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Robert Shiller

Mercredi 14 décembre 2005 3 14 /12 /2005 17:12

 

 

 


We're Still Too Exuberant

 


The man who wrote the book on irrational investing says we haven't learned our lesson. I believe him.

 

 



By Geoffrey Colvin


One of the most important lessons you can ever learn about markets is also one of the easiest to forget: Just because prices are more reasonable than they were doesn't mean they're reasonable. I'm sorry to report that it's absolutely the lesson to keep in mind now that the Dow has hit 42-year highs and crept back up near 11,000.

The preeminent teacher of that lesson is Robert Shiller, a Yale professor with a strong record of thinking independently and being right. His book Irrational Exuberance, arguing that stock prices were insanely high, appeared almost precisely at their peak in March 2000. Now he has updated the book to reflect 2005 valuations and concludes that, believe it or not, the market is still irrationally exuberant.

How does he come to this conclusion? After all, stocks are generally lower than back in the bubble days, and we've had four years of economic growth to rehabilitate corporate profits. His answer is simple. As he told me the other day, all the competing theories boil down to one easy-to-understand calculation: 'The trailing P/E ratio for the S&P composite is still around 25, vs. a long-term average of 15."That's a huge difference, much greater than what you read about in the newspapers. The commonly cited figures—a current market multiple of 17, vs. a historical average of 15.2—are based on the previous 12 months" earnings. But, as Shiller points out, that's foolish: "Twelve months is kind of short, only a fraction of one business cycle." So he uses a ten-year earnings average, an approach advocated by Graham and Dodd in Security Analysis, the value investor's bible. And while prices are clearly above the long-term trend any way you cut it, by that measure they are still mountainously beyond normal.

For some people—I don't want to mention any names, but cast a glance at “Nope—We’re Too Gloomy”—that conclusion is impossible to accept. So they contort the numbers and cook up theories about why today's prices aren't really as high as they appear. The most significant theory, which surveys show is believed by vast armies of investors, is that stocks aren't as risky as we used to think they were, so they're actually worth more than investors have historically been willing to pay. In other words, we were simply wrong for the past several decades but at last have seen the light, and in that light today's overall market valuations make sense.

Shiller
would hoot at that one if hooting were his style. Instead he just mentions that this is 'the Dow 36,000 theory.' That 1999 book by investing columnist James Glassman and former Fed economist Kevin Hassett, you'll recall, argued that prices would rocket as the populace realized that in the long run, stocks always beat other investments, so they're really safer than conventionally thought. We must all thank Shiller for reminding us of this prediction from the book: "... a sensible target date for Dow 36,000 is early 2005, but it could be reached much earlier." Or not.

It's easy to make fun of Dow 36,000, but it's more important to recognize that the theory behind it is still at work, and it still doesn't add up. As Shiller points out with voluminous support, it just isn't true that stocks always outperform other investments over long-term periods, and, he says, 'there is certainly no reason to think they must in the future.' If that's true, then stocks would appear to be just as risky as ever. We are not in a "new era." Math still works the same way. And today's valuations are too high.

No one wants to hear that. It's almost irresistible to believe that after all we investors have endured—the hellish bear market, the recession, the scandals—we've emerged from the crucible sadder but wiser, finally willing to face the truth about stock values. But it isn't so. The amazing reality is that we haven't learned our lesson even yet.

 

How does he come to this conclusion?

The answer is quite simple. Take a look at the evolution of the different stockmarkets (Footsie, Eurostoxx, Dax, Cac, MIB, etc etc) worldwide after the burst of the tech bubble in april 2001 and compare this evolution to the Dow Jones (without forgetting the deficit).

 


 

 

 

 

Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : Robert Shiller
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Vendredi 27 janvier 2006 5 27 /01 /2006 17:35



A. MARSHALL (EN 1890!!!!) NOUS LIVRE ICI UNE EXPLICATION POSSIBLE ET EXCELLENTE...

PARFAIT (PARTII)


 


"In real life such oscillations [around equilibrium] are seldom as rhythmical as those of a stone hanging freely on a string; the comparison would be more exact if the string were supposed to hang in the troubled waters of a mill-race, whose stream was at one time allowed to flow freely, and at another partially cut off...If the person holding the string swings his hand with movements partly rhythmical and partly arbitrary, the illustration will not outrun the difficulties of some very real and practical problems of value. For indeed, the demand and supply schedules do not in practice remain unchanged for a long time together but are constantly being changed; and every change in them alters the equilibrium amount and the equilibrium price, and thus gives new positions to the centres about which the amount and the price tend to oscillate." (A. Marshall, 1890: p.288-9)

 




Is Bernanke ready?

By Robert J. Shiller

Ben Bernanke, the nominee to replace Alan Greenspan this month as Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board, is a highly capable economist who has devoted his professional life to understanding the historical role of central banks and the problems that they have faced. His views represent, as much as can be expected, a consensus among those who have studied the issues carefully.

But that does not mean that Bernanke is prepared to ensure that healthy economic growth continues in the US in the coming years and provide the kind of leadership that the world needs. By the standards of what is generally understood today, he will do a good job. Unfortunately, that may not be enough. John Maynard Keynes once said that monetary policy may work like a string. A central bank can pull the string (raise interest rates) to rein in an economy that is galloping ahead unsustainably. But it cannot push the string up: if economic growth stalls, as when confidence is seriously damaged, lowering interest rates may not be enough to stimulate demand. In that case, a recession can occur despite the central bank’s best efforts.

Bernanke made his name as an economist by analyzing the worldwide Great Depression of the 1930’s – good expertise to have, since preventing such disasters is a central bank head’s most important job. The Great Depression, which followed the stock market crash of 1929, saw unemployment rise sharply in many countries, accompanied by severe deflation. In the US, consumer prices fell 27% between 1929 and 1933, and the unemployment rate topped out in 1933 at 23%.

According to Bernanke’s “debt deflation” theory, the collapse in consumer prices was one of the causes of the Great Depression, since deflation raised the real value of debts, making it difficult to repay loans. As Bernanke pointed out, 45% of US farms were behind on mortgage payments in 1933, and in 1934, default rates on home mortgages exceeded 38% in half of US cities. The debt burden destroyed consumer confidence and undermined the banking system, crippling the economy.

Bernanke’s research also stressed that the sooner a country abandoned the gold standard, the better off it was. Adhering to the gold standard during the Great Depression implied a deflationary monetary-policy bias, since it required keeping interest rates relatively high to encourage investors to hold deposits in banks rather than demanding the gold that backed them. Once a country eliminated convertibility into gold, it was free to pursue monetary expansion, and deflation tended to end.

But Bernanke’s impressive research on the Great Depression does not mean that he can prevent the next recession or depression, for stopping deflation hardly solves all problems. After all, the US went off the gold standard in 1933, and the Fed cut the discount rate to 1.5% in 1934, ending deflation (except for minor episodes); but the unemployment rate did not fall consistently below 15% until 1941 and the onset of World War II.

Bernanke will therefore have to be careful about over-generalizing from his past research, just as medical specialists must be careful not to over-diagnose diseases in their own specialty and military strategists must be careful not to over-prepare to fight the last war.

Of course, this does not mean that we should ignore the past altogether. A 2005 study headed by Guillermo Calvo, Chief Economist for the Inter-American Development Bank, found important similarities between the Great Depression of the 1930’s and economic crises since 1980 in 31 emerging countries. But the study also found important differences.

The fundamental experience of the Great Depression has repeated itself, on a smaller scale, many times and in many countries in recent decades: a shock in financial markets, followed by a sharp decline in gross domestic product. But the behavior of consumer prices in the post-1980 crises is fundamentally different from that seen in the 1930’s. In contrast to the Great Depression, collapsing national output was in recent decades accompanied by accelerating inflation, not deflation. The Calvo study thus concludes that Bernanke’s debt deflation theory of the Great Depression does not generally apply to the more recent crises.

At the same time, Bernanke is inheriting a pair of economic vulnerabilities that are unusual by historical standards, and that did not precede the Great Depression of the 1930’s. We are now in the late stages of the biggest real estate boom in US (or world) history, driven by frenzied market psychology. In contrast, US home prices were uneventful before the Great Depression, and actually fell slightly in real terms between 1925 and 1929. Moreover, we are now experiencing a fundamental change in expectations about oil prices: not only are today’s prices quite high in real terms by historical standards, but the futures markets indicate that prices are expected to remain high for years to come. In contrast, real oil prices were flat leading up to 1929, and down nearly 50% in real terms from the 1925-6 “fuel folly” peaks.

In the near future, substantially higher oil prices, lower real estate prices, or both, could, depending on public reaction, put Bernanke into uncharted territory for economic stress. If confidence declines, his historical understanding of the Great Depression of the 1930’s could leave him ill-equipped to prevent such shocks from sinking the US, and the world, economy. He might find himself pushing on a string.

Robert J. Shiller is Professor of Economics at Yale University, Director at Macro Securities Research LLC, and author of Irrational Exuberance and The New Financial Order: Risk in the 21st Century.

 

 


Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : Robert Shiller
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Lundi 27 février 2006 1 27 /02 /2006 22:22


Dear Mr Shiller,


as a young man mainly blinded by ambitional 'entrepreneurship' (Ha,ha !) , I probably will not be able to 'argumentally seen' put myself on the side of your 'outspoken' position:



"Shiller’s advice is to diversify and to keep plenty of money in the bank or in “boring” inflation-proofed bonds...."



Supposing that I (P.-V.) am the embryonic (by 'embryonic' I mean young) "Incredible Hulk", I would rather say:




Adrenaline keeps me in the game
Adrenaline you don't even feel the pain
Wilder than your wildest dreams
When you're going to extremes(!)
It takes adrenaline
(You don't feel the pain)



ripe (rīp)
adj., rip·er, rip·est.

1. Fully developed; mature: ripe peaches.
2. Resembling matured fruit, as in fullness.
3. Sufficiently advanced in preparation or aging to be used or eaten: ripe cheese.
4. Thoroughly matured, as by study or experience; seasoned: ripe judgment.
5. Advanced in years: the ripe age of 90.
6. Fully prepared to do or undergo something; ready: “By 1965 the republic was ripe for a coup” (Alex Shoumatoff).
7. Sufficiently advanced; opportune: The time is ripe for great societal changes.
8. Exhibiting overtones of or references to sex; scatological: “The language on the stage was riper than anything I have heard in a lifetime of newspaper work” (John Hughes).
9. Emitting a foul odor, especially body odor.

[Middle English, from Old English rīpe] (P.S.: in german it's 'Reif'  (rïv))
ripe'ly adv.
ripe'ness n.




 
Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : Robert Shiller
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Mercredi 8 mars 2006 3 08 /03 /2006 11:51


Catastrophes, assurances et mondialisation

Robert J. Shiller





Près de 6 mois après la destruction de la moitié de La Nouvelle-Orléans par l'ouragan Katrina, de nombreuses victimes expriment colère et ressentiment, car tous leurs espoirs de dédommagement ont été balayés. Cette situation est d'autant plus douloureuse que beaucoup d'entre elles se trouvent dans une situation qui aurait pu être évitée : propriétaires de leur logement, elles ont subi des pertes énormes, mais ne sont pas indemnisés parce qu'elles n'étaient pas, ou insuffisamment assurés. Elles pensaient souvent ne pas avoir les moyens suffisants pour souscrire la police d'assurance voulue.

Cette situation risque de se reproduire lors des prochaines catastrophes - tempête, tremblement de terre, tsunami, éruption volcanique, feu de forêt, catastrophe écologique, épidémie ou attentat. Il est donc nécessaire d'en comprendre les causes et de se demander dans quelle mesure les systèmes d'assurance peuvent fournir la protection voulue face aux risques auxquels nous sommes exposés.

Selon un rapport de l'Institut d'information sur l'assurance, les demandes de près de 70% des propriétaires de logement avaient été traitées fin janvier, ceci pour un total de 7,5 milliards de dollars. Cela peut paraître beaucoup, mais étant donné qu'il y a eu près de 200.000 habitations gravement endommagées ou détruites, cela représente moins de 40.000 dollars par habitation, ce qui est manifestement insuffisant.

60% des propriétaires de la Nouvelle-Orléans ne disposaient d'aucune assurance contre les inondations. Et parmi ceux qui étaient assurés, beaucoup ont découvert que des clauses restreignait leur indemnisation. Dans certains cas, les compagnies d'assurance ont invoqué des articles du contrat indiquant que l'indemnisation était moindre si les dégâts étaient dus à une inondation et non à un ouragan. Aux yeux des victimes, cela pouvait donner l'impression de couper les cheveux en quatre, alors qu'elles ont tout perdu, mais telles sont les termes du contrat qu'elles ont signés, sans toujours bien les lire.

Cela a conduit à de nombreux procès, mais finalement, beaucoup de victimes ont dû se rendre à l'évidence, elle doivent se contenter pour toute aide des prêts à faible taux d'intérêt. Pas tout à fait à tort, le président Bush veut limiter l'aide de l'Etat aux quelques 20.000 propriétaires auxquels on ne peut reprocher de ne pas avoir souscrit d'assurance inondation, car ils vivaient en dehors des zones déclarées inondables.

En dépit de cette situation, l'assurance privée reste encore la meilleure protection contre les catastrophes. Les polices d'assurance qui indiquent clairement le montant des indemnisations et le type de dommage qu'elles couvrent sont bien supérieures à l'aide de l'Etat sur laquelle beaucoup de gens semblaient compter. L'assurance privée peut encore être améliorée par l'éducation de la population, de meilleures institutions d'assurance et des coûts plus faibles. Il faut travailler sur tous ces points, car chacun doit avoir son rôle à jouer dans tout plan destiné à faire face à la prochaine catastrophe.
(P.-V.:Mais le role des assurances est aussi de maximiser les profits !, donc ceci n'est au bout du compte pas du tout dans leur interet..."Vive la 'Unbound economy'", si elle implique que: 'Qui lache le morceau a perdu')

Le principal problème ne semble pas résider dans le coût de l'assurance. Selon Robert Klein de l'université d'Etat de Géorgie, en Louisiane, les primes d'assurance ont déjà augmenté de 70% entre 1997 et 2005. Au niveau de l'Etat, les régulateurs de l'assurance s'opposent à ces augmentations, mais ils n'ont pas grand pouvoir, car les assureurs peuvent facilement se déplacer d'un Etat à l'autre.

La NAIC (National Association of Insurance Commissioners) a proposé en décembre que chacun des 50 Etats des USA crée un fond d'assurance couvrant un large éventail de catastrophes parmi les plus coûteuses, à l'image de ce qui existe déjà en France ou en Espagne. Par la suite, le gouvernement fédéral pourrait étendre ce système aux catastrophes exceptionnelles.

Cette proposition est actuellement en discussion. Si elle était adoptée dans son intégralité, ce qui est improbable, ce serait une révolution dans la gestion des risques, analogue à ce qu'à a été la création de la sécurité sociale en 1934. Mais la gestion des risques liés aux catastrophes majeures ne doit pas être exclusivement du ressort du gouvernement. Les marchés financiers peuvent aussi intervenir dans la mesure où ils parviennent à soulever l'attention et l'intérêt des investisseurs.

Ainsi, les obligations liées aux catastrophes (les cat bonds), ne sont pas remboursées si une catastrophe spécifiée se produit. Les compagnies d'assurance qui prennent un risque financier important en couvrant des risques majeurs peuvent négocier ces obligations sur le marché mondial. Si elles parviennent à les vendre pour un montant suffisant, elles diminuent leur risque et peuvent proposer des contrats d'assurance qui ne soient pas trop coûteux.

Ces obligations ont pris de plus en plus d'importance au cours de ces dernières années. Selon la société Lane Financial, leur émission a été à hauteur de 1,8 milliards de dollars en un an, d'avril 2004 à mars 2005. Depuis Katrina, elle a encore augmenté. Après Katrina, de septembre à novembre 2005, il y en a eu pour un montant de 2,1 milliards de dollars. Le montant total de ces obligations est peu de chose par rapport au désastre provoqué par Katrina. Mais comme la tendance est à la sophistication et à l'élargissement des marchés financiers, on peut encore s'attendre à une croissance importante de ce type d'obligations.

A l'échelle de la planète, l'ouragan Katrina et d'autres catastrophes de même ampleur ne représentent pas grand chose. Le montant total des pertes dues à Katrina - selon une étude du secteur de l'assurance, 34,4 milliards de dollars de bien étaient couverts - ne représente qu'une infime fraction de la richesse mondiale. Mais à l'échelle d'un pays, il s'agit de sommes non négligeables. C'est pourquoi la théorie financière recommande de répartir les risques aussi équitablement que possible à travers le monde, plutôt que de les faire supporter par chaque pays individuellement.

Les projets de fond d'aide en cas de catastrophes sont élaborés au niveau purement national. Pourtant, la possibilité de gérer les risques nationaux à l'échelle de la planète est l'un des avantages de la mondialisation et de l'expansion des marchés financiers.


Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : Robert Shiller
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Mardi 11 juillet 2006 2 11 /07 /2006 15:03


A bond that insures against instability

By Stephany Griffith-Jones and Robert Shiller


'There has been increasing interest in creating bonds linked to the growth of a countries’ gross domestic product. At the spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, both potential issuers and investors expressed a clear appetite for such bonds. The servicing of these GDP-linked bonds would be higher in times of rapid growth and lower when growth was slow or negative.

GDP-linked bonds would have important advantages when compared with conventional debt for borrowers and investors, as well as significant externalities for the international financial system. For borrowers, issuing such bonds would help stabilise public spending throughout the cycle as governments would service more debt when they could better afford to, and less in more difficult times. It would also significantly reduce the likelihood of costly and disruptive defaults and debt crises. Defaulting on debt is a last-resort that governments find highly undesirable and costly to the country’s international reputation. A temporary reduction of a country’s debt service when the economy deteriorates would facilitate more rapid recovery.



For investors, defaults are costly as they result in expensive renegotiation and sometimes in very large losses. As GDP-linked bonds would help reduce the probability of default, effective total payments will tend to be higher than with conventional bonds. Furthermore, GDP-linked bonds would give investors the opportunity of taking a position on a range of countries’ growth rates, offering a valuable diversification opportunity. If GDP-linked bonds became widespread across countries, investors could take a position on growth worldwide – the ultimate risk diversification.

For international institutions, there would be benefits from the decreased likelihood of debt crises. Reduced risk of crisis contagion would also benefit other countries. These externalities and the fact that financial innovations are difficult to introduce may justify some initial public action (for example, from the World Bank) to help develop this market instrument. The World Bank could, for instance, make loans whose servicing would be linked to GDP. The loans could then be grouped, securitised and sold to the financial markets.

GDP-linked bonds should be a core element of government financing both for developed and creditworthy developing countries. Both of these could start today. Developed countries are the best equipped to issue GDP-linked bonds immediately, because of the relatively high trust that is placed in their capital markets and in their GDP accounting. Their doing so would have a valuable demonstration effect around the world.

Developing countries stand to gain more from issuing these bonds and they could start issuing GDP-linked bonds now. The issuance of even small quantities of these bonds by creditworthy emerging economies would help set in motion an important process of financial development.

The history of financial innovation is essentially one of learning by doing. Inflation-indexed bonds met initial scepticism, relating to problems such as precise measurement of inflation. In fact, once these bonds started to be issued, inflation statistics improved further. Inflation-indexed bonds are now widely accepted across the world; in the UK, they represent around a quarter of government debt. A similar evolution can be envisaged for GDP-linked bonds.

Introducing GDP-linked bonds would create a market for the economies themselves. The widespread impression that the stock market of a country is a market for the entire economy is mistaken. Stock markets are claims on net corporate profits that can constitute as little as 10 per cent of GDP. ...'



A lire le reste ici:


Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : Robert Shiller
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Lundi 21 août 2006 1 21 /08 /2006 01:52








Q.:
…you have another thought, which is basically...whatever the situation is right now, you think that the weakness we’re seeing in housing, is going to escalate, and eventually lead and take this country into a recession… tell us why…


A.:
Yes, there’s a significant probability of that, and I’m not right away, in fact housing prices are still going up generally…

Q:
A significant probability…90 %?...

A:
I would …no, not that high…60%...I’m making that up…and maybe in 2008…ehmm, because the housing-market just doesn’t turn on a dime…but once we see prices actually falling in a number of cities…if that happens…then, that would harm confidence even…we’ve just reported into the confidence numbers…you know…the ‘Michigan?’ number incidentally…is more a long term than the confidence board number….the question goes further up…and I think that a lot of people, are fairly confident about the next 6 months…but not so sure about what’s going to happen and once the oil prices if they continue for a while….and if housing prices start falling…and so the people are uncertain about the more distant future…

Q:
…but…is there…I mean how definitive is your research…and is your correlation, that a housing slow-down will lead to a recession…ehmmm, some would argue that, yes we would see a little bit of a slowdown…and that’s going to be picked up by other areas of the economy…ehmm and there were…the correlation between a slowdown in housing and definitive leading into a recession…doesn’t necessarily always come up…and so I would like to find out from you…why is it that you feel…’One has to lead to the another’…?

A:
Well, doesn’t have to…the other thing is (…but you have been willing this in this situation…)…I have some diffidence even about predicting the housing prices before…because we’ve seen slowdowns in housing prices and that then get reversed…but the thing that really strikes me …if you just look at the broad picture of the data…is that we have had the biggest housing boom in the history of this country…it is just an enormous boom…and it has had an enormous psychology, which has driven the economy…and you can’t go on for ever….in fact its been… from year to year its been generally accelerating …that can’t go on for ever…and so once it stops accelerating and it starts going in reverse…I think there’ll be a big impact in psychology…and that’s what ultimately causes recessions…



Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : Robert Shiller
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Dimanche 27 août 2006 7 27 /08 /2006 22:10


Growth rate gulf result of opposite approach to saving
by Robert Shiller




The saving rate in China is the highest of any major country. China's gross saving rate ..., which includes both public and private saving, is around 50 percent.

By contrast, the saving rate in the United States is the lowest of any major country - roughly 10 percent of GDP. Differences in saving rates must be a major reason that China's annual economic growth rate is a full six percentage points higher than in the US. ... Unfortunately, explaining saving rates is not an exact science.

Ingrained habits probably explain more about China's saving rate. When incomes are growing rapidly, as they are in China, it is easier to save because people are not yet accustomed to a higher standard of living. They also tolerate enterprise or government policies that encourage high saving.

For example, the uptrend in saving in China began at around the same time as its family planning policy was implemented in 1979. This prevented the birth rate from rebounding after the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76. The late Nobel laureate economist Franco Modigliani, in his last major published paper in 2004 (co-authored with Shi Larry Cao), argued that this demographic change explains much of the increase in the saving rate, as Chinese substituted investment in capital for investment in children.

But income growth and demographics do not explain everything. After all, the virtuous circle of high savings and rapid growth operates more strongly in China than in other developing countries where incomes are rising and birth rates are falling. This suggests that there are other, deeper factors that underlie the differences in Chinese and US saving rates.

For one thing, the Chinese trust their government more. According to a recent World Values Survey, 96.7 percent of Chinese expressed confidence in their government, compared to only 37.3 percent of Americans.

Likewise, 83.5 percent of Chinese thought their country is run for all the people, rather than for a few big interest groups, whereas only 36.7 percent of Americans thought the same of their country. With this relatively higher trust, China's government and enterprises are better able to enact and implement strict policies that promote saving and growth.

Moreover, while economic inequality is on the rise in both countries, Chinese and Americans comprehend this very differently. In the US, widely called "the land of opportunity," the shame of being poor is unbearable, and there are no cultural resources to enable such people to maintain self-esteem... As inequality deepens, many who fall behind struggle to save face, consuming in order to maintain the appearance of success.

By contrast, poor people in China mostly view their personal situation as transitional. There is no shame in being poor in China if one reflects that one's children or grandchildren will be successful.

In the US, one's income is a dark secret that one might not reveal even to one's own spouse. In China, people tell each other how much they earn with relative ease.

Especially in Chinese villages, people know how their neighbors are faring. Conspicuous consumption becomes less important when people already know your income.

Of course, Chinese increasingly consume fancy new cars and designer clothes. But there is relatively less pleasure in public displays of consumption at a time when the prevailing national story is one of triumph over adversity.

China will most likely be saving more than the US for years to come. But, as the next generation takes control in China, this will change.


Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : Robert Shiller
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Dimanche 1 octobre 2006 7 01 /10 /2006 09:51


À quoi pensent les futurs propriétaires ?

Robert J. Shiller


La flambée de l'immobilier touche de nombreux endroits du monde depuis la fin des années 1990. Comme je le disais l'an dernier, dans la deuxième édition de mon livre Irrational Exuberance , ce boom a son origine dans l'investissement spéculatif par des acheteurs immobiliers ordinaires, et il est alimenté en grande partie par la perception mondiale que le capitalisme a triomphé et que chacun doit se débrouiller par soi-même en devenant propriétaire. Convaincus que la propriété privée est devenu un élément essentiel d'une vie à la page, les acheteurs font grimper le prix des logements.

En outre, la crainte de devoir devenir propriétaire avant qu'il ne soit trop tard pousse souvent les gens à faire grimper les prix de l'immobilier encore plus rapidement aujourd'hui. C'est ce qui semble se produire pour la psychologie des marchés en Chine et en Inde, où l'augmentation rapide des revenus et les nouveaux riches vont certainement mettre la pression sur les marchés des terrains, de l'immobilier et des matériaux de construction. Cela fait des années que les grandes villes de ces pays connaissent une flambée de l'immobilier. En Chine, malgré certains signes de faiblesse – le marché de Shanghai est à la baisse, par exemple – la hausse des prix reste robuste dans la plupart du pays.

Mais le boom généré par de telles idées ne peut se poursuivre éternellement, car les prix ne peuvent pas toujours augmenter et les signes annonciateurs d'un atterrissage forcé sont déjà visibles. Aux États-unis, les journaux et les magazines annoncent à grands cris que la flambée de l'immobilier qui dure depuis une dizaine d'années est peut-être en bout de course, et que la bulle pourrait bien exploser. La psychologie a soudain changé d'orientation, provoquant une peur très répandue de soudaines baisses des prix de l'immobilier américain.

Le nouveau marché à terme pour les maisons individuelles du Chicago Mercantile Exchange (que j'ai contribué à établir en mai dernier avec notre société MacroMarkets LLC) prédit que d'ici août prochain, les cours vont baisser entre 6% et 8% dans les 10 villes américaines cotées.

Si les prix de l'immobilier s'effondrent aux États-Unis, bastion du capitalisme, pourraient-ils détruire la confiance et mettre un terme à la flambée dans les autres pays ? Si c'est le cas, une récession mondiale pourrait-elle s'ensuivre ?

Ce scénario est une vraie possibilité, bien qu'il y ait des raisons d'être sceptiques. Le plus important est que les principales sources du boom de l'immobilier, c'est-à-dire la foi dans le capitalisme et la future croissance économique, semblent être solidement implantées.

La tendance à la baisse du marché américain , par exemple, ne semble pas refléter de profonds changements dans la confiance économique à long terme. L'enquête que Karl Case et moi avons menée en mai et juin de cette année, sous les auspices de la Yale School of Management, montre des déclins brusques dans les attentes à court terme concernant les prix de l'immobilier aux États-Unis mais relativement peu de changements à long terme. La plupart des gens pensent encore que l'immobilier est un bon investissement à long terme.

Peut-être les prix de l'immobilier ne retomberont-ils pas à leur niveau d'avant le boom parce que le changement fondamental de perception du capitalisme triomphal s'inscrit dans la durée. Les changements des façons de penser fondamentales des gens ne s'inversent pas si facilement. Par conséquent, leur intérêt pour l'immobilier en tant qu'investissement spéculatif majeur n'est pas près de changer non plus.

La transformation des croyances des investisseurs est frappante. Avant la flambée de l'immobilier de la fin des années 1970, la monté des prix de l'immobilier n'inquiétait pratiquement personne. Il est étonnant de constater qu'une recherche dans des journaux de cette époque ne révèle que très peu d'articles sur les prévisions concernant les prix des logements. Ceux qui abordaient la question semblaient généralement se baser sur la supposition que des fluctuations mineures des coûts de construction, et non d'importants mouvements du marché, étaient responsables des modestes changements des prix de l'immobilier constatés.

En effet, rien de notable sur les prix des logements n'a jamais été signalé, à part un commentaire occasionnel dans un article traitant d'une autre sujet. Par exemple, un article dans The Times of London en 1970 expliquait que l'augmentation des prix de l'immobilier reflétait le passage au nouvel horaire British Standard Time (imposé dans le cadre d'une expérience de trois ans en 1968 pour faciliter le commerce avec l'Europe occidentale en plaçant la Grande-Bretagne dans le même fuseau horaire). L'article prétendait que ce changement faisait grimper les coûts en forçant les ouvriers du bâtiments britanniques à travailler davantage dans une relative obscurité. L'investissement spéculatif n'était que rarement évoqué les rares fois où le prix des logements était abordé.

Pour comprendre la nature du changement qui allait se produire, imaginez qu'il est difficile de nos jours de trouver quiconque s'inquiétant d'une future hausse des prix de l'automobile sous prétexte qu'une hausse de la demande de fer et autres matériaux en Chine et en Inde va rendre l'automobile hors de prix à l'avenir. À part un petit groupe de collectionneurs qui investissent et spéculent sur des voitures anciennes ou de spécialité, l'idée de spéculer sur l'automobile n'existe simplement pas dans la conscience du public. C'était la même chose pour l'immobilier jusqu'à la fin des années 1970.

Maintenant que nos positions ont changé par rapport à l'immobilier, nous ne serons plus jamais les mêmes. Mais évidemment, les prix de l'immobilier ne peuvent augmenter qu'à un certain rythme. Des prix immobiliers élevés et en hausse rapide ont tendance à stimuler l'offre du neuf, ce qui à son tour a tendance à faire chuter les prix. Sur une période de plusieurs années, à mesure que les gens se rendent compte de l'abondance de l'offre dans le neuf, il se peut qu'ils cessent de penser que l'immobilier est un investissement génial, causant une chute progressive mais au final conséquente des prix de l'immobilier.

En effet, si les changements dans les perceptions fondamentales ne se produisent ni facilement, ni rapidement, ils ne devraient jamais être exclus. Les prix des terrains des plus grandes villes japonaises subissent une baisse presque constante depuis 1991, à mesure que s'estompe l'immense foi dans les pouvoirs miraculeux du capitalisme japonais.

Le même genre d'érosion des prix de l'immobilier pourrait se produire dans de nombreuses villes du monde. Il suffit simplement que l'augmentation de l'offre immobilière finisse par entamer la foi des investisseurs dans le capitalisme et ne puisse plus entretenir une croissance aussi rapide de la demande.



Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : Robert Shiller
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Jeudi 8 février 2007 4 08 /02 /2007 13:51





               



Things That Go Boom

by Robert Shiller


It seems that no one in the 1990s forecast the doubling of home prices since 2000 in cities in the U.S. and many other countries. ... Books really predicting the housing boom started to appear only after it was well underway, when their forecasts were simple extrapolations. ...

We shouldn't blame these people for not seeing the boom coming. Nobody did. But those economists who say today that the real estate boom has been justified by "fundamentals" have to explain why they weren't able to forecast the high home prices we have today based on those fundamentals.

With the failure of anyone really to predict today's high home prices, one may well conclude that no one can predict ... the housing market... That may be the right conclusion...

On the other hand, there is another perspective on this colossal failure to predict. Maybe it doesn't mean that no one can forecast, but instead that the high home prices today are just an enormous anomaly that will have to correct downward sometime, if not right away.

This has been the biggest housing boom in world history, and when one looks at a long-term chart of U.S. home prices, this boom stands out among the other price increases like the highest kite in the park. It certainly looks anomalous, and maybe it is. Moreover, home-price booms, and sometimes at least real estate busts, seem awfully persistent lately, so that it looks like we should be able to forecast them. ...

Some short-run indicators have been interpreted as showing that the recent weakness in the housing market may be correcting upward. ... But the increase may be attributable in large part to unseasonably warm weather and sales incentives. ... The futures market still predicts home price declines in all traded cities over the next year, though modestly lower declines than in the recent past. ...

The fact that home prices have risen so high relative to construction costs and other indicators suggests that home prices might fall back substantially in some markets -- and maybe that is what is going on. But one can hardly be sure about whether and when it will happen. ...

We are left with a deeply uncertain situation, but one in which it would seem that a sequence of price declines continuing for many years has some substantial probability of happening. Traditional finance theory has trouble reconciling even a semi-predictable sequence of price declines with basic notions of market efficiency. The situation we are facing is a reminder of the glaring inefficiencies and incompleteness of existing markets for residential real estate, and may be regarded as evidence that institutional changes will be coming in future years to fundamentally change the nature of these markets.



Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : Robert Shiller
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Jeudi 5 avril 2007 4 05 /04 /2007 16:29


L'evolution des prix de l'immobilier aux E.-U. (de 1890 - present) comme si vous y etiez....(attachez vos ceintures...)






                   











Merci a Immobilienblasen et speculativebubble...





Par Pancho Villa - Publié dans : Robert Shiller
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