moyen de partir aux États-Unis et aux Pays-bas. Le pétrole est un bien fongible et les marchés se résorbent à un prix commun. Quand la situation s’est calmée, il est apparu que tous les importateurs, américains, néerlandais et tous les autres, avaient souffert en gros des mêmes manques et payé le même prix exorbitant.

Cela signifie que la Chine et l’Inde se bercent d’illusions si elles pensent acquérir une certaine sécurité en signant des accords préférentiels avec les Soudanais ou les Iraniens. Quand les troubles apparaissent, la Chine, l’Inde et les États-Unis constateront tous qu’ils payent les mêmes prix et souffrent donc tous de la même façon. Entre temps, le malentendu mercantile des marchés côté chinois entraîne qu’elle paye trop pour ce qu’elle prend, à tort, pour une certaine sécurité de son approvisionnement énergétique.

Tout comme M. Bush. Même s’il réduit les importations du Moyen-Orient, l’Amérique ne jouira pas d’une plus grande sécurité sans réduire sa soif absolue de pétrole. Par le passé, les hausses de prix du pétrole ont participé au ralentissement de la consommation de pétrole aux États-Unis. Les États-Unis n’utilisent plus que moitié moins de pétrole par dollar de production par rapport au passé, avant la hausse des prix des années 1970s. Mais plus de la moitié du pétrole consommé par les Américains disparaît dans les automobiles et les camions. Les États-Unis ne résoudront pas leur problème de sécurité énergétique sans améliorer son économie pétrolière, éventuellement par une combinaison de mesures technologiques, fiscales et régulatoires.

Le pétrole n’est pas à l’origine de la guerre d’Irak dans une vision simpliste où le simple contrôle américain sur le pétrole irakien lui apporterait une certaine sécurité. La dépendance mondiale envers le pétrole du Golfe persique indique que tout le monde a intérêt à assurer la stabilité de la région tout en améliorant l’efficacité énergétique de sa consommation et en diversifiant les approvisionnements dans leur ensemble. "


Partager cet article
Repost0
29 juin 2005 3 29 /06 /juin /2005 00:00


by Joseph Nye

 

 


The United States consumes a quarter of the world’s oil, compared to 8%  for China. Even with high Chinese growth expected in coming years, the world will not run out of oil anytime soon. Over a trillion barrels of proven reserves exist, and more is likely to be found. But two-thirds of those proven reserves are in the Persian Gulf, and are thus vulnerable to disruption.


In the past, rising prices had a strong effect on US oil consumption. Since the price spikes of the 1970’s, US oil consumption per dollar of GDP has fallen by half, which also reflects the general economic shift away from industrial manufacturing to less energy-intensive production. After all, it requires a lot less energy to create a software program than it does to produce a ton of steel.


In the early 1980’s, energy costs accounted for 14% of America’s economy. Today, they account for 7%. Adjusted for inflation, oil prices would have to reach $80 per barrel (or $3.12 per gallon of gasoline) to reach the real level recorded in March 1981.


According to the US government, if there are no supply disruptions, and the American economy grows at an annual rate of 3%, the price of a barrel of oil will decline to $25 (in 2003 dollars) in 2010 and then rise to $30 in 2025. The energy intensiveness of the economy will continue to decline at an average annual rate of 1.6%, as efficiency gains and structural shifts offset part of the overall growth in demand. Nonetheless, dependency on oil will grow at an annual rate of 1.5%, from 20 million barrels per day in 2003 to 27.9 million in 2025.


The American political system has difficulty in agreeing on a coherent energy policy.

But over the next decade, the politics of energy in the US may gradually change. Some observers detect a new “Geo-Green” coalition of conservative foreign-policy hawks, who worry about America’s dependence on Persian Gulf oil, and liberal environmentalists.


In the hawks’ view, the real energy problem is not the absence of petroleum reserves, but the fact that they are concentrated in a vulnerable area. The answer is to curb America’s thirst for oil rather than increasing imports.


Greens argue that even if energy supplies are abundant, the ability of the environment to support current rates of consumption is limited. The middle of the range of scenarios considered by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change projects that atmospheric CO2 concentrations will reach nearly three times their pre-industrial level in 2100. While the Bush Administration remains skeptical about the science behind such projections, some state and local governments are enacting measures to cut CO2 emissions. More importantly, companies such as General Electric are committing to green goals that go well beyond government regulations.


A recent report by the bipartisan National Commission on Energy Policy exemplifies the new coalition. While President Bush argues that technological advances in hydrogen fuels and fuel cells will curb oil imports in the long run, such measures require major changes in transportation infrastructure that will require decades to complete. The commission suggests policies that could be implemented sooner.


For example, in recent testimony before Congress, James Woolsey, a commission member and former CIA director, urged the use of hybrid gasoline/electric vehicles that could charge their batteries overnight with cheap off-peak electricity; energy efficient ethanol made from cellulose; and a ten-mile-per-gallon increase in fuel-efficiency requirements. He argued that this agenda could cut gasoline consumption significantly in a matter of years rather than decades. It would also avoid the need for dramatic increases in gasoline or carbon taxes, which are broadly accepted in Europe and Japan, but remain the kiss of death for American politicians.


But US government policies are unlikely to change Americans’ energy consumption significantly in the next few years. Even if a new administration were to enact new policies after Bush leaves office in 2008, there would still be a lag prior to any effect on actual consumption.


In the next few years, market forces are likely to be more important than government policies in influencing consumption patterns. But over the next decade, the combination of markets and policies could make a big difference. For example, between 1978 and 1987, government regulations produced an improvement of 40% in the fuel efficiency of new American-made cars.


In a surprise-free world, the Bush administration is probably right that America’s thirst for oil will grow by 1.5% annually over the next two decades. But political disruption in the Persian Gulf or a new terrorist attack in the US would drive up oil prices rapidly, and the political climate in America might also change quickly.


The probability of such events is not negligible. Energy independence may be impossible for a country that consumes a quarter of the world’s oil but has only 3% of its reserves. Even so, a major decline in America’s thirst for oil is not out of the question in the longer term.

 

 

 

 


 

 


Partager cet article
Repost0

Pages